THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
OF
PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

VOLUME XXI JULY 1940 PART 3

ORIGINAL PAPERS

SOME REFLECTIONS ON PSYCHO-DYNAMICS

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A Clinical Case

For the better understanding of what will follow, I believe it would be useful to have in mind a case to which I can refer back as an example.

A woman in her early thirties came to be treated for severe agoraphobia and claustrophobia. Her symptoms had started five years before, shortly after her marriage. She had gradually limited her activities to an ever decreasing minimum. Finally she had reached a state in which she could not go alone in the street, and had always to be accompanied by another woman. Even then, she could not go on a bus or any other vehicle from which she was not able to get out instantly when she wanted to do so. At home, she could not stand being left alone, and when she was with people, the door of the room had to remain open, lest she might be locked in. Her movements were greatly restricted. She felt forced to walk very slowly, and in a rather stiff manner. She could not lie down in a horizontal position, and had to sleep half-seated in bed, as she believed that if she lay down her stomach would touch her heart; when this 'happened', she would develop an anxiety attack, with palpitations and tachycardia. Walking briskly would produce similar effects. The first time I saw her in one of these attacks the pulse was in the neighbourhood of 150 a minute.

She was afraid of being alone with her husband, and always needed the presence of another woman near her. It will be easily understood when I say that her symptoms had reduced her to a state of almost complete invalidity.

My purpose in presenting this case here is not to enter into details regarding the interesting and sometimes very complicated phantasies

underlying her symptoms. I shall focus only one aspect of it, namely, how certain id-impulses were seeking for expression, how they were fought by the forces of the ego and super-ego, and how the interplay of these opposing parties gave birth to the symptoms. As I am interested at the moment in only one problem, namely, the interplay of opposing forces in the mind, I shall refer as little as possible to the *content* of the various impulses and phantasies. I shall concentrate my attention on the course and direction of the streams, rather than on the waters they carry.

It soon became evident that the patient had a great deal of oral craving. Meal times represented very important moments in her life. The food had to be served exactly in time : she would develop an anxiety attack when she was kept waiting for a few minutes. On the other hand, she needed to have food within reach, in case she felt the wish to eat ; for that reason she always carried some biscuits with her. As soon as she encountered the slightest difficulty, fear or frustration, she would immediately proceed to eat a piece of biscuit. In fact, she seemed to feel like a devouring beast which needed careful handling, lest it might get loose and do incalculable harm. The difficulty was, on the one hand, to keep this dangerous animal satisfied, and to prevent it from being destructive, on the other. Soon everything pointed to the fact that the oral desires were mainly concentrated on the penis, as a substitute for the breast. She sensed, unconsciously, that she wanted to suck the penis, to get food from it, and to bite it off and swallow it in order to have it continuously feeding her from inside, thus avoiding even a momentary parting from it. For this reason she felt exceedingly dangerous to any man who came near her, for he might find himself deprived of his penis before he had time to realize what was happening. If she went alone in the street, all men passing her by would be quickly castrated. Hence her need to be accompanied by a woman. By this means, she would prevent herself from giving satisfaction to her aggressive, greedy impulses, and, at the same time, would feel protected against any retaliation from imaginary attacked men.

In spite of all these precautions, she felt as if she had actually swallowed a penis, which filled her inside. Her bodily rigidity served the purpose of not enraging it, since otherwise it would attack and bite her.

From this description we can already form an idea of the situation. The patient felt the urge of very strong oral desires directed towards

the penis. In order to prevent satisfaction of these desires, a strong super-ego commanded the ego to take defensive measures. As a consequence, the oral impulses had to accommodate themselves to finding satisfaction by means other than the ones originally sought. The symptomatology represented partly the defensive measures taken by the ego and partly the substitutive satisfaction of the id-impulses. For instance, her not being able to go alone in the street served the purpose of warding off any possibility of gratification of wishes towards the penis. But, at the same time, going out with a woman was, to a certain extent, a satisfaction of the same wishes, obtained by replacing the penis, the object of her desires, by a breast.[1] Similarly, eating biscuits furnished direct oral pleasure, and was, at the same time, a symbolic introjection of a good, protective penis, and, ultimately, of the breast.

It goes without saying that these arrangements only formed the final stage of a complicated evolution. Before wanting the penis, the patient had, naturally, been attached to the breast. As, for various reasons, guilt was aroused by these desires, she turned towards the penis. In the process of displacement, the choice of object, the penis, was, in the course of later development, facilitated and strengthened by the genital impulses. After some time of analysis we were able to differentiate another important reason for her inability to go out unaccompanied. She felt that, if she were left alone in the street, she would give herself in intercourse to any man who asked her ; ' going in the street ' thus meant being a ' girl of the street ', a prostitute. By intercourse she would, at least momentarily, have a penis, the so much desired source of both oral and genital gratification.

Let us now weigh against each other the frustrations imposed on, and the gratifications allowed to, her oral and genital impulses.

Frustrations : There was complete prevention of any act which might symbolically mean an appropriation of the penis, thus avoiding oral or genital satisfaction coming from that organ. It is important to note here that, as a result of displacement, her oral cravings were mainly directed towards the penis ; any interference along that line of satisfaction brought about, consequently, both oral and genital frustrations : not being able to go alone in the street, or to stand being

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[1] Although it was only an imaginary one, as in actual reality she did not have the breast, having a woman near her provided some appeasement of these desires.

left alone in the company of men, being generally helpless, in order to prevent herself from carrying out her robbing wishes against the penis. Finally, there was her almost complete inability to have sexual intercourse, due to the anxiety concerned with it, and to a strong vaginism.

Gratifications: These were mainly obtained by regression to primitive phases of development: immediate satisfaction of any desire to eat, meals at punctual times, eating a biscuit whenever she encountered a frustration of any kind; good relationship with women, who provided her with everything she needed, and generally waited upon her.

A comparison of the two groups would show that, although many normal adult desires were denied gratification, there were present, in exchange, a good number of pleasures of a regressive type. The forbidden impulses had managed to find roundabout methods of obtaining release. The energy expressed in them had not disappeared, only it had sought other means of discharge. The difference between the patient and a normal person consisted mainly in the type of discharge the impulses were allowed.

Psycho-dynamic System

From these considerations we now arrive at the notion of what I propose to call the *psycho-dynamic system*. I use the word 'psycho-dynamic' to differentiate it from the term 'psychic system' which has been used in analytical literature to mean something which is not quite the same.

We find in the physical world that to utilize the energy of a system in order to obtain work we need differences of potential. One part of the system needs a higher potential than the other, and the changes of energy consist of a fall of energy from the part where higher potential exists to the part with lower potential. To quote a few examples: we can obtain work from a fall of water, from a gas which moves from higher pressure to lower pressure, or, in the steam engine, from heat which moves towards cold.

Now let us consider how things happen in the mind. The energy of the id-impulses represents the higher tension, or higher potential. As in the physical systems, it has a natural tendency to fall into a lower potential, or—to use the classical expression—the energic tension of the instincts has a natural tendency to be discharged. If the gratification or satisfaction can be obtained immediately and directly, the mental activity is either nil or reduced to a minimum. But in this process of discharge towards satisfaction, or diminution of tension,

the id energy often finds obstacles in its way. These obstacles can be grouped into two categories :—

(*a*) The external obstacles.
(*b*) The internal obstacles.

The internal obstacles are represented by the forces of ego and super-ego, barring the id-impulses their way to direct gratification. These have consequently to find tortuous ways to achieve diminution of tension. The path from higher to lower potential is thus lengthened and complicated, and the activities that the id-impulses have to develop before they obtain satisfaction represent, in a way, the whole of human activities. The resultant of the impulses seeking satisfaction on the one hand, and the ego commanded by the super-ego barring the way on the other, is what we call ' defence mechanism '.

If we consider defence mechanisms from this angle, some light can be thrown upon one of the functions they fulfil in the psychic organization. To revert for a moment to our comparison with the physical world, which, being simpler, helps us to keep some guiding threads in our hand, we can say that in the physical world work is obtained by a fall of energy from a higher to a lower potential only if an obstacle is in the way : in the case of a waterfall by interposing a hydraulic wheel, by means of a steam engine, if I am dealing with heat moving towards cold.

In a similar way, in the mind we have, at one extreme, the id-impulses, and, at the other, their satisfaction. The ego, directed by the super-ego, puts some obstacles in their way. The impulses passing through those obstacles provoke the so-called defence mechanisms. Thanks to this arrangement the ego can utilize the energy of the id-impulses in activities of all kinds (wishes, desires, feelings, actions) which would not have been developed had the impulses been allowed to find direct gratification.

Thus, from the energic point of view, it can be said that defence mechanisms represent the utilization mechanisms for the id energy—the heat engine of the mind.

A psycho-dynamic system would thus be constituted by one or more id-impulses and the defence mechanisms by means of which those impulses achieve discharge or satisfaction.

The Function of the Mechanisms of Defence

From a statistical point of view, it can be affirmed that more or less clear signs of the existence of defensive systems are to be found

in everyone. Thus, it seems that it could hardly be maintained that ' defence ' is a pathological phenomenon. Statistics, however, would not furnish, in this case, an ultimate criterion, if there were no other evidence pointing in the same direction.

Human beings often experience impulses that tend to be discharged by means of a substitute for the specific satisfaction originally or naturally demanded. This is usually reached by displacement, or the choice of a symbolic object. Such is the case with a good many of the pregenital impulses, such as the cannibalistic, coprophagic, scopophilic or exhibitionistic ones [2]; the same could be said of bisexual impulses. On looking more closely into this problem, we come to realize that these impulses could not, in adult life, be discharged otherwise, without useless, and often harmful, activity. To put it bluntly, the advantages of psychically introjecting the parents over actually eating them, of being an actor over being a mere exhibitionist, are quite evident. It appears, therefore, that the process of development leads naturally to a displacement from the original to symbolic objects. We could even go a step further and say that, after the phase of direct gratification has passed, only a symbolic one is capable of relieving tension. This can be explained in terms of a controlling super-ego, serving the purposes of a deep biological tendency to make use of what would otherwise be useless or harmful.

Another explanation could be added to reinforce the argument. There comes a time in development when certain impulses are not properly discharged if given the specific or direct satisfaction originally sought. This would be conditioned, apart from super-ego reasons, by a change in the impulses themselves: by a curious twist in their nature, they no longer want their primitive objects.[3] In such a way,

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[2] It might be observed that some primitive people have cannibalistic, coprophagic and other like habits. As far as I know, these are usually of a ritual kind, and, irrespective of the great significance they may have, I very greatly doubt whether they provide more than an occasional outlet for the corresponding impulses. The bulk of these have to be discharged by other means.

[3] This would contribute to explain, together with other reasons (super-ego guilt, etc.), the paradoxical fact that perverts are left with an obscure, conscious or more or less unconscious, sense of frustration after indulging in the perverse act. This usually furnishes a direct gratification by means of the primitive object, or a thinly disguised one, and it turns out in the end that what they seek is not really what they want.

a state of internal tension is created which can be put to good use, as we shall consider later on.

There is a group of id-impulses that, ideally speaking, can never find completely adequate satisfaction, on account of the individual's lack of the proper organs necessary to provide it. I am referring to the bisexual impulses. Consequently, these are always forced to find a diverted means of discharge. The diverted means of discharge, both in the bisexual and in the pregenital impulses described above, are provided by the defence mechanisms ; thanks to these, the possibilities of satisfaction are diversified and increased. It is usually said that the ego exerts the defensive function as a protection against the onslaught of instinctual drives. But it is equally true to affirm that instinctual drives are discharged by the defensive arrangements, sometimes by one, more often by a combination of several of them. A dam represents a protection against flood, but is also useful for purposes of irrigation. Similarly, the defence mechanisms fulfil a function of utilization of id-energy, both for internal and external activities.

It is probably not an exaggeration to say that human beings, or animals for that matter, are interested only in what concerns them directly or indirectly. Whatever the activity undertaken, it always represents a precipitating point for one or many impulses. Everything we come into contact with is spontaneously used as a playground for our instincts. By devising systems of defence mechanisms, human beings have been able to enlarge their range of interest, thus permitting the activities of civilization to develop.[4] In this process, not only sublimation, but all the other mechanisms described have played a part. Together they represent, as it were, a system of irrigation which makes it possible for the individual to cathect more or less energy, when needed at a certain given point.

The advantages of this arrangement are obvious. But there are disadvantages also. By an exaggerated cathexis, the ego-function of

[4] Animals appear to have the capacity for ' defence ', but only in a rudimentary state, in comparison to humans. I once observed a clear example of displacement in a young fox terrier. He had to suffer ceaseless teasing from a young boy of the house, with whom he was otherwise on friendly terms. On one occasion when he could not stand this teasing any longer, he jumped on a chair, became very menacing and showed his teeth. The boy did not stop the teasing, though. Faced by the conflict of ambivalence, the dog found an unexpected solution : he began furiously to bite the chair, while still looking at the child with blood-shot eyes.

adaptation to reality can be disturbed when, for instance, a violent projection makes a friend appear as an enemy.

The difference between a normal and a neurotic individual lies, not in the absence of the defensive system, but in its mode of functioning. On account of his imperfect methods of utilization of id-energy, which we will consider later on, the neurotic has to cling to defensive reactions, even when these are not adequate; the result is a stiff and stereotyped functioning of the system. Whereas the normal person is able to achieve a smooth and plastic working of it. Thanks to a fundamentally satisfactory system of drainage, he employs his energy freely; to give an example, when intellectual creative work is concerned, he will 'let himself go' during the phase of development of a new idea, and, on the contrary, be subtle and precise, and weigh the meaning of every word in an almost obsessive manner, when the moment comes to put these ideas into words. The same could be said of any function pertaining to our relations with the external world. We cannot avoid seeing the world through the mesh of our instinct. '*Todo es según el color del cristal con que se mira*',[5] as the Spanish verse goes. We cannot ever escape having our eyes coloured by our past and by our emotions and impulses. What the normal person can do, and the neurotic often cannot, is to withdraw energy from an object when it becomes hyper-cathected. His sense of reality is sufficiently developed to enable him to become aware of a projection or any other defence mechanism, when it begins to impair his judgement, and subsequently to abandon it. By this capacity for alternating cathexis and withdrawal of cathexis, he provides himself, as it were, with two angles of observation of a given object, and is thus able to form a better idea of it, to separate it from his own emotions. For the neurotic, on the contrary, a moment may come when the intensity of the cathexes is such that the external object becomes a mere pretext for an impulse or wish to express itself. The real qualities of the object will thus be drowned or suffocated by the attributed ones.

Let us now consider the working of psycho-dynamic systems in the case of the patient already mentioned. She wanted the penis for oral libidinal gratification, for genital pleasure, and as a source of food; finally, she wanted to possess a penis. All these impulses exist normally. The last two cannot, for obvious reasons, ever attain

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[5] Campoamor. ('Everything is in accordance with the colour of the glass through which one looks.')

gratification in reality. The normal woman gives them adequate discharge by means of various psycho-dynamic systems. To mention a few: sexual intercourse can symbolize feeding, introjection results in the mental possession of a penis, identification could serve the same purpose; dresses, hats, frocks, etc., provide innumerable opportunities for the symbolic satisfaction of this wish; finally, the same could be said of an emotional relationship to a man. By these, and various other mechanisms, all impulses incapable of achieving the original specific satisfaction are canalized into numerous activities that give them substitutive gratification. The more easily a woman can use these various methods, the more satisfaction she will obtain, and the more spread this satisfaction will be over many territories of her everyday life. By means of this fine division of an impulse into many small manifestations of it,[6] she will gain many advantages. Apart from achieving, on the whole, a more substantial satisfaction, she will be better able to stand frustration of one or more of the small gratifications, as there will be many others left. And, most important in the case of her desire to have a penis, she will be able to blend and combine this desire more finely with the specific feminine impulses, in this way achieving a better synthesis. Thus we can often detect this desire as a component of many coquettish actions that represent typical feminine manifestations.

Our patient did not allow herself any of these normal outlets, on account of a strong super-ego, and, possibly, because of the intensity of her impulses. She had, therefore, to find other methods of discharge, which were, in her case, provided mainly by regression. Her oral desires towards the penis were dealt with by regressing to the attachment to the breast, and to all sources of food as phantasy substitutes for it: amongst other peculiarities already mentioned, she had a compulsion to eat grapes and oranges, and drink orange juice, which was clearly a substitute for urine. By these mechanisms, impulses which had already achieved the important stage of development in which they were contented with substitutive gratification, were made to regress to the stage of direct gratification.

Her possessive desires towards the penis were also dealt with mainly by regression. Instead of allowing herself to be all-possessive of men,

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[6] Edward Glover was the first, to my knowledge, to put forward a similar idea in relation to the obsessional neurosis: 'A Developmental Study of the Obsessional Neurosis', this JOURNAL, Vol. XVI, 1935, p. 131.

in order thus to have a penis, she became all-possessive of women. The omnipotent powers of the penis for obtaining everything she could desire (the magic wand) were transferred to her maid, who actually did everything she wanted. Finally, her genital passive tendencies found satisfaction in being generally waited upon. Particularly important in this respect was the fact that her meals were prepared for her, and almost put inside her mouth.

Thus we may conclude that the id-impulses had managed to find means of satisfaction which were allowed by the super-ego. Both id and super-ego suffered, comparatively speaking, from no undue tension. But the ego was submitted, instead, to innumerable frustrations and curtailments of its activities. When a person is normal, the existing psycho-dynamic systems provide adequate means of satisfaction for the three institutions of the mind. Not only the state of tension created in the id will smoothly find its way to discharge, but the channels for discharge will be satisfactory for ego and super-ego.[7] In theory, it seems possible that abnormal systems may exist in which this happens ; I believe that some perverts *approach* this state of affairs, though perhaps never completely reach it. In actual practice, it is far more common to find the abnormal person suffering from frustration. The favourite site for this seems to be the ego. Although I am not quite convinced that there is enough evidence categorically to affirm it, at least many facts tend to show *that the id and the super-ego always find discharge of their tension, even if this necessitates the complete wreckage of the ego.*[8] I believe many a psychotic structure could be explained

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[7] I am indebted to Dr. Adrian Stephen for this remark. It is here that the comparison with a physical system is no longer useful.

[8] At first sight it would appear difficult to reconcile this view with the existence of repression, whose purpose is to prevent the satisfaction of id-impulses. But a moment's reflection will show that the contradiction is more apparent than real. On the one hand, repression is often coupled with other defence mechanisms, which allow ' the return of the repressed.' On the other hand, when this does not happen, as would be the case with not very strong impulses, the ego has to mobilize forces to keep continuously opposing the impulse in question, and it is by this means that this can obtain satisfaction, by turning into its own opposite. Every repression is paid for, at least with a certain rigidity and the avoidance of dangerous stimulus, which price represents, in a sense, the inverted satisfaction of the repressed impulse. The concept ' satisfaction of an impulse ' is a relative one. External circumstances can affect its meaning

along these lines : it looks as if the id-impulses, in their recklessness to find satisfaction, force the ego to accept, as ego-syntonic, activities which entail the destruction of functions such as reality control, harmonizing, etc., for the fulfilment of which the ego exists.

Very often, though, the ego agrees to a curtailment of some of its activities, as was the case in our patient, and thus reaches a state of understanding and comparative peace with the id and super-ego. Thanks to these agreed restrictions, psycho-dynamic systems are devised, neurotic or perverse, which function smoothly and provide adequate discharge. But at certain moments situations may arise in which the id-energy cannot empty itself in its totality through the systems of defence mechanisms, either normal, perverse or neurotic. To put it in other words—a state of hypertension is created in the id. The surplus of id-energy which, for the time being, cannot find its way to satisfaction, produces, as it were, a flood in the psychic system, and consequently tries to find its way to discharge or equalization of potential by various means. Strong affective states (depression, anger, etc.), muscular movements, epileptic fits, and outbursts of anxiety seem to be the more commonly chosen.[9] The last mentioned is a frequent occurrence in neurotics, and, maybe, forms one of the characteristics of the state of being neurotic—so much so that it has even been said that the object of psycho-analytic treatment is relieving anxiety. In the case I have mentioned, the patient had not been able satisfactorily to dispose of the total amount of her desires by means of substitutes for normal activities. Her symptoms dealt very imperfectly with these desires, and, as soon as a further slight stimulus increased them, she would develop anxiety.

Considering the importance of anxiety, we will return to this problem later on, but let us study for the moment the problem of psycho-dynamic systems in relation to treatment. From what has already been said one can conclude when a person is ill—

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to such an extent that the same impulse will be, at different times, discharged by different amounts of actual gratification. Take, for instance, the desire to accumulate wealth. One can well imagine that the same person, having the same desire, will, in a communist society, content himself with quite different results from what he would expect in a capitalistic one. The same considerations can be applied to an impulse under the strain of repression.

[9] As will be seen, I am referring to impulses for which no *organized* discharge is provided.

(*a*) that his systems of defence mechanisms are not satisfactory qualitatively and lead to neurotic or perverse activities,

(*b*) that, from a quantitative point of view, they are not sufficient to deal with the amount of psychic energy present in the individual.

In the course of the treatment we aim at creating better arrangements, by diverting the psychic energy from the existing channels to invest it in more satisfactory ones. Now, I believe that if we consider the energic side of the process, we could gain more knowledge regarding the practical possibilities of improving the patient.

Changing of System

Let us consider the first case—namely, when a system of defence mechanisms is not satisfactory because it leads either to neurotic or perverse activity. Usually a person who suffers from neurosis fulfils conditions (*a*) and (*b*), but for the sake of argument let us assume that (*b*) is not present, that is to say, that this system, although leading to neurotic activity, is sufficient and satisfactory, from the energic point of view, for discharges of tension in the psyche. Such a system will be naturally stable, and will resist every attempt we make at modifying it.

Something similar could be said of normal structure and perverse structure. If we wish to alter the channels by which the id-energy is being emptied—or in other words, if we wish to alter a certain given system of defence mechanisms, we have only one method at our disposal. This method, similar to the ones we employ in the physical world, consists in *creating differences of psychic potential which will, as it were, attract or suck the id-energy into other channels.*[10]

If I want to destroy a stable chemical combination, I must either

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[10] I want to draw the reader's attention to the fact that this paper is not an attempt to make a comprehensive description of all that happens as a result of analysis. I do not maintain for a moment that psycho-analytic treatment could be considered as equivalent to a ' changing of psycho-dynamic systems '. There are numerous other aspects, such as changes in the id-impulses, changes in ego and super-ego, psychic immunity, etc., which, though closely related to this subject, would not receive a fair consideration if they were looked at only from this angle. The most comprehensive theory of analytic cure ever attempted, to my knowledge, is the one developed by E. Bibring in his contribution to the Marienbad symposium ' On the Theory of the Therapeutic Results of Psycho-Analysis ', this Journal, Vol. XVIII, 1937.

render it unstable, by heating for instance, or bring it into contact with a substance whose affinity with one of the elements of the combination is greater than the affinity of the other element. This added substance will attract one of the elements into itself, and thus break the combination.

Similarly in the mind, by creating differences of potential we facilitate rearrangements in the energic systems. We can recall in this respect that such psychic systems are always chosen as represent, from the dynamic point of view, the easiest solution. Stability is only a relative property in the defence mechanism. It can be broken whenever a change occurs in any of the elements which play a part in the constitution of the system—that is to say,

(*a*) when the amount of id-energy increases, and thus the system becomes insufficient to provide for its discharge,

(*b*) when the difficulty put in the way to discharge increases, and consequently the energy will not be able to pass through.

The result in both cases will be the arousing of anxiety, which from this point of view represents a sign of incomplete discharge.

A consideration of certain observed facts leads one to the conclusion that changes in the systems of defence mechanisms along the lines just described also occur in human life outside analytic treatment. Any stimulus capable of shattering the mind with a certain violence creates favourable circumstances for a re-arrangement of forces.

I shall briefly mention two examples that seem of peculiar interest. The first is the case of suicidal attempts. There would appear to be certain types of persons who change considerably after a suicidal attempt, if the circumstances immediately following that attempt are favourable. The second case is that of shock treatment in schizophrenia. It would appear as if in both instances the psychic energies were, so to say, set loose, and ready to choose new paths for discharge. In these circumstances, the individual seems to be able more easily to develop normal modes of living.

I have an impression that a similar state of affairs exists at the beginning of psycho-analytic treatment. The novelty of the procedure, the circumstances which led the person to analysis, and probably various other factors, act, so to speak, by bombarding and shattering at least a certain part of the defensive systems. Interpretation achieves the rest, and perhaps this explains partly the well-known fact that improvement occurs in a great number of cases during the first three or four months of analysis.

We can say that all energy which is not very firmly attached to a system can easily be diverted or shunted into other arrangements by means of interpretation. But there are other psychic structures which are not so easily modified, and which have to be slowly dislodged into the new energic system of the transference neurosis, from which they will be gradually given back to the ego for new utilization. Let us consider for a moment, from the energic point of view, how the transference neurosis can be established. Again we can say here that it represents an easier and safer way of discharge.

For the sake of simplicity we can choose one particular example of transference neurosis, namely, when a conflict which was latent is being reactivated by means of the transference. If we follow Strachey's [11] explanation of the way in which the cure is being effected, we can say that an impulse which could not be expressed freely because the forces of repression kept it completely crushed has in the transference the chance to come to the fore. If we apply this to the energic systems we have described, we can say that the difficulties put in the way of discharge are diminished by the fact that, on account of the analyst's auxiliary super-ego, the patient's super-ego bars the way a little less than before. By this means a channel for easier discharge has been provided. Thanks to this arrangement we enable the patient to retrace step by step the path chosen by the rejected impulse in the course of its development, and thus re-live the past.

In the course of this process of changing id-energy from one system to another we have to consider various factors. We have said that in order to change a psychic system which, by assumption, is stable, it is first necessary to render it unstable ; we have then to offer another system into which the id-energy will couple itself. In practice we cannot do the one without at the same time doing the other. This is similar to what happens in the physical world.

To take an example from chemistry. If I want to oxidize a substance, I need to bring this substance into contact with another substance which will provide the oxygen, and, in so doing, will be deprived of it itself—that is to say, will be reduced ; in nature there is never an oxidation without at the same time a reduction : there is always an oxido-reduction.

Similarly in the mind, the energy which abandons one system must

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[11] ' The Nature of the Therapeutic Action of Psycho-Analysis ', this JOURNAL, Vol. XV, 1934.

automatically go into another system. It seems, nevertheless, that there are moments in the analysis when the conditions are non-existent for the energy of an impulse to change from one system to another. Either the patient clings to his old system because it represents an easier and safer way of discharge, or he finds no other alternative system. In either case one gets the impression that the progress of the treatment has been arrested, and the neurotic symptoms are repeated over and over again. It would be as though the shunted circuit offered for new utilization of energy were not functioning. This lack of the dynamic conditions that make the change possible is sometimes misinterpreted as repetition compulsion or working through, which are altogether different phenomena. I believe this occurs frequently in the treatment of many a rebellious symptom, and to a certain extent in every analysis.

Perhaps it would be useful to illustrate what I mean when I speak of ' lack of dynamic conditions '. I shall choose two examples. The first is the classical one of the analysis of a phobia. It is generally accepted that after some time of analysis, when the various meanings of a phobia have become evident, the patient must be encouraged and stimulated not to give in to it, but gradually to perform the avoided action. In the case of the patient mentioned, after we had seen the meanings of her not being able to walk alone, she was encouraged to do so. This meant for her mainly a defiance of a prohibiting super-ego, and consequently aroused anxiety. But at the same time it created the best conditions for an alteration of the super-ego by means of the analysis, as she had to find new methods of dealing with an unpleasant situation. If she had made no efforts to go against her phobia, there would have been no urgency to alter the existing arrangements. There are cases when the hope of changing a symptom by a mere elucidation of its various meanings appears like an attempt to change the course of Niagara Falls by talking to it.

The second example where this point is clearly seen is that of inhibition in working. A good deal of research has been made into the meanings of this symptom. Probably there is still more to do in this respect, but, nevertheless, it would appear that we do know the essential processes at stake. Now, it is possible gradually to reconstitute during the treatment the origin and formation of this neurotic structure. Its various elements will come sooner or later into the transference situation, thus enabling the analyst to interpret them in relation to himself. But the symptom will not disappear if the patient does not

make deliberate efforts against it, for the very simple reason that it usually represents a comfortable solution (in spite of its harmful effects) of one or several conflicts: whenever these conflicts are aroused the easy way will be chosen. By acting against the inhibition we bar the way to this solution, thus creating anxiety, which, this time, will be dealt with by other methods (interpretation, etc.).

I have chosen, for the sake of clarity, two examples in which the changes of energy from one system to another are effected by voluntarily blocking the existing system; consequently, the ego is gradually forced to devise new arrangements for discharging this energy. Naturally, this is not the only means of changing the course of id-energy. The opposite method is the one used in other cases: namely, 'unbarring' the normal way of gratification, which had been stopped by a strong super-ego. This 'unbarring' is effected by the analyst's attitude, by interpretation, and also by all methods that result in the introjection of a benign super-ego, as described by Strachey.[12] There is, finally, a third possibility: when the energy goes easily from one system to another because the alternative offered in the treatment furnishes a far better path for discharge of impulses. This is often provided by means of interpretation. Perhaps this third method is the most important although the less obvious. There are not many times in analysis when we resort to the first method, more perhaps when we use the second. But the innumerable and various ways in which analysis enables the patient to improve are often due to the finding of better methods for using energies, which is not necessarily connected with diminution of the severity of the super-ego. From this angle, analysis touches education.

Upon reflection, it will be seen that the three methods described are fundamentally alike in so far as they effect changes in the discharges of id-energy by creating such conditions as result in an alteration of the relations between id, ego and super-ego. The differences are rather of an external or tactical nature.

Anxiety

It may happen that the alternative system for discharge is not able to dispose of the entire amount of energy. In that case the surplus will have to be utilized in one way or another. As a rule it will change into anxiety. In this light, an attack of anxiety would only be the discharge of an amount of energy for the employment of

[12] *Op. cit.*

which we have not offered a satisfactory alternative, and which has, in consequence, chosen the path of the neuro-vegetative system. From this angle anxiety would be similar to the surplus of energy of chemical reactions which is changed into heat. Anxiety would be the heat of the mind.

But just as we can say that anxiety is aroused when the new method of utilization of id-energy cannot dispose of the total energy with which we are dealing at the moment, we can also say the opposite. That is, in order to dislodge id-energy from a certain defence mechanism arrangement, we have first to make it unsatisfactory and unstable ; and this instability will be shown by the appearance of anxiety. Hence the tremendous importance of anxiety in analytic treatment, and the relative truth of the statement that in the course of treatment what we do is to relieve anxiety. When we succeed in arriving at a situation in which a certain amount of anxiety is present, we can say that we are in the most favourable circumstances to obtain changes in the energic system. This, of course, is very well known, and has been expressed in relation to the development of the child by saying that anxiety is a stimulus in its development ; being the sign of hypertension, its presence means that the circumstances are favourable for the mind to create new roads of discharge, that is, to create new systems of defence mechanisms.

Here again, the question of degree is very important. There exists an optimum point of anxiety in which the circumstances are most favourable for the possibility of finding a new system. Below this optimum—that is, in a system where anxiety is present in small quantities—the system will be relatively stable. If, on the other hand, great quantities of anxiety are present, the mind will have to resort to emergency methods of dealing with it ; these are unsatisfactory both from the point of view of stability and of utilization of id-energy. These considerations can be applied alike to the development of the child, and to the analytic treatment, in which—to paraphrase Strachey —the fact of being analysed throws the patient again into the melting pot of psychic development.

It is important from this point of view to keep an eye on the amount of anxiety present—when it is too much, to relieve it and to arouse it deliberately, when it is too little, as is often the case in some obsessive structures which, alas ! deal so over-efficiently with the patient's difficulties.

Let us now consider another problem. Supposing we have suc-

ceeded in dislodging momentarily a certain amount of id-energy from the neurotic system of defence mechanisms, by means of a transference interpretation. We speak as a rule of release of id-energy by means of transference interpretation, but we must ask : ' What happens to these released id-energies ? '

A first approach to this problem could be made along the lines I have just been describing. We could say that this released id-energy goes into another system. There are two possibilities in this case. One is that this change of energy from one system to another will lead to a new system of utilization, which will be stable ; that is to say, the change of system will be an irreversible one, and we shall have obtained a permanent gain in the progress of the treatment. The other alternative is that we have only succeeded in effecting a reversible change : when similar circumstances of tension occur later on, the id-energy will not choose the newly created path, but will go along the old ways of discharge.

Acting Out and Working Through

We have just spoken of reversible changes, of a certain amount of id-energy abandoning an old system of defence mechanisms to pass on to a new one, and subsequently reverting to the old system. This phenomenon of swing, or pendulum, is very common during analysis. It seems that the mind is reluctant to abandon a system which has been tried and tested. In spite of its insufficiency, it has at least one advantage—the safety of that which is already known.

The changes have to be very gradual, so that the ego can remain in control of a situation which is moving all the time. I have the impression that, from the energic point of view, acting out and working through fulfil the function of allowing the ego to get to know gradually the nature, intensity, danger and possibilities of an impulse that is being moved from one system to another. Acting out and working through would, looked at from this angle, be an attempt to know a certain impulse all round, to avoid a one-surface grasp, like a photographic image. This knowledge would enable the ego gradually to build a new and more satisfactory system of defence mechanisms.

There is another angle of approach to the understanding, in energic terms, of this question of acting out and working through. As we all know, the various successive experiences of past life have played a part in the gradual development of the systems of defence mechanisms in each individual. The systems slowly evolve in the course of time.

In this evolution there are some important moments which play a preponderant part in the constitution of a certain given system ; there are also periods of repeated stimulation, which contribute to push the discharge of psychic energies along certain lines. Each particular moment, each particular experience, although not sufficiently important to appear separate from the rest, has yet canalized a certain amount, no matter how small, of the stream of psychic energy along the system.

In this respect we could consider each experience of acting out and working through as the withdrawal from the pathological system of a little bit of the energy which was vested in it during its development. Energies which went into it at different moments abandon it also at different moments. Perhaps this fact constitutes one of the most essential differences between a physical and a psychic system ; while the past does not matter for the physical system—as it is usually expressed, a physical system has no past—for a psychic system it is all important to know the road it has followed in order to be what it is.

Making Conscious

Up to now I have been considering psychic systems, and changes of energy ; the antithesis conscious-unconscious has hardly appeared. I have been referring to impulses ; impulses as such, as Freud has clearly pointed out, cannot be made conscious, nor, in a way, can they be described as unconscious. They are, as it were, outside the notion conscious-unconscious. One can become conscious of having an impulse, as one can become conscious of having a liver. But to say that a psychic impulse becomes conscious implies an absurdity just as great as to say, for instance, that one's liver becomes conscious.

All this is very clear, and universally accepted, but when we begin to discuss the thorny subject of interpretation, we do not find it so easy to remain well orientated, and often we speak, as we say, ' for the sake of simplicity ', of impulses becoming conscious.

In this paper I am studying only changes of energy in the mind ; from this point of view I will now consider the changes brought about by interpretation ; but in studying the energics of interpretation I cannot help touching on the subject conscious-unconscious.

My feeling is that we should greatly gain if, when we speak of interpretation, we keep sharply separate, on the one hand the changes of energy in the psychic system which are brought about by it, and on the other hand, the registration of these changes in the patient's conscious mind.

This is connected with a twofold function of the ego in regard to repression. As Freud wrote in *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* :— ' Just as the ego controls the path to action in regard to the outer world, so it controls access to consciousness. In repression it displays its power in both directions, acting in the one manner upon the instinctual impulse itself and in the other upon the psychical representative of that impulse.' [13]

With this in mind, we have a guiding thread for the study of the dynamics of interpretation.

The patient comes to analysis to be cured of his symptoms, not to know himself ; thus we can say that our task is essentially not to illuminate him as to the meaning of his mental activities, but to help him to overcome his emotional difficulties. Nevertheless, it is a very well-known fact that at the end of a successful analysis the patient has a good deal of intellectual knowledge about his mental life. I believe that the amount of conscious understanding needed to effect the cure has been over-emphasized ; on the other hand, we have to admit that a certain amount of intellectual knowledge about the workings of the mind is necessary for the patient to get better.

Here we come across a problem which has never been very clearly solved. To take one example—we say that sometimes a patient can have an intellectual understanding of the meaning of a certain particular symptom, and yet this symptom remains unchanged. In the process of analysis a moment comes when the patient sees the already known meaning in a new light, and his intellectual understanding becomes—as it has been said—' emotional or real understanding ' ; the patient has a feeling of relief and, consequently, the symptom diminishes, or disappears. But, somehow, this description, although it conveys what happens quite distinctly to a person who has had the experience, is not satisfactory to the intellect. Freud has made in this respect a sort of anatomical comparison by saying that at the moment when the ' real understanding ' occurs, we establish some links between two separate parts of the mind—one where the unconscious impulse was located, and the other where the knowledge of this impulse was stored.

What I have described represents one group of facts about which we do not seem to be clear. This group of facts tends to show that there is not an exact parallel between becoming conscious and being

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[13] *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*, 1936, p. 28.

cured ; the same has been expressed by saying that the object of the treatment is not to make the unconscious conscious, but to lift the repressions of the unwanted impulses.

But again this statement is not completely satisfactory, and is apparently contradicted by other statements. We are told that the ideal situation in analysis is obtained when we succeed in persuading the patient not to act his difficulties out, but to express them in the analytic session, until gradually all the unconscious phantasies are made conscious and expressed in words. On the one hand we seem to imply that making conscious is not so essential, but on the other hand, when we say that we should try to get the patient to express his impulses in phantasies, or words, we imply that making conscious is essential.

A further set of facts seems to increase this confusion. Let us consider an imaginary example. At a given moment of analysis a patient experiences a certain impulse towards the analyst ; by means of a transference interpretation the analyst, as has been said, releases a certain amount of id-energy, the id-energy expressed in that impulse. In these circumstances, what happens in the intellect of the patient ? I believe there are various possibilities.

First of all, let me make it clear that, by assumption, this interpretation has released a certain amount of id-energy. The patient can—

(*a*) fully agree with the analyst's interpretation, which will appear clear to him ;

(*b*) express mixed opinions about it ; sometimes he may deny the correctness of the interpretation, but at the same time reveal in the expression of his face that, although it is difficult for his conscious mind to see that he has such an impulse, somehow he does not deny its existence. This is very often expressed in laughter, especially when the impulse belongs to a primitive category—say, for instance, a cannibalistic impulse. It is hard for him to accept that he is being a cannibal at heart, at that particular moment, and he dismisses the possibility with a laugh, yet one feels that some problem, or part of one, is solved by the interpretation, in spite of the patient denying its truth.

It seems as if the degree in which a patient accepts a right interpretation varies greatly with the patient. In a very general way I should say that obsessive patients have a better intellectual grasp of inter-

pretations than hysterical patients; but, in any case, it seems to me that we cannot establish, as a criterion of the effectiveness of a right interpretation, the extent to which the patient accepts it. I might say in parenthesis that I am referring particularly to transference interpretations.

On the other hand, it seems quite evident that in some cases we can give transference interpretations which are right, and which correspond to the problem which, at that moment, occupies the patient, and yet not produce any improvement in him. I am thinking mainly of cases where we interpret too violent and aggressive feelings, especially at the beginning of analysis. The result in these cases might be an appearance of guilt.

What is it, then, that makes interpretation active for the cure, and what relation does this unknown element bear to the intellectual grasping of an interpretation? It would appear that effective interpretations could be classified into at least two groups according to their manner of action.

The first group, the one which is usually recognized as fulfilling the function of interpretation, would be constituted by those interpretations which act *by making the unconscious conscious or preconscious, or, in other cases, the preconscious conscious.* By this I mean making clear, to the conscious or preconscious mind, the *real sense or meaning* of a psychic process. This type of interpretation does not aim, therefore, at impulses as such, but only at the awareness, on the part of the intellect, of their existence. It results in an increased awareness, which automatically enables the ego to modify its attitude towards the process in question.

The main function of this group consists in bringing back the derivatives of an impulse to their more primitive object. As an example of this type I will mention the case of a woman patient who was in a state of strong positive transference towards the analyst. When his attitude made her realize that he would not satisfy her love and sexual desires, she developed disappointment, resentment, and hate against him. But her love for him, and the fear of losing him, could not allow the direct expression of these feelings. A part of them were drained off in a violent quarrel she had with a man friend, taking as a pretext some very slight neglect he had shown on one occasion; this made her indulge in violent hate against him. Another portion of the feelings against the analyst was turned into its opposite. The analyst became, in her eyes, an excessively good and kind person; to maintain this

idealized figure, the patient had to perform a good deal of mental acrobatics. The analyst pointed out the lack of proportion that was apparent in this sudden hate of a good friend and in the equally sudden increase of love for the analyst, and explained how this was the result of her attempts to deal with impulses against him, provoked by the realization that he would not satisfy her love and sexual feelings. The patient saw the point, and the hyper-cathexes were immediately withdrawn.

An interpretation of this type alters emotional processes (in this case, by withdrawal of hyper-cathexes) *viâ* the intellect. It is not necessary, for it to be effective, that the patient should fully accept it *consciously*. Provided we have a good logical case in its favour, preconscious acceptance sometimes suffices, even when there may be a conscious rejection.[14] In such a case, the emerging into consciousness represents an unnecessary surplus, and it might even be difficult to bring it about. In the example I have mentioned, the interpretation given was, at least indirectly, in relation to the transference. It seems possible, though, that one could give interpretations which would fulfil the function of bringing back a derivative to the original impulse, of *redressing*, as it were, without any immediate relation to the transference. A condition for this happening would be that the impulse in question should not be a strongly repressed one. Summarizing, we could say that interpretations of this first type have the preconscious as headquarters for their campaign.

To describe the second type, let us take as an example the same patient that has just been mentioned. After the interpretation referred to above was given, and accepted, she did not allow herself fully to feel hate against the analyst. She strongly repressed that impulse, which, consequently, had to seek for an expression other than the direct one. The patient began to feel that analysis was uninteresting and boring, that the analyst was very slow in understanding her, and very often did not understand her at all; finally, she asked herself whether it might not be better to stop the analysis altogether.

After giving full allowance to the possible truth of her criticisms against him, the analyst pointed out that this sudden change of feelings

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[14] Melitta Schmideberg has drawn attention to the importance, for cure, of the establishment of new preconscious links. This touches, though from another angle, the subject under consideration. 'The Mode of Operation of Psycho-Analytic Therapy', this JOURNAL, Vol. XIX, 1938.

needed a further explanation, which was provided by her hate against him. This interpretation, given in a tolerant attitude, finally enabled the patient to allow herself to feel her hate, thus leaving the path open for subsequent changes. Before studying the possible subsequent changes following an interpretation of this type, it is worth considering what happens at the moment when it is given. If the impulse that has been the subject of interpretation is not very strong, the verbal expression of it by the analyst (*i.e.*, the interpretation) furnishes satisfaction to it, and, in so doing, relieves the tension. We could also say that what makes an interpretation of this type effective is not the patient's realization of the impulse or process in question, but the fact that the analyst explicitly or implicitly, as the case may be, tolerates it, or, in some cases, even encourages it. When I interpret to a patient : ' This shows that at this moment you hate me,' what helps him *at that particular moment*, is to know that, implicitly, *I allow him to hate me.* The same could be said of impulses other than hate.

Thus we see that, by tolerating an impulse, and by expressing it in words, interpretations of this second type provide a discharge for it. The first function, that of tolerating the impulse, is shared with other elements in the process of analysis, such as the analyst's attitude, etc. From this angle, it is interesting to note that, provided it touches the problem that is important at the moment, it is not necessary that the interpretation should give either a full or accurate description of it. This is a hopeful reflection, as it gives full allowance for the imperfections of our knowledge. It is difficult not to imagine that, a hundred years hence, the analyst of the future will smile at the naïveté of some of our explanations. But, in the meantime, we do cure patients, in spite of our relative ignorance. In the course of the treatment we probably use many elements which we do not know, just as the biochemist of a few years ago believed that he cured rickets by means of irradiated cholesterine, when he actually cured it with an impurity of that product, the irradiated ergosterine.

Regarding the second function of the interpretations under consideration, that of verbal satisfaction, one cannot help asking oneself : Is it possible for an impulse to be satisfied by a verbal expression ? The reply seems to be definitely in the affirmative in certain conditions. Take an example from ordinary life. If someone makes me angry, I might think in my mind of some nice epithets against him, or I might occupy myself with building imaginary situations in which I would punish him. If my anger becomes overwhelming, I shall have

to express it both in words and deeds, and it might be that the discharge of tension would not be sufficient until I had given him a good punch. But if I am a little more civilized, I might substitute for a punch a mordant, highly sarcastic or subtle phrase, and thus satisfy an impulse by means of a verbal expression.

In analysis a good deal of that is done both by the developing of the phantasies of the patient, and by the analyst's interpretation. Sometimes we might find that after an interpretation the patient's impulse has not been completely satisfied by the verbal expression, and he will be compelled to do small actions, like breaking matches, pulling threads of the cushion, etc., which will have the same energic function as the interpretation.

By satisfying an impulse by means of a verbal expression, interpretation fulfils a function similar to those served by public spectacles like plays, films, boxing matches, or bull fights, where, by identifying himself with one or more of the actors, the spectator allows himself the gratification of some of his wishes.

In this process it is essential that the intensity of the impulse should be such as to permit satisfaction in only verbal expression. On the other hand, the attitude of the analyst when he gives the interpretation is also important; he may contradict his words by the tone of his voice. On other occasions a right interpretation might actually imply a criticism, and prevent the satisfaction of the impulse. This is, for instance, the case when a patient is feeling aggressive towards the analyst, and the analyst hastens to say that he is only a parent's substitute at that given moment. For the patient this might mean: 'Don't be angry with me; be angry with your father or mother,' as the case may be. Interpretation will then be useless, because it will not furnish a bridge or conductor for changes of energy.

As will be seen, it has been implied throughout, that interpretations of this type are always transference interpretations of the type Strachey has described as 'mutative'.[15]

Let us now consider the subsequent changes following an interpretation of the second type. We have supposed that at the moment immediately following it, a certain impulse is discharged. This impulse may be:

(*a*) either an isolated one, which has thus been discharged by means of the interpretation; or

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[15] Strachey, *op. cit.*

(*b*) one instance, as it were, in a line of identical impulses, which are being generated in the mind all the time.

In all likelihood (*b*) is more often the case, as transference phenomena represent the repetition of impulses which were directed towards someone else before the analyst came upon the scene and will be directed towards someone else after the transference ceases. What will, then, happen to the series of similar impulses that will come later on, when the analyst no longer plays a part ? Since we accept the view that our interpretations tend to effect permanent changes in the mind, we must assume that effective interpretation of this second type provides *a permanent way of utilizing a stream of psychic energy*, no matter how small that stream may be.

If this condition is not fulfilled, the interpretation will be useless for the future, irrespective of how helpful it may be at the moment it is given. I believe this can be the case when we deal with erotic impulses in hysteria, in which transference interpretations often do not carry us very far, as the patient plays his impulses over and over again on to the analyst, and thus achieves satisfaction. But it also happens in other instances ; patients sometimes make a reference to this by uttering comments such as : ' I can see all that, but how is it going to help me to improve ? '

In this respect, I believe the effects of an interpretation of the second type can be classified into two groups :

(*a*) After the impulse has been experienced towards the analyst, the patient may become aware of its exaggeration or lack of proportion in the present circumstances. It is in this respect that it can be said that the patient decides, as it were, to drop it. An archaic manner of reaction, which took place without the patient being consciously aware of it, is brought to his conscious attention, and this results, almost automatically, in a process of readjustment.

(*b*) The fact that the analyst implicitly or explicitly tolerates or encourages the impulse creates an alteration in the balance of energies between id, ego and super-ego, often by diminution of the severity of the last, thus opening new paths for further substitutive discharges, by means of new psycho-dynamic systems. This may happen without the patient being consciously aware of it, and may remain unconscious.

Nevertheless, when an impulse passes, so to speak, through a verbal

expression, when it is momentarily satisfied by means of a verbal expression, it seems that the conditions are then at their optimum for the mind to become consciously aware of the existence of that impulse. In this case the understanding has a certain quality of reality, and is not mirror-like. I believe this is what has been called ' real ' or ' emotional ' understanding. One understands fully only when one feels fully, when the primitive impulse passes through the mesh of language, where the conscious ego and the id converge. Language is thus preponderantly important in human life, in that it furnishes this point of convergence of instinct and intellect. Every verbal expression is tainted with instinct, at the same time as it represents the vehicle of pure intellect.

The proportion of the mixture may vary from an almost pure logical-intellectual use of language—as is the case with mathematical writing—to the opposite extreme of surrealist writing (as in Picasso and Joyce), where the language is to a great extent the vehicle of pure emotion, logically unco-ordinated, as in the unconscious.

By thus bringing impulses, as it were, momentarily to the surface, where the conscious or preconscious ego can observe them, interpretation provides the conductor which will enable these impulses to return to the preconscious (or unconscious ?) to vest themselves into a more satisfactory system of defence mechanisms. The process would resemble what one sometimes observes at the Zoo, when looking at the sea lions : suddenly one of them comes to the surface, jumps into the air, and dives again, following a different direction.

TEMPER TANTRUMS IN EARLY CHILDHOOD IN THEIR RELATION TO INTERNAL OBJECTS

BY

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In this paper I wish to discuss the phantasies and special mechanisms involved in ' temper tantrums ', those manifestations of acute anxiety so often seen in children between one and five years. In these outbreaks, children are liable to scream violently, kick, stamp, hit and bite other people, hold their breath, stiffen the body, throw themselves on the floor, and struggle against all control. At the height of the attack the child appears to be deaf to the voice of reason, persuasion or command, and almost inaccessible to external influence.

It is very rarely that such attacks occur in a violent form in the actual work of child analysis, since we can usually read the signs of mounting anxiety and anticipate the worst by interpretation. But it is often possible to discern the particular phantasies which without interpretation would lead to tantrums, and to relate the analytic situation in these respects to the circumstances which actually provoke the tantrums, in the child's external life, as well as to his earlier experiences.

During the last few years, I have analysed several children who throw light on these phenomena, and have also had an adult patient whose behaviour on the couch at moments of extreme anxiety was extraordinarily like that of a child in a violent tantrum.

Objective studies of the frequency and distribution of tantrums have shown that they reach a high peak during the second year of life ; they then gradually lessen in frequency until the sixth or seventh year, when they become comparatively rare in normal children. They appear to be a phenomenon of normal development, since they occur to some degree with all classes of children in all sorts of general circumstances, although some children in some circumstances are much more liable to such outbursts than others.

The immediate causes of such outbursts are very varied, but a study of all types of provoking situation seems to suggest one common element, viz., that the tantrum is a response to compulsion. Tantrums occur when children are told to do something they do not wish to do, are denied something they wish to have, or when there is some

change in the routine of their daily life. Within the ordinary routine they may violently object to being dressed or undressed, being washed or lifted out of the bath, being made to clean their teeth, to put on some clothing they dislike, to go to the toilet, being given an enema; being kept waiting for something they are expecting to receive or to happen, having their bodily movements restricted, being forced to share their possessions with someone else or unable to get hold of someone else's property; being unable to make their wishes understood, being shut out of the activities of other children or the attention of the grown-ups. Tantrums may also occur when the child fails to achieve something he is trying to do, e.g. when he cannot successfully manipulate some physical object. The child's response when this happens shows that he feels this neutral physical object to be defying and attacking him, and defeating his aims, as if it were another human being.

Examples of the provoking situations could be multiplied, and many specific motives can be discerned. In some of these situations, the child's libidinal aims are frustrated. In others, his sublimated sexual wishes and reparation tendencies are defeated. In others again, he shows his castration anxieties and his fear of other people's aggression. But the general character of all the moments which cause this unmanageable anxiety is the *compulsion* exerted upon the child, to do, to have or to endure what he does not want, to lose, or to refrain from doing or being what he does want. The child feels he is up against some force which he cannot control or alter, a person who will defeat all his wishes, rob him of all pleasure, restrict all his movements and reduce him to complete helplessness. He is in the hands of his persecutors.

The violence of the child's struggle in his tantrums is usually so much out of proportion to the actual loss or compulsion that we are obliged to recognize that the most primitive phantasies and anxieties are at work. He is fighting a phantasy mother, rather than the real one with whom he actually struggles. The real denial or command acts like a hair trigger releasing in full force the most primitive persecutory phantasies. If he does not get *this* sweet, his mother is going to starve him. If she puts *this* particular garment upon him, or will not let him get down from her knee at *this* moment, she is going to bind him and reduce him to permanent and complete helplessness. If she insists upon his urinating or defæcating *now*, she is going to castrate him and tear out all his inside. If he cannot build a tower *now*, when

he wants to do so, he never will be clever enough to balance one brick on top of another. If he has to give up his toy to a playmate, he never will get it again, or any other toy in the world. Above all, he feels that if he cannot control people and things completely and make them do what he wishes here and now, he himself will be reduced to a complete and helpless loss of everything that he needs and longs for.

The detailed study in analysis enables us to take a further step and to recognize that these phantasied persecutors with whom the child struggles are primarily felt to be inside his own mind and his own body. He projects these internal persecutors upon external thwarting persons, since outside enemies *can* be fought and resisted. To appreciate this helps us to understand the violence of some of the bodily symptoms, such as the bodily rigidity, the kicking and hitting, the momentary deafness and blindness of the child. He is so much alive to the danger inside his body that he becomes for the time being deaf and blind to external reality.

The general theory of internal objects, derived first of all from the work of Freud and Abraham, has now been clearly developed in the various contributions of Melanie Klein and other members of the English group. This paper is concerned not with the elucidation of the general theory of internal objects, but with the way in which an understanding of the various phantasies connected with internal objects serves to illuminate the phenomena of temper tantrums and helps in their analytic treatment.

I will now quote from two cases some material illustrating certain of the detailed phantasies involved in children's tantrums, first from a boy of three and a half and then from an adult obsessional patient.

The boy of three and a half came for treatment because of a particular symptom. His relation with other children in the nursery school was friendly but distant. Every now and then, however, he would separate himself from the others and stand alone for ten minutes or longer, psychically quite withdrawn, and with marked tension and spasmodic quivering of his body. These moments had alarmed his nursery school teacher by their look of abnormality.

At home, he had from the end of his first year been subject to specially violent tantrums. I realized during his analysis that these queer moments of silent withdrawal and tension in the nursery school were substituted for the tantrums. He was too frightened of the many other children there to show his fear and aggression openly.

In the analysis, it soon became clear that the boy's brother, just one year younger, and their inter-relations with their mother, provided the dominant factor in his life.

Now from the beginning of his analysis, my patient showed an absorbing interest in the insides of things, drawers, cupboards, boxes, the gas fire, electric fire, etc. For instance, he found he could lift off a portion of the front of the gas fire, and look at its inside parts. He was always very anxious and eager about this, wanting to know what they were, to touch them and take them out ; one day he pointed to what he called ' the crack ', across the head of a large screw inside this part of the fire, saying : ' I don't like that.' Here we obviously have his fear of castration, dread that he will have a ' crack ' instead of a penis. But he is quite as much preoccupied with the fact that this ' crack ' is *inside*, and thus shows his fear of a broken and damaged penis, inside himself.

I would emphasize here that in all our interpretation of the child's play, the place where he puts objects or takes them from is quite as important as the particular object he is using. The spatial context of his play will tell us as much as the details of what he does. He will show us quite clearly, if we look, whether at any one time he is concerned with internal or external reality, and with the inside or the outside of his body.

Quite early in the analysis he drew me a picture of his brother. The drawing showed a little figure in the centre of the page, encircled by a line going round and round him several times. This represented the brother inside himself, and being controlled by him.

His concern with things inside always came out very plainly after he had, either in reality or in dramatic play, eaten something he wanted. For example, he found one day in a cupboard a pencil sharpener which had been left there accidentally by a previous patient. He said urgently : ' Whose is that ? I am going to have it.' When I told him I could not let him have it as it belonged to someone else, he said : ' I *shall* have it, I shall eat it up ', and actually pretended to eat it. Then he put it into his trousers pocket and threatened to go away with it. The following day he was anxious and much pre-occupied with everything which might or did contain cut- or broken-up bits, or messy stuff. On another occasion, I was wearing a flowered silk frock with chains of coloured daisies all over it. The boy eyed the dress up and down, but said nothing about it. He took up the plasticine and asked me to cut a large piece into a number of small pieces. He

then stuck all these pieces together, and asked me to roll it all into a ball. Then he said: 'Where's the sugar?' (He has a little granulated sugar every morning for cooking play.) He ate all this up. Then he took the large ball of plasticine again and asked me to cut very small pieces off it and roll them into little balls. He was very pleased with these and made me count them. I had to make sixty or seventy. Seeing him look again at my frock, I knew that these many small balls represented the many daisies on my frock, which in turn stood for the children inside me, and that he wanted them. He confirmed this, saying: 'I *shall* have that frock and wear it,' and tried to mess it up with plasticine. The next thing was to say: 'I want you to pull me', that is, to pull him about the floor by means of a skipping rope, he holding one end and I the other. He got me to pull him across the floor, as he lay, three or four times in different positions, sitting down, lying on one side, lying on his stomach. Before he left, I had to make more tiny balls, until all the plasticine was used up, wrap these in a piece of paper and seal the parcel down. He took this parcel home.

On a later day, when much work had been done about his fear of his brother's envy, his guilt about his own greedy wishes to have his father's penis and not to let the brother have it, or to get both the brother's and his own, and thus have a bigger and better one, he repeated this skipping rope play. Again he held one end of it, and I had to hold the other and pull him about as before, dragging him helplessly along the floor in different positions. But now I saw a specific point. The rope had two long wooden handles; one of these was broken, and I always had to hold the broken end while he held the good one. That is to say, I had a bad broken penis, a short one, I was castrated, while he had a long, good, whole one. But in pulling him about I was the more powerful.

What is the meaning of this play with the rope, in which the child gets himself pulled about helplessly in different positions? The first point to be noted is that it always occurred in an oral setting. On each occasion, the boy had been showing me in the clearest way that he wanted to eat up any good thing that he desired—e.g. my frock, or the daisies on it, representing myself as his mother, my breast and the babies and penises I had inside me. He wanted to get these and to eat them up so as to have and keep them for himself.

In his helplessness, allowing me to pull him about over and over

again, he was also expressing strong masochistic tendencies.[1] In making me the more powerful person, in spite of the fact that I held the broken handle, the short penis, he was taking the feminine position, while I, in standing up and doing the actual pulling, was in the masculine position. Yet to say that this expressed his masochistic feminine tendencies does not go far enough, since it does not explain the connection of this behaviour or these tendencies with their oral setting. It is after he has eaten the mother and her baby that he stages the rope play, and represents himself as a completely helpless creature. The boy's masochism was thus a way of dealing with his feeling of complete helplessness against his own id, against his oral greed and the intensity of all his desires. Moreover, since he makes me pull him towards myself across the room, he is representing his feeling that the object of his desires is identified with his desires It is *his mother* who attracts or pulls or drags him towards *her*, who stirs up his greedy desires, who renders him unable to stop wanting her and eating her up. I (his mother) had become identified with his id, his bad, greedy self, because by having a flowered dress, or sugar to eat, or good breasts, a baby inside me, or by being a loving person, I had aroused in him these irresistible greedy destructive impulses.

Moreover, in making me drag him towards me he was representing his phantasy of my eating him up in retaliation, thus externalizing his persecution dread, his fear of the bad breast biting him, as he had bitten it, his fear of his brother's vengeful fury as well as of the retaliating mother, retaliating for what he wanted to do to the baby inside her. By letting me pull him towards me with the rope over and over again he not only externalized this dread of persecution, but reassured himself against it. He did not lose me or get eaten up or castrated. I could pull him towards me but did not injure him.

In this way he was also representing me as his super-ego. I had to do the guiding and controlling to keep him safe, and he proved over and over again that I would do so. At one and the same time he said

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[1] I am indebted to my critics in the discussion following this paper at a meeting of the British Psycho-Analytical Society for pointing out to me that the way in which the paper as read presented my interpretations of the child's behaviour was not adequate. It was far too condensed and not well balanced, taking for granted many points that needed further explication in order to show their connections. I have now tried to rectify these omissions.

in this play that it was my fault that he was so helpless, and that I must take care of him and be responsible for his safety as well as for him. In this way I stood both for his id and for his super-ego.

Finally, in this masochistic play he dealt with the internal situation of his ego in its helplessness against both his id and his super-ego. He externalized this feeling of helplessness and turned it into a pleasure, libidinizing it through bodily sensations. In other words he was proving himself in full control, able to get pleasure for himself, by staging the play, even though the nature of the play itself was so helpless and masochistic. He really controlled me and his internal situation at one and the same time. Masochistic tendencies in which anxiety situations are sexualized are themselves but one variety of the manic defence.

Now the boy's actual behaviour with his brother in his external life at home showed how strong was his defensive need to control the brother's acts and wishes all the time. If the younger boy was asked whether he would have anything, the elder answered for him: 'Yes, Rob will do so-and-so', 'No, Rob doesn't want so-and-so.' Partly as a result of this the younger child at three years of age did not talk yet, although he was certainly intelligent. The elder answered for him in every situation. This answering for the little brother had itself a complex significance. On the one hand he was saying: 'My brother *can* talk, listen to him.' That is to say, his speaking for the brother was restorative, giving him speech magically, much better speech than he could have had naturally. The elder boy was thus also acting as a super-ego for the little brother, saying that he must talk properly or not at all. On the other hand, he also prevented the little brother from speaking, thus showing his own hatred and wish to castrate the brother, as well as the intensity of his own need to control the younger boy. He had to control him in this way because of his terrible fear of what the younger brother, both actual and internalized, would do if he became bigger, stronger, able to talk, able to do for himself. He would indeed be a persecutor, and must therefore be controlled, kept inside, kept a baby, and castrated all the time. But of course this purpose in its turn increased the elder child's anxiety, since in his mind it gave the brother further motive for revenge.

In his play, the boy thus showed me that his tantrums were not simply due to conflict of feeling in external relationship with his actual brother, or myself as an external person. His mind was domi-

nated by dread of the castrated and vengeful brother felt to be inside himself. His compulsive wetting and dirtying was connected with the phantasy of his brother's cutting, biting, burning and poisoning him inside, in revenge for his own aggressive wishes. His castrated dirty baby brother, who could not talk but only scream, made *him* dirty, cut *him* to bits, made *him* scream, from the inside. He had to defæcate and to scream for two.

The boy gave me another vivid representation of the anxiety connected with his various internal objects. One day he brought his nurse's umbrella to the play-room. He opened it and several times made me twirl it round and round, with the point resting on the floor. When it was going round very fast he named the various spokes, touching them in turn and saying: 'That's Nanny, that's Ida, that's May, that's Mummy, that's Daddy, that's Rob;' in other words, they stood for all the people he was afraid of, moving round inside him. The expression of his face as he told me this showed that the whirling umbrella represented his own feeling of everything whirling round outside him, and the blurring of people's faces outside him, under the stress of anxiety, as well as of the sense of their controlling him from the inside. This was connected with his compulsive wetting, since just before he had made a big wet mess on the floor, followed by a half-hearted attempt to wipe it up, which failed.

In the analysis, every aspect of the actual relation of the two brothers had of course to be explored. For example, as both brothers went to the same nursery school at the same time, and my patient's coming for the analysis without his younger brother was the first major separation of the two, his guilt about this wish-fulfilment of his rivalry with his brother was enormous. Everything which he had to play with, I, as his brother, must have also. He was unable to believe that if he had a ball, a pencil, a cup, and there was not a second one for me, I was not burnt up with fury and envy and ready to burn him or bite him to pieces. He dealt with this terror in various ways, but only slowly, as the analysis of his persecution phantasies reduced his anxieties, could we reach any direct expression of his wish to have everything for himself.

He showed his fear of his little brother's wish to castrate him, if he himself became a big boy, got the father's penis, in many ways. As one example, he asked me to model a fire engine with plasticine. When I did so, he gibed at it, saying it 'looked funny', it 'looked like a horse', or 'a donkey'—in other words, I could not do things

any better than his little brother. He then said I must put a ladder on the fire engine, but as I began to do so, he said: 'I can do it; I can do it better', and quickly modelled a ladder and fixed it on, saying 'Aren't I clever?' But immediately, he took his own scissors and cut his own ladder in two, thus anticipating my jealousy for his being clever, and my revenge on him for his scorn of me, that is to say, his brother's revenge on him for having a bigger and better penis. He felt certain I would cut the ladder out of envy, and forestalled me by doing it himself, thus depriving me of the satisfaction; in this way, he also reassured himself against his dread of being assaulted inside.

When he had been in analysis for two months, there came a phase in which he begged me to let him bring his little brother too to the analysis, and his nurse had difficulty in getting him to come alone. This urgent wish arose partly from his fear of his brother's jealousy and anger, partly from brotherly love and reparation wishes. In his mind, if he got good things for himself, grew big, learned to talk, to dress himself and keep himself clean, to jump and play ball, to draw and write, his brother would get smaller, more clumsy and more dirty, never able to talk at all. In his phantasy, there was only one good penis, and if he had it, his brother lost it, was castrated by him. He told me anxiously one day that he wore pyjamas, but his brother wore only nighties.

The boy had had a happy first year of babyhood, with a devoted nurse, who was sent away when the second child was born, two days before my patient's first birthday. The loss of this loved nurse, as a result of the birth of his rival, was the primary stimulus to his tremendous anxieties. From then onwards, his temper tantrums, together with excessive wetting and dirtying of his garments and his bed, had been extremely acute.

It was mainly because these catastrophic events, the loss of his nurse, owing to the birth of his deadly rival, came at an age when oral and anal impulses and the introjection-projection mechanisms were dominant, that they fostered the boy's phantasies of persecution by his internal objects. The baby brother drove away his nurse; he took her place, came instead of her. The loss of the actual good nurse evoked the feeling of loss of the good internalized object, and the hatred and fear of the crying, dirtying baby stirred up the dread of a bad internal persecutor.

During the analysis, the details of these persecution phantasies

were linked at every point with the real characteristics of the actual brother and of my patient's real behaviour to him.

To turn now to the adult patient; with him any occasion of specially acute anxiety in the analytic situation led to behaviour extraordinarily like severe temper tantrums in a young child. The patient would shout obscenities or prayers in an extremely loud screaming voice, and would twist his body, make violent movements, clamp his jaw so tightly that I could hear the teeth grinding; and at times he struck his own forehead violently in a way that was most painful to watch. The head knocking disappeared after three years' analysis, but the shouting, although lessened in frequency and intensity, remained as a sporadic transference symptom to the end.

(The patient had been diagnosed as a severe obsessional neurotic, but his paranoia was very acute and the onset of his illness at twenty years of age had shown a brief catatonic phase. His mother was an epileptic, and the patient always feared that he was or would become so himself, although he was not in fact.)

These symptoms on the couch repeated the patient's temper tantrums of childhood, but in his phantasy they were also a repetition of the mother's epileptic fits. His earliest conscious memory was of seeing his mother, when he was three-and-a-half, fall down and injure her head in a fit, at a time when she was pregnant with a child who died at six months of age. He had certainly heard his mother's cries and groans and thumpings in her fits at night, as well as in the day, the fits thus being very closely associated in his mind with parental intercourse.

Now there were many different meanings to this violence on the couch. It represented feelings and phantasies at different levels of the psyche, as well as various real experiences. These could be briefly summarized as follows:—

(1) By his shouting the patient showed his wish to control and defy the analyst as a real person in her own right, in many different ways. He drowned my voice, and told all the world what a dreadful person I was. Because of his fear of rivals, his wife, his friends, other patients, he denied that he was getting any good from me or had any positive wishes towards me. Again, he had to shout in order to let other people know how dangerous he was, and to make sure they would come and save me from him, when he feared his own aggression towards me or his own sexual wishes, which were connected with the most terrific sadistic phantasies. He shouted also in order to make

me stop the analysis when it seemed to stir up too strong libidinal and sadistic wishes. He was also in his shouting testing me and the clinic, to see how much we could stand, how indulgent or how frightened we were, how much we could control him. Moreover, his shouting prevented my hearing the mocking laughter which was going on in his mind all the time. This laughter was partly a sexual pleasure at my forcing his thoughts (his fæces) out of him; partly a mocking laughter of defiance, pride and pleasure in foiling me, defying me, putting fæces upon me, etc.

(2) The shouting expressed also a manic control of me as standing for his own actual parents in the Œdipus situation. He was representing the noise of parental intercourse, connected with his real experiences of his mother's cries in her fits in the night. Alternatively, he was stopping parental intercourse; and actually killing his parents in the sexual act. He often brought out a phantasy of being Samson pulling down the house, and feeling that he would willingly kill himself if his death would put a stop to parental intercourse. This wish arose in part from direct Œdipus frustration, partly from his notion that sexual intercourse had actually caused his mother's epilepsy.

(3) His shouting also represented the attack and defence of part objects by part objects. His enormous voice represented a penetrating penis which he was forcing into me in the most sadistic way, as well as hard, forcing fæces, which he forced into me in order to prevent me from getting his fæces—equivalent to his secret thoughts and feelings—out of him.

(4) He was also re-enacting many dramatic early experiences, assuming now this, now the other part, with the analyst in the corresponding rôle. E.g. his mother had been an over-indulgent weak woman, who stirred up by her indulgence the most awful dread of his severe and tyrannical father. He shouted at me in order to make me hate him and turn him out instead of indulging him. At other times he was acting the part of the mother, shouting in her rage and jealousy of his father, as well as representing her fits. At still other times, he acted the part of his baby brother who had died when he was about four, died ' fighting for his life ', as his father had described it, in acute bronchitis. The patient was thus fighting me for his life, as well as bringing the baby brother to life again by acting his part. At still other times, he represented himself as the shouting, schoolmaster father, who could control a hundred boys and make them instantly obedient to his will by his tyrannical loud voice.

(5) Yet none of these repetitions of actual people and relations in his external history or of his present relations to me as an external real person brought the most significant key to his tantrums at their worst intensity. The times when his behaviour on the couch came the nearest to that of the screaming, struggling child in an extremity of anxiety were when he was ' fighting for his life ' *with internal objects*. Internal objects were very plain in the phantasies of this patient. He would, e.g., sometimes apostrophize his own fæces, the hard turd, which was at one and the same time a source of immense pride to him and of the utmost dread, as being a phantasied, cutting, tormenting penis. When, as often, he had difficulty in bringing out such a turd, he would speak to it and say : ' Come out, you bugger ! I will wring your neck for you ! ' And in the most violent moments on the couch, when he would strike his own head till the room resounded, he was fighting with the utmost extremity of terror the terrible persecutors within, the epileptic mother, raging in her fits or screaming at the father in her jealousy, the shouting, school-master father, or sometimes the two parents together in the most dreadful sadistic intercourse, as well as at other times the dying baby brother in his struggles for breath. All these, as well as the sadistically conceived part objects, were incorporated and were now in deadly conflict within the patient himself.

(6) Finally, in the shouting and violent movements, the patient was also denying his own inside feelings of love, grief and remorse, with accompanying depression and terror of death. Indeed, one of the most profound meanings of the shouting and the violent movement was the need to deny the silence of death, the silence of the baby brother after he had died. In this patient's mind the terror of his persecutors was so great that to be good was to be absolutely still, like his mother in her quiet moments after her fits, or the stillness of the baby brother after he gave up fighting for his life and was dead. To be good meant to give up life, to give it to the baby brother and the mother. The violent movements and shouting were therefore the most forcible denial of the necessity which his love and remorse and conscience forced upon him, to give up his life, to be castrated, to lie still and to be subjected to the most terrible attacks of every kind which I, as then representing the tyrant father, the epileptic mother and the brother who died because of the patient's jealousy, would wreak upon him. The patient often told me that to be analysed was to be a wax cat chased through hell by an asbestos dog. He had

to be the asbestos dog in his violent movements and shouting, so that I should not turn him into the wax cat who would be altogether melted and destroyed.

It was the interpretation of these terrible internal persecutors which provided the key to the analysis of this patient, gradually relieved the most acute of his paranoic phantasies, caused the convulsive movements and shouting to disappear, strengthened his relations with his external objects and his real present-day environment, recovered his memories and released the long buried feelings of love and grief and remorse towards his parents and the baby brother, and of hope in his present life.

Now in this particular case, there was a very special factor, the influence of the mother's epilepsy. This was certainly the chief reason for the occurrence of these violent tantrums in adult life, as well as for the neurosis as a whole. But the patient's experience of his mother's epilepsy does not nullify the relevance of his case to my general thesis regarding the main significance of tantrums in childhood, since, to his mind, his mother's fits *were* temper tantrums. He saw his mother reduced (by his own jealousy, greed and aggression) to a dirty, kicking, biting, screaming infant, behaving exactly as he felt in his own moments of fear, frustration and fury.

This was in fact to my mind one of the most interesting and illuminating aspects of this case, namely the discovery of what such a terrible experience as seeing one's own mother in epileptic fits can mean to the infant mind. The reality of his mother's epilepsy was appreciated by him in terms (*a*) of his own actual experience of kicking, biting, screaming, dirtying, etc., (*b*) of his own awareness of his intense feelings of annoyance, frustration and rage, together with (*c*) his phantasies of what happens to one's mother if one behaves in this way to her. She, having been subjected to one's own attacks, becomes a dirtying, screaming infant herself. She is poisoned, bitten, made helpless, filled with bad feelings and a violent, destructive penis, and this terrible reality has been brought about by one's own evil magic.

To return in conclusion to tantrums in general: the analysis of situations evoking tantrums in young children shows that these occur when the child feels himself unable to control 'good' objects and his persecutors, internal and external, by the ordinary means of appealing or commanding words and actions.

The need to control the actual persons upon whom the child depends for love and food, or whose actual aggression he fears, is

itself one of his motives for eating them up and incorporating them. We incorporate not only to keep and to have what we desire, but also in order to control what we fear, by magical means. I have elsewhere quoted the four-year-old girl who nearly choked herself in swallowing her brother's whistle, and told her nurse : ' I didn't like the noise it made, and so I hid it in myself.'

But the need to control is only augmented by this magical incorporation, since the enemies are now at work in a hidden secret way, inside. And the child attributes every failure of his own ego, in his clumsiness, dirtiness, smallness, lack of speech or fatigue, to the attacks of an incorporated enemy. Hence these faults and failures of his own are liable to provoke the tantrum, no less than denial or compulsion from actual persons, since both kinds of thwarting release an unmanageable dread of internal enemies. In children who are liable to acute tantrums, or in all children at the ages when these are specially liable to occur, minor disappointments, denials and compulsions, stirring feelings of rage and helplessness, are instantly interpreted by the child as a violent attack from his internal enemies.

The child's screaming, struggling and rigidity in the tantrum represent his attacking and being attacked by his enemies within and without, against whom he must call up every resource of body and mind, since his life depends upon his getting them once again under his control.

ON THE NATURE OF UGLINESS AND THE CREATIVE IMPULSE

(MARGINALIA PSYCHOANALYTICA. II)[1]

BY

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LONDON

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§ 1. Introduction

The study of Æsthetics presents difficult problems and the solution of them is made more arduous if the field of observation is unduly constricted. So long as Æsthetics is confined to an examination of Beauty research is likely to prove as sterile as is a study of Behaviour which confines itself to the single factor of pleasure. Human psychology made greater progress when it gave recognition to the factors of mental pain, anxiety and guilt; it would therefore seem prudent to accord more significance than is commonly done in the literature to these disturbing but powerful forces in our æsthetic inclinations,

[1] The second of a series of notes marginal to the already full pages of psycho-analytical literature. The first appeared in an issue of The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis honouring one of Ernest Jones' decennial birthdays, this appears for the same purpose ten years later.

and to see whether the underlying impulses of destructiveness, which give rise to these painful feelings, do not provide a substratum to Art as they do to everyday life. It is even possible that by representing in a neutral medium the interplay of creative and destructive instincts the artist can help us to comprehend a better solution of the conflicts that press within us than we could do for ourselves unaided, with nothing interposed between us and our passions but the medium of our unstable flesh. The artist provides more than a momentary consolation for our miseries; he goes behind the veil which screens the source of our dejection and brings back evidence for the triumph of the creative impulse over the forces of destruction; he can do this not by the denial of pain but by facing it with a determination to master it. If we are to learn anything about Æsthetics we must be ready to follow the path he takes.

It cannot be said of the psycho-analysts that they study only the pleasant things of this life, and we should expect that their contributions to æsthetics would be full of the struggle between the contending forces in the mind. Oddly enough the subject has suffered a relative neglect and when mentioned attention is given in the main to those factors which have contributed to the content of a work of art rather than to the meaning to the artist and his audience of the underlying forces of love and hate, of creativeness and destruction, which possess us in the depths of our being; perhaps it would be more correct to say that the deeper strata of conflict are implied rather than made explicit. The strain that man suffers from the double task of adjusting his love and hate to two objects at a time, both being loved and both hated, and, what is more, both being related to one another—a difficulty in orientation and emotional adaptation which analysts call the Œdipus Complex—has of course found much exemplification in our literature. Ernest Jones' 'Hamlet' (1910) is an excellent instance; and the way in which, owing to the unbearable nature of our unconscious ideas, if appearing undisguised in consciousness, our minds disguise the crude and horrible, so that these will not disfigure the more gracious intentions of our thoughts, has been often illustrated; again we can refer to Ernest Jones' work, particularly his 'Madonna's Conception' (1914). The lead in this direction of research was given by Freud in his *Delusion and Dream* (1907) and *Leonardo da Vinci* (1910), he also wrote the only paper by a psycho-analyst which deals solely with the aspect of æsthetics that is usually neglected—'The Uncanny' (1919).

The research into our mental life which takes into account not

only man's double orientation and ambivalence to objects but which also brings into prominence the employment of projection and introjection, not as mere and occasional expurgatory or masterful acts, but as the basic behaviour of the immature psyche, and stresses the continuing activity of the extroject and the interoject in the outer or inner world respectively, and the interplay of these in the mind, and, as it seems, the body of the infant and of our unconscious grown-up selves—these new researches, which we owe to Melanie Klein, throw fresh light on æsthetic problems, and are illustrated in her 'Infantile Anxiety-Situations reflected in a Work of Art and in the Creative Impulse' (1929). What follows here is a marginal note to that paper, and to her 'Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States' (1935).

§ 2. The Etymology, Meaning and Uses of the Word 'Ugly'

Skeat tells us something which at once carries us deep into our subject. He defines *ugly* as

frightful, hateful. It comes from a root connected with *ugg-* (Icelandic) meaning *fear* and with *-ligr* meaning *-like.* The main root is traced in the Gothic *ogan,* again meaning to *fear* and *ogjan* meaning *to terrify.* The Scandanavian *oga* (dread) is connected with the O.H.G. *egiso* = terror and the Gothic *agis* = *fear, anguish* and the Irish *aegal* meaning the same thing. These words are derived from the same root as the Greek ἄχος meaning *anguish* and *affliction.*

In the columns of the O.E.D. under *Ugly* we find the following:

Having an appearance or aspect which causes dread or horror; frightful or horrible, especially through deformity or squalor . . . offensive or repulsive to the eye . . . morally offensive or repulsive, base, degraded, loathsome, vile, later used in weaker sense as offending against propriety, highly objectionable . . . offensive or unpleasant to taste or smell . . . causing disquiet or discomfort, of a troublesome awkward nature . . . somewhat hazardous, perilous . . . suggestive of trouble or danger . . . cross, angry, ill-tempered.

§ 3. An Experiment on the Feeling of Disgust

Although in this paper we shall not refer again to the contributions of Experimental Psychology or Experimental Æsthetics to the solution of the problem of Ugliness—nor for that matter to any other work but psycho-analytic—the researches of Petö (Budapest, 1935) cannot pass unnoticed. They are valuable not only because they deal with the

rather neglected field of Osmics but chiefly because they show that the subjective response may vary with the age of the subject, a point that does not find much mention in works on æsthetics.

Various substances (spices, flowers, fruit, resin, fumes, and smells of putrefaction—assafœtida, polysulphides) were exhibited to nearly 300 children, aged from one month to sixteen years, who were divided into three groups, under five, five to six, and over six years old. 89 out of 92 under five showed no disgust or disagreeable feeling, one showed disgust towards some smells, two reacted as grown-up people would have done. Of the 39 in the five-to-six-year group 11 behaved with indifference or said that disagreeable smells were good ones, 19 showed disgust like grown-up people, 9 showed partly a satisfied or indifferent, partly a dissatisfied reaction. In the over-six group of 164 children, 127 showed dissatisfaction or strong disgust, 13 indifference, 24 a mixed behaviour. Only the children of five years and over distinguished between agreeable and disagreeable smells; before that age there was no aversion; over six-years children made the adult distinctions.

Petö rightly points out that in view of the light which psychoanalysts have thrown on the latency period and also on the building up of the super-ego, with accompanying changes in the mental outlook, at least among civilized peoples, the main alteration in æsthetic response in this instance may be ascribed to changes in the vita sexualis and to consequent altered outlook of the mind.

§ 4. Some Factors which influence Æsthetic Appreciation

(*a*) *A missing part.* Some people feel uncomfortable in the presence of ancient statues which are incomplete; they say that these would be beautiful if they were not mutilated, but as now seen they are horrible and sometimes in their injured state they are even called ugly.

When such people come as patients to us for analysis—usually of course for other reasons than a disturbance of their æsthetic sense—we have an opportunity of finding out some of the factors which influence their appreciation or disappreciation of these objects. Analysis does not provide much material for æsthetic study, but the smallness of the number of individuals who bring forward material bearing directly on these problems is compensated for by two factors: first we observe the æsthetic judgement or appreciation in the same setting as we observe all other mental activities of the patient, i.e. in the framework of his free associations in analysis, and secondly we are able to observe the changes in æsthetic appreciation running parallel

with the changes in mental outlook in other directions, in the patient's love life, work and sublimations generally.

Returning to the statues: it appears that the subject identifies himself with these objects, i.e. he has thought of himself as a mutilated person, or he has identified the statue with someone whom he has in his thoughts mutilated. It would be more correct to say that the sight of the statue rouses unconscious phantasies of re-mutilation, because the phantasy is not roused for the first time by the statue. Its injury awakens the impulse to carry the destruction a stage further. These phantasies can be traced back to the patient's early years and have undergone many modifications, submergences and resuscitations. An important fact confronts us at this point: the reawakened phantasy is more disturbing than the defects in the object itself; the phantasy, which is one of aggressive action, remains unconscious, the affect of fear or horror becomes attached to the external object so that the person does not realize his secret wish; the phantasy is kept from consciousness at the expense of the richness of the subject's emotional relation to an external object.

The reason for thinking that the affects roused by the phantasy are more disturbing than those roused by the defects in the object is found in the effects of treatment; when the wish-phantasy of mutilation is brought to consciousness and the patient is able to bear an examination of it, and has traced its origin in its relation to loved persons, it is also found that his contemplation of mutilated statues is now not affected by his anxieties, he can enjoy them as a 'composition' or a 'unity' and is not distracted by the defective or defaced parts. It is perhaps hardly necessary to say that the change does not come about through 'discussing the statues,' nor from any talk about æsthetics, but solely as a by-product of work necessary for the treatment of a neurotic trouble.

It may be objected that this first example is a trivial and neurotic reaction and that it cannot be made the basis of a general criterion of ugliness. I should consider the objection sound were the response to mutilation not so very widespread; mutilation phantasies play a large part for instance in the inhibitions of love life, and I should be loath to exclude them from a discussion of æsthetics, because their elaboration in the unconscious part of the mind and the impetus they give to exertions of an opposite character—restorative and creative—may on further examination be fruitful in our understanding not only of æsthetics but of our social life.

(*b*) *The attitude to deformity, to defective growth, to a 'foreign body' and to unfinished work.* It is not regarded as surprising when people say that they regard deformity of body or defect in growth, whether generalized or localized, and whether seen in the flesh or in a representation, as ugly. Though we accept the statement readily enough, the reason for this view may be quite complicated. There is a component derived from the anxiety about personal mutilation which comes from an identification with the victim of the distortion; but since the mind resists the idea that the self is ever horrible this factor of identification with a dreaded sight cannot in itself lend much strength to the feeling that the object is ugly. There is, however, sometimes another component derived from an identification with the aggressor who has produced the distortion; such pleasure as is harboured in the unconscious on this account is manifest in consciousness as discomfort due to guilt, the direct perception of guilt feelings as such being suppressed. In the case of a work of art the aggressor is clearly the artist, so that the contemplation of his work puts us in a position where we are faced in our phantasy with two objects at the same time, the producer and the object produced, which in the unconscious is always regarded as a person. It is possible that the production and enjoyment of art is dependent on this capacity to cope simultaneously with ambivalence to two intimately related but yet separate objects. The eagerness in the young to produce what in any other animal would be properly regarded as a biologically useless activity, the drawing and plastic work, rhythmic noises and tunes, and the variation in intensity of these impulses with the phases of sexual development, suggests that a close connection exists between the employment of art-work and the personal and social problems derived from this double orientation, because in the young the task of experimental manipulation of love and hate impulses towards objects, internal as well as external, is almost its sole occupation. (Those who apply the Theory of Dialectical Materialism to art and who emphasize the dependence of creative art upon the social impulses, have also to consider the possibility that these spring from a common root: those who hold true to the theory will readily accept this; those whose inner strains call for immediate application of their views in political action commonly overlook it.)

Returning to the distortions and to unfinished work: these have in common the effect of rousing in the imagination the thought of what might have been. Just as the distortion rouses guilt at our

complicity in the deed or anger at a potential good thing being deformed, so on contemplating unfinished work some feel cheated by the artist and react to the frustration with hostility—using the judgement of ugliness as a cover for their resentment. Others of course respond in the opposite way, feel grateful to the artist for that part which he has given them and enjoy the opportunity to share with him in their phantasy in the completion of a lovely production. There is another characteristic which sometimes excites the judgement of ugliness, viz. where the onlooker finds what he regards as a ' foreign body ' in an otherwise acceptable work. If this particular figure was not in the composition or this cloud was not in the sky the picture would be all that could be desired ; as it is it is spoiled by this alien thing and the picture is reckoned ugly. This is the antithesis to the ' missing part ' objection, it is the presence of something bad which renders the whole intolerable—a neurotic reaction, surely.

(*c*) *Fettering of interest to periods, cultures and antiquity*. The foregoing considerations have roused in our minds the impression that these factors which limit æsthetic appreciation are neurotic manifestations, and that perhaps no true art lover is influenced by them ; in a word that the investigation of those things which produce aversion are calculated to disclose neurotic behaviour, and that it does not take much gumption to surmise that neurosis is likely to disturb art appreciation in some way or other. Maybe this is so ; nevertheless the way in which the disturbance comes about should not be neglected by psychology.

Leaving aside the aversions, let us consider some factors which limit the scope of what is felt to be attractive in works of art. Certain periods in history and certain cultures have as we say an appeal for us, we think we should have felt at home in them, and anything which reminds us of them gives us pleasure so that we readily respond to their influence. If we examine this attitude more closely we commonly find that there is a connection between the conception of the culture or period and the day-dreams or phantasies which serve as the background of our mental life. The links between the culture chosen and the day-dream can be traced if we follow the history of the significant content through the course of development of the patient's phantasies, but the awakening of the association by a work of art need not be direct nor of course need it disclose its Œdipal roots ; indeed it need not be direct at all, e.g. the general treatment or style of a picture may

evoke some echo of that world we people in our day-dreams. An artist seems to be able both to convey by an economy of means denied to lesser folk a wide range of associations, more particularly of the emotions, which the whole composition and the details of his work evoke, and to control them so that they shall not scatter wide but by subtle focussing reinforce one another and penetrate deeper and deeper into the mind of the onlooker ; at least I take it that some such process occurs, analogous to the interplay of elements in a dream.

These preferences for particular periods or cultures are apt of course to pass over to a possessive appreciation of the chosen field with depreciation of others—a characteristic of nursery preferences, but one which leads directly to interest in external objects. In contrast there is the type which can only enjoy or venerate the antique. One patient whose family was of a ' respectable antiquity ' was fascinated by any work (artistic or political) of the period when his family ' began '. I think the reason which some antique-fetishists put forward, viz. that objects which have been preserved through the ages against the carelessness and resentment of succeeding generations must have some merit in them, contains a truth, but a truth which they use as a rationalization. In this connection we must remember those who are unable to see in an ancient work of art anything that commends it to their favourable notice, i.e. a quality as intrinsically irrelevant as antiquity is used as a mark against it. The truth is that there is a fashion in these matters, and people are influenced to a far greater extent than they are aware in their æsthetic appreciations by social habits. Another instance of this is the relatively recent enjoyment by civilized nationals of the art of primitive tribes ; it would seem likely that this is a case of diminution of æsthetic inhibition coinciding with a greater tolerance of other sexual customs and social codes than their own and resulting in an increased æsthetic enjoyment : anxiety is the chief inhibition of enjoyment, whether it be æsthetic or other.

(*d*) *The relation of limitation of æsthetic appreciation to inhibitions in love life.* The parallel between these two kinds of restriction is striking —the preference for newness or for age, the satisfaction in completeness and intolerance of a missing part, deformity, a ' foreign body ', the pleasure in private possession of the prized object and numbing of the senses in a public collection, the proneness to be disturbed from

the enjoyment of the whole if anxiety is roused by a part—all these peculiarities are in the person approaching an object whether it be artistic or sexual. The legend of Pygmalion reminds us that from classical times the connection between the two impulses was recognized and that a bridging of the gap might be abnormal. And yet there is a ready transfer of emotion from loved persons to works of art in normal people and many feel a refreshment of spirit from a work of art similar to that which they experience when they make the acquaintance of an inspiring person. It seems to be stronger than a mild narcotic and provides more than ' a temporary refuge for us from the hardships of life ' (Freud, 1929), though its influence may ' not [be] strong enough to make us forget real misery '—the same may be said of love—yet it has the power to penetrate beneath the surface of our minds and both assist us in our struggle with despair and help us to grasp those things which seem to triumph over death.

It seems that since we left the illuminating pages of Skeat and the O.E.D. we have drifted away from the subject of ugliness and have hardly touched on the creative impulse at all. Perhaps that will come later, but we must consider first some more general problems connected with what may be going on in the artist's mind when he is engaged on his work.

§ 5. Dream-Work and Art-Work [2]

' Dream-work ' is the best known instance of the interplay between unconscious impulses on the one hand and perceptions and memory traces on the other. In the dream the unconscious wish uses sensory perceptions and memory traces in order to express thoughts that cannot come to consciousness on account of repression ; the dream work consists in transforming the arrangement of images so that they have one meaning for the unconscious part of the mind and they may or may not have another sort of significance or interest for the conscious layer of the mind. Since the aim of the dream is to provide unconscious satisfaction to the dreamer it is as a rule a matter of relative indifference whether the manifest content of the dream makes sense for anyone else ; there is the familiar analogy of the play written by and performed for an audience of one—the dreamer.

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[2] The substance of this section was sent to about a hundred members of the British Psychological Society in December 1936.

Dreams differ in respect to the degree to which the manifest content shows the influence of the primary processes of thought (condensation, displacement, absence of contradiction, etc.) or ' perception identity ', or reveals the influence of the secondary processes of thought or ' thought identity '. Perhaps this difference in dreams could be employed also in æsthetics. Some works of art give the appearance at first meeting of being confused and formless (Surrealist pictures for example), others show at first sight at any rate the opposite tendency, viz. an effort to achieve exact representation of detail (Frith's ' Derby Day ' is an instance of this). Just as orderliness of the manifest content of the dream is not its most important characteristic for the analyst, so conventional forms are not the most important thing to the artist. The Surrealists deliberately imitate the dream but only of course the visible characteristics of the manifest content. On the analogy now being pressed, their work will be strong only so long as the force attaching to the latent content can be given full scope. Also on this analogy it would be as rash to judge an artist's work by the standard of his own theories as to value the significance of a dream (as a thing giving a key to important aspects of the dreamer's inner life) by the importance he attaches to its neat arrangement or its incoherence.

Both dreamer and artist strive to reduce mental tension; an important difference between the two work processes lying in the different ' audiences ' for whom the elaborate phantasy is produced.

We should try to relate the aphorism ' A dream is a play with an audience of one ', to the saying that an artist does not produce for himself but for the whole of humanity. Ferenczi (1913) in one of his brilliant asides put the question ' To whom does one relate one's dreams ? ' and quotes Lessing's couplet

> Alba mihi semper narrat sua somnia mane,
> Alba sibi dormit; somniat Alba mihi.

(It is just as charming in English: Alba always tells me her dreams in the morning; she sleeps for herself, but she dreams for me.) Sachs (1920), recalling our attention to the fact that the day-dream is a preliminary stage of poetry, considers that ' day-dreams in common ', in which two or more persons co-operate by giving up their closest ego-interests, should further our understanding of the production of poetry. He found that a common feeling of guilt leads the players of the story-telling game to seek and to find ' relief in the working-out of a day-dream, since in it lay an unconscious admission of the same

guilt of the other party. . . . The artist's own person has to step into the background for the sake of the effect of the work ! '

We could therefore arrange the dream series as follows : first the dreams for oneself alone, then the dreams for a particular person, then the day-dreams-in-common for the group playing that particular game. To apply this to art is no great step, but our explanation must also take into reckoning that the artist feels that his work is for the whole of humanity and for ' all time '. We achieve a simplification if we say that the ' inner audience ' for whom the artist works is the super-ego. This may influence his work on three levels : the least important super-ego element is derived from the art school where his technical accomplishment was in some measure shaped, where his work had to pass muster. It is a late acquisition, a conscious or pre-conscious level of mental operation, which guides the hand rather than fires the spirit. Another audience is that of the cultured people of his generation whose influence he absorbed during his formative years. The first influences his technique, the second commonly influences his choice of subject, neither have much to do with that which will make his work live. I suggest as a guess that there is a third kind of ' audience ' composed not of memory traces of actual people's actual behaviour but of those compounds of external experience and inner phantasy which following Melanie Klein we call ' inner objects '. A work of art is composed for them in the sense (to be elucidated more fully later) that they are the objects who are intended to be influenced ; they both give impetus to the creation of the work and are the objects to be influenced by it. Before we deal with this there is a general question to be touched on.

§ 6. What is it that is Satisfying in Art ?

Three answers to this question will be discussed ; first the factor of sensuous pleasure, secondly the relief of tension that comes when a conflict is solved, and thirdly an aspect which we may call an ' eternal ' factor, borrowing the term from common usage.

(*a*) *Sensuous pleasure.* It is usually held that the mere representation of a sensually attractive object does not constitute great art. The wide diversity of object-choice in the love life of man, and in its derivative the beauty-loving life, is so great that the attractiveness of a particular object exactly reproduced is bound to have a restricted appeal. At best this so to say photographic representation of the attractive

recalls past gratifications; what 'movement' it possesses is retrogressive, and even the recall of past pleasures is limited. Its effect is psychologically unstable, it cannot recall a moment from the past without recalling all of it, its pain and its guilt as well as its joys: the avoidance of discomforting aspects of experience does not reanimate experience but fosters illusion. Such art is a 'flight to beauty'; it reminds us of the struggles of the psychotic to conceive of a world more and more saturated with goodness so that he may cherish the illusion that evil does not exist in it at all. But anxiety and guilt cannot for long be denied, the attempt to evade them leads to an ever increasing emphasis on the charms of the object, till the point is reached when—in the case of a work of art—the observer can feel neither identification nor loving object-relation with the thing represented and dismisses it—as he would dismiss a person who had such a one-sided disposition—as insipid and uninteresting.

And yet sensuous pleasure lies at the very centre of art. It is clear that sensuous pleasure of the positive or attractive kind is not enough; the artist who is in flight to beauty creates an illusory world and does not help us much to face the pain of the real world nor does he endear it to us. I take it that I have been describing 'Escape Art' and its limitations.

(*b*) *The solution of conflict.* In work where this plays a large part the artist faces the problem of anxiety and guilt. The mind finds rest when it has first mastered pain and then turns to pleasure. This factor is easier to state than to demonstrate, but an example is seen in 'Hamlet' in which as Ernest Jones (1910) pointed out the playwright carries us into the painful situation of the Œdipus conflict and depicts various aspects of its solution. Drama deals with the tensions of triangular situations in the medium of the relation of living people; in the case of other arts the analogous interaction would be that of part-objects and the interplay of constructive and destructive tendencies. There is little I can say in support of this notion beyond the statement that it strikes me as somewhat plausible. Just as our adult emotional life is a great elaboration and synthesis of the primitive phantasies of childhood, so one would expect our adult art to be a similar elaboration and synthesis of the graphic impulses which in our early years gave expression to our need to exercise power over objects with the magic of drawing, and our need to externalize and fix those ever changing images and moods which disturbed our peace of mind.

To the child's phantasy a line *is* a parent figure, another line crossing it is the other parent or is a knife hewing the first in two. The pencil is a magic wand giving power over the figures to do good or ill as the mood is at the moment. This is a primitive expression of what the ' infantile artist ' *feels*, it bears no relation to what he *sees*. When a higher stage of graphic skill is reached there is a desire to bring under the dominion of the magic pencil objects seen in the outer world.

One might hazard a guess about the development of the graphic impulse having three phases: first the expression in the magical action—drawing—of primitive impulses directed against external objects, without regard to the accuracy of the representation of those external objects in the drawing—a depicting of inner phantasy, perhaps of the relation of inner objects to one another. In the second phase attention is paid to the depiction of the form of the external object, interest being driven to it perhaps through anxiety as to the fate of its inner counterpart, but the treatment of details is governed by part-object interests. In the third phase the element of ' composition ', always present even in the first phase though then rudimentary, now develops, perhaps as a result of the increasing capacity to separate the elements in the combined-parent figure ; this is the phase in which the interaction between inner and outer objects ceases to be wholly magical and acquires some of the characteristics of thought—delayed discharge of mental tension allowing for the matching of the product of the mind with the objects dealt with, whether these are external events and processes to be co-ordinated by the formulation of a law (as in science) or the matching of the feelings experienced on viewing an object after its exteriorization, with those experienced by the ego resulting from maybe unconscious introspection (as in art). Composition is probably always a synthesis of elements which the mind has decomposed or torn asunder, an effort of construction after a mental act of destruction.—This is a modification of Ella Sharpe's view (1930).

We may get a little further if we consider the nature of the instrument in the unconscious phantasy by means of which this magical control is exercised, and by considering the artist's relation to it. Sometimes we hear an artist say, ' If I am an artist, I live ; if not, I am dead. Unless I am creating, I am nothing ! ' There is felt to be something inside but separate from the self which is essentially creative, it produces ' art-children ' out of the artist, who is in a way passive to its power but active in response to it. If we follow carefully the early history of this mental experience we find it expressing a passive rela-

tion to a creative image of infancy, the father figure, and to the part of him which is both capable of creating and of entering another person. The creative power is in phantasy an inner possession because in phantasy its corporeal prototype was originally desired by the child for the purpose of incorporating it in the self, and thereby he could obtain control over his world, father, mother and all future children and rivals. But the incorporating process cannot be selective against the inclusion of the unpleasant; the ambivalence felt against the external object follows it into the inner sanctuary. Hate jeopardizes it in the one place as in the other. 'If I am an artist, I live' can be interpreted, 'Unless I have evidence that this object within me is alive and active in the creation of good things, there is nothing to live for since my hate against it will extinguish the producer of all that is good and desirable.' In such a case—perhaps in all—the production of a work of art takes away the sense of guilt arising from the fact that death wishes are streaming towards and stifling the good object which was once external and now in phantasy is harboured within the self. Artists sometimes feel that they are the trustees of a great treasure, this accounts for their modesty; at times they feel so close an identification with the great force within them that they reckon themselves as gods. In this connection and in view of the infantile origin of the notion of god and of creativeness the arrogance of some artists is not a thing to be wondered at.

(*c*) *The 'eternal' factor.* Of one thing an artist is certain when he has achieved his highest purpose: that its power to affect the heart of man will last for ever. It is not a sufficient explanation that his work will give satisfaction beyond his lifetime and that in the reckoning of time after our death we count a thousand years as but a day; the imperviousness of the unconscious to thoughts of personal extinction and to the gauging of time do not bring us to the correct position, as it seems to me, to value this feeling of the 'eternal' in art. Nor I think should we lean overmuch on the thought that through the most intimate contact of the artist's mind with generation after generation of men he extends the duration of his influence to timeless dimensions. Such a pre-conscious thought may make an artist the readier to speak of his own or another person's art as of everlasting value, but the same motive cannot influence us who merely look at and appreciate his work.

A work of art appeals to us in proportion to the depth of the emotional level which is stirred in our minds; the artist cannot take us

where he himself has never been. If we limit ourselves to what might be called the biographer's life of the artist we cannot explain the power these people have to affect nearly the whole of mankind. But if we take into consideration the intensity of infantile pain, the enormous courage and endurance of the child in the face of what it feels to be great dangers to itself and to loved ones, its passionate belief that in spite of the fact that its world is reduced to chaos nevertheless it will and can put things right, its good humour due to its belief that in spite of its own evil impulses it has the power to restore and recreate a good world again and that its good objects will remain, if we reckon with the fact that the child goes through periods when the face of familiar things is changed and all that it loves and trusts is crushed by its own violence and befouled by its hate, and if with all this we reckon with the influence and power of infantile phantasy and experience upon our adult perception and emotion : then we may see how the artist can lead us into and out of the world of suffering. His creative activity is the Beginning of a New World built on the ruins of the old ; those strokes of the brush in his phantasy build up bit by bit the good objects which he has destroyed and makes them come to life. (I do not mean to imply that all great art is done in a paroxysm of nervous breakdown, but that unless the artist can reach down to the experience of deep anxiety and find the way out his work will not give us a deeper understanding of ourselves or a fuller enjoyment of life.)

But to return to our question. Time is not really the point of discussion, *death* is the thing referred to. The immortal work of art is not one which has merely survived through the ages from the carelessness and indifference of other people, but is a living proof that the artist himself has stayed the course of havoc and has himself made life come out of dust and confusion. In all nature death is the only irreversible reaction, the triumph and the illusion of art is that it can turn back the dead into the world of the living.

It is not so really. It is believed to be so. But artists feel it this way, and because we wish for the same outcome we give currency to the conception about the eternal value of a great work of art. At least this much is true, that these treasures are the nearest to the eternal that man can make, and in fact both in antiquity and in the reverence they compel they can meet the challenge of the everlasting hills.

We have been speaking about works of art to the neglect of that to which the term beauty is most applied—the human face. Of its

beauty we say that it contains an undying loveliness, though we know that half a dozen decades will end it. Do we only mean that we hope that the satisfaction we get from the contemplation of the beautiful face will never be erased from our memory by pain or destroyed by hate ?

I would like at this point to refer to a curious experience. A patient in deep depression came for analysis. She was dressed in black and wore knotted round her neck a long scarlet rope of silk, her face was hooded with a large black hat. She wore black gauntlets of shiny kid, but her fingers which kept up a twisting angular movement seemed too small for the gloves so that the thin leather creased and bent as if it were the loose scaly covering of a bird's claw. Her face was made up in the livid purplish colouring of a corpse ; her mouth was curved almost to deformity and was usually drawn in, but it opened and closed slowly as the tip of the black kid claw pulled down the lower lip. Her brow was drawn and her eyes stared intently at nothing. All this while she uttered soft groans, saying to herself ' Oh ! Oh ! Oh ! '. In the course of a session a commonplace interpretation was made ; instantly she changed to a new creature. The angular movements of her fingers gave place to a smooth stroking of her body, the claw turned to a soft caressing hand, the hunched shoulders relaxed, her brow smoothed, her eyes brightened, the hollows in her face filled with smiling cheeks, her expression was radiant. The thought crossed my mind, ' Why, my goodness, she is beautiful ! '

Reflection showed that in repose (I am not speaking of the expression in melancholy) and even when smiling, which had great charm, the attribution of beauty might perhaps be an exaggeration. My first idea was that my mind followed the quick return of animation, and, possibly in relief of strain, overshot the due mark of appreciation. But to that view another and less psycho-mechanical explanation can be added. For the moment my words—so I then regarded the episode, or so my unconscious phantasy ran—had brought this living corpse to life. It was a miracle, and the description ' beautiful ' was applied because that is what we think of life when we expect death, that is what we think when we see the signs of triumph over death.

Since having this experience I have wondered whether some of the special power to hold a lasting position in the memory which some film actresses possess, I think of one in particular, is not due to the fact that in repose she has at times the appearance of enduring an almost unbelievable burden of inner misery and mental pain, and not once but several times in each film we see that ' miracle ' occur—

under the influence of her partner or from the upwelling of her own emotion that bare skull grows soft and human.

One of the characteristics of beauty is its power to convey the feeling that struggle is over, that peace has come at last. Though we may go into the depths of pain and depression again and again we carry with us the assurance that through all violence and evil there has remained this marvellous witness to the endurance of life over death. Once deathless is deathless ever more !

In all this only one aspect of beauty is touched on, that which leads to the reduction of anxiety and pain, not that which leads to the heightening of pleasure and desire. Or should one say that which leads directly to the heightening of pleasure and desire ? It is doubtful whether the direct paths of the mind are as straight and simple as they seem ; maybe we only wish they were so, so that we need take no reckoning of the way our mind is shaped by pain.

What, it may be asked, has all this talk of Beauty to do with our topic—Ugliness ? Only this, that it does not do to try to answer over-simple questions on the terms of reference which wishful thinking too readily provides. This paper serves merely to emphasize a possible genetic connection between the pain due to destructive impulses and the paramount need to create lasting goodness and wholeness from what had been in phantasy injured and rendered bad. The urge to Reparation is, owing to the strange nature of human mental development, probably an integral part of creative activity ; the horror of the ugly and the wish to change it is that *vis a tergo* which thrusts us into constructive work in art, in science and even in the humble tasks of our daily round.

§ 7. What is Ugliness ?

Ugliness has power over us, we cannot treat it with indifference. It rouses our deep-set emotions and its horror lingers in the memory. The etymology of the word shows that it is closely connected in men's minds with fear ; but we also find on closer viewing that it rouses anxiety and guilt. A sailor may call a cloud ' ugly ' but he means only that it forebodes the dangers of a storm ; as an artist (on land) he might regard its splendour with admiration because its threats will not assail him ; as an ordinary being he might find relief, as many do, at watching the development of an *external* tempest, which being none of his making can be viewed without rousing inner alarm or misgiving. If there should be horror we can safely say that it is due to the arousal

of early phobias and phantasies in which the raging elements are surrogates for persons whom he himself has lashed to fury, and that he dreads to witness the external fulfilment of his own secret wishes or to see spread out before him the awful chaos which lies within himself.

The case of a cloud called 'ugly' is really too simple to help us much; but what do we mean by an ugly face? Is there a face that all mankind would call ugly; an awfulness that strikes chill into the heart of every soul? A configuration of chaos, a sense of something destroyed, of hate embodied in or indelibly marked upon human flesh, that we have no power to transform? As eternal beauty is a challenge to destruction and a triumph, is ugliness a challenge and a victory, but to the other side? Ugliness is not merely displeasing in the highest degree, a cause of mental pain, giving no promise of peace, it is something which stirs phantasies so profoundly that our minds cannot let the object alone; it does not feel as if this thing has merely 'happened' but that it is something done to hurt. I believe that the fear which ugliness rouses is due to the irrefutable evidence which it provides that the will to destructiveness has been let loose; and we turn from it in part through dread of the temptation of complicity, in part because we cannot bear to contemplate what in our unconscious phantasy we have already done to something that was and might again be good. Those whose lives have been shaped by restitutive impulses, the Sisters of Mercy, nurses, and those who minister to the incurables, and also those who are fortified by the desire to fulfil a special office, the priest giving extreme unction or relatives attending to the wants of the dying, do not notice or are seemingly unaffected by appearances which all others would call the ugliest manifestations of deformity and disease; and such is the power of affection, often supported it is true by the process we call 'denial', that persons whose character and conduct seems of the ugliest are to those dear to them people who are only troubled in spirit and struggling with difficulties.

The word 'ugly' is used as a judgement upon an object or as the expression of an emotional response to it, and always denotes a disturbance, present or latent, of equanimity in the presence or at the thought of the object. If we are dissatisfied with a description or definition of the term which allows for so much subjective bias, it means, I think, that we are trying to make our intellectual judgements an absolute criterion, like an act of mensuration where both end points can be tested with complete freedom. But if we must be content, as I think is the case—and we can only be satisfied with it if we are

convinced that it is true—that in the emotional life of man there is always a point of reference, a zero on the measuring scale, that lies in the unconscious part of the mind, then we must adapt our mode of research, or at least one part of it, to a closer understanding of the unconscious factors which influence if they do not govern our æsthetic judgement and appreciation.

(If one end of the measuring scale is buried out of sight we must forgo absolute standards and use the concept of quantity only so far as it applies to what we can observe. In this connection I have made no attempt to apply the dialectical conception of a change of quantity producing a change of quality; this cannot for long be ignored in respect to the problem of anxiety though so far few analysts have dealt with this.)

Man, it has often been said, is a religious animal; this notion is used to support the view that there must therefore be a God, an Absolute of Creativeness and Initiation, towards which we poor mortals must inevitably turn in our moments of need and to whom we must give thanks for our blessings. Man, it is less often said, is an Art-needing animal, and by the same process of ratiocination it is thought that there must be an Absolute of Beauty to which as the lodestone draws iron we half blind mortals turn for a criterion and for refreshment. Both views express a lofty if rather childish aspiration but they are hard to reconcile with man's position in animal creation. If we were oriented, as I imagine the animals are, in a relatively simple way, to the objects which excite our interest; if we desired without doubting our love and hated without qualm; if our periods of rut and non-rut were more or less separated, and the sexual impulse only thrust itself upon us when we were independent of parental care and capable of achieving coitus and reproduction after the manner of those who produced us; if the litter in which we were born was not confused and encumbered with the still dependent but vigorous offspring of the litter before us, and we had no ground for jealousy of those that came after us—if all these things were so, I doubt if we should have deep rooted in our mental life our load of anxiety and guilt. But there we should not be human, and, as Freud said, none of us would change places with the creatures in an animal community however much we might feel discontented with our human civilization. The reason for this, I surmise, is that, these experiences having become engrained, we need to work over the tangle until it is straightened out. There is a limit to the process of denial; under strain or through

our weakness we can deny a part of the reality of our inner life, but not all of it. Born into a human world we shoulder a burden characteristically human that cannot be laid down.

The mark of our humanity is the depth of our capacity to love and the agony which overwhelms us when our loved ones lie in danger from our own aggression. The strongest passions arose when we were weak and least able to control them, and our minds were flooded with phantasies which roused—and still rouse—our horror and excite our sensual cravings. On this foundation our mental lives and our civilization is built.

In the works of man, as in those which we separate and call the products of nature, we see creative and destructive forces in active interplay. When we discern the influence of creation predominating we are moved by something we call beauty, when we see destruction we recoil at the ugly. Our need for beauty springs from the gloom and pain which we experience from our destructive impulses to our good and loved objects; our wish is to find in art evidence of the triumph of life over death; we recognize the power of death when we say a thing is ugly.

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LAUGHTER AS AN EXPRESSIVE PROCESS

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PSYCHO-ANALYSIS OF EXPRESSIVE BEHAVIOUR[1]

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I. Formulation of the Problem

It is possible to distinguish two formulations of the problem in regard to the psychology of laughter. One examines the occasion and cause of laughter and the underlying question runs: '*When* does one laugh?'; the other examines laughter as a physical process and the underlying question is: '*How* does one laugh?' The first question has as its focus the psychology of the comic,[2] and the second the facts of physiology and anatomy. Laughter as a physical process, and more precisely as an *expressive* process, will form the starting-point of this paper, but a choice must be made out of the problems in this field and some things must be omitted which would otherwise stand in the foreground. For our aim is to examine, by means of this example, what contribution psycho-analytical considerations can make to the understanding of expressive processes; it is clear that the scope of those considerations is only a limited one and cannot cover the whole subject.

The expression of the human countenance and its play of feature have a mysterious power. They play a decisive rôle in the contact between man and man, always confronting us with the riddle: what is the relation between man's appearance and his personality?[3] In every

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[1] Based on a paper entitled 'Bemerkungen über das Lachen, Beitrag zur Psychologie der Mimik', read before the Fourteenth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Marienbad, 1936.

[2] For purposes of definition: not everything that is comic is laughed at, not all laughter is a reaction to something comic.

[3] In the scientific study of expression, 'expressive behaviour' ['*Mimik*'] or 'pathognomy' ['*Pathognomik*' (from the Greek '*pathos*' = 'feeling')]—and I employ these terms indifferently—has to be kept distinct from 'physiognomy', which is based upon the physical framework of the face. The antithesis between the two points of view was brought out as early as the eighteenth century in Lichtenberg's polemic against the physiognomy of Lavater. The doctrines of physiognomy have persisted to a certain extent in the science of bodily build; pathognomy

field of psychological research approaches to this question have been sought. Psycho-analysis too has contributed to such attempts: the countenance of a predominantly anal or oral person has been described by a successful use of intuition.[4] But we do not intend to pursue such attempts here; what we shall deal with is not the characterological side of expressive behaviour, but expressive activity itself and the course it takes.

When seeking orientation with regard to the expressive behaviour of another person, one uses two kinds of data: his unintentional reactions to stimuli and the signals he makes to his fellow men, because only a part of his expressive behaviour is directed towards the other person, whereas the whole of it is perceived by the latter and serves the purposes of social contact.[5] Expression as a means of contact is called 'the speech of the human countenance'.[6] We venture on such

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or expressive behaviour is a part of the branch of psychology first studied scientifically by Bell and Darwin, namely the psychology of expression. Cf. Lersch, *Gesicht und Seele*, 1932, and a more recent compendium of wider appeal, Herland, *Gesicht und Charakter*, 1937. For historical references see H. Pollnow, 'Historisch-kritische Beiträge zur Physiognomik', *Jahrbuch für Charakterologie*, Bd. V, 1928, and K. Bühler, *Ausdruckstheorie*, 1933.

[4] Cf. Abraham, 'Contributions to the Theory of the Anal Character' (1921), *Selected Papers*, p. 391, and Gerö, 'Zum Problem der oralen Fixierung', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, Bd. XXIV, 1939.

[5] Cf. Buytendijk and Plessner, *Philosophischer Anzeiger*, Bd. I, 1925–26; from another aspect, cf. Bernfeld, *Die Psychologie des Säuglings*, 1925, *passim*, especially S. 44 f. If one thinks of the contact achieved through expressive behaviour as a 'transmitter-receiver system', one may look for disturbance at both ends if the contact is disturbed. Disturbances relating to the *transmitter* will be dealt with later. Concerning those relating to the *receiver* I shall only say this: people who interpret the expressions of others with considerable uncertainty and whose understanding of them is to a high degree unstable are usually disturbed themselves, or easily can be, with regard to their own expressions. But the converse does not seem to be true.

[6] F. Lange, *Die Sprache des menschlichen Antlitzes*, 1937. This kind of speech extends far beyond the species *homo sapiens*—but of course the trustworthiness of communication varies. We understand animals too, and we can even 'understand' some things in plants. (Cf. Buytendijk and Plessner, *op. cit.*, S. 108.) In this sense the limit of understanding is set by bodily experience.

a comparison not in order to demarcate the line between the verbal and the pathognomic giving of information, but because this comparison offers a useful approach for a survey of the problems which pathognomy presents to science and the scope of our limited subject can be defined with its help.[7] We distinguish at the outset between *linguistic* questions and those concerning the *history of speech*. We may ascribe to the latter the researches of Darwin, who tried to discover how pathognomy had developed in the course of human evolution as a medium of communication, a question concerning the prehistory of expressive behaviour. But even since its establishment the speech of the human countenance has certainly not been without its history. It became differentiated according to age, social position, race and period, in the same way as speech through human gesture, of which it is regarded as the most universal part. Compared with these questions of prehistory and history, those of the linguistic branch of research would seem somewhat more modest. One can direct one's research to the vocabulary of pathognomic speech, to the *types* of pathognomic expression, and, in the case of laughter, to types and sub-types of laughter ; the answering of these questions falls into a descriptive or classifying field of work. A further investigation can be made of the *grammar* of pathognomy, where the question is one of the method of formation of each separate pathognomic act, and in the case of laughter, the method by which it arises as a bodily, and, in particular, as a pathognomic process, which concerns the anatomy and physiology of pathognomy. Finally one can investigate the *syntax* into which the vocabulary and grammar of pathognomy are fitted. This question, which relates to the central regulation of the pathognomic processes, will be in the foreground of our discussions, while others can only be incidentally touched upon.

If we attempt to estimate, in regard to laughter, the scope and importance of this formulation of the question, we must first refer to the extensive field of work which has been opened up by neurological research, such as the work of Oppenheim, Bechterew, Brissaud, Dumas, etc. on the pathology of laughter in cases of disease of the brain. In comparison with this imposing trend of research, a more modest task

[7] K. Bühler has examined the history and significance of such a comparison between the speech of expression and verbal speech. The angle of approach adopted here was suggested by his line of argument. A discussion of Bühler's point of view regarding the psychology of expression cannot be attempted here.

falls to the hypotheses at which we are aiming; they deal with the problem of the central regulation of expressive behaviour as a problem of psycho-analytic ego-psychology.[8]

We can make a connection with psycho-analytic research if we start from the fact that the human body as an apparatus for movement constitutes a unit, in which expressive and motor activity cannot be separated from each other. The fact that the system Pcs., 'the last system at the motor end', controls motility, gives us sure ground to stand on. We are concerned with a preconscious, automatically discharged ego-function.[9] Since he introduced the theme in *Studien über Hysterie*, Freud formulated the problem in this way, and on this foundation Abraham, Ferenczi, Landauer, Fenichel and others have based their considerations.[10] It is not our intention to add anything new to these researches. What is new in psycho-analytic research always arises out of analytic experience; but by glancing over one's analytic material, which anyone can do, as well as by reviewing psycho-analytic literature, the impression is confirmed that only rarely and in special cases (as in cases of *tic*) does one have the opportunity of bringing into the foreground of analytic discussions the questions referred to here, namely, the 'slighter' psychological disturbances of the apparatus controlling expressive and general movement. Our observation is mostly limited to chance occurrences which appear on the periphery of the field of treatment. To some such observations I am indebted for whatever understanding I bring to the questions to be discussed in what follows. They have given me the opportunity of relating together, in a way that I shall try to present here, reflections which have occupied me in another connection for a long time. My aim is to give an exposition of the operation of the ego in the phenomenon of expression and this will be exemplified by reference to the process of laughter.

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[8] I make no attempt here to prove the correctness of this formulation of the question, as opposed to a neurological one, or to mark off the one from the other.

[9] For the theory of such ego-functions cf. Hartmann's recent paper, 'Ich-Psychologie und Anpassungsproblem', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, Bd. XXIV, 1939. (Abstracted in this JOURNAL, Vol. XXI, 1940, p. 214.)

[10] Cf. in particular Landauer, 'Automatismen, Zwangsneurose und Paranoia', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XIII, 1927, and Fenichel, 'Über organlibidinöse Begleiterscheinungen der Triebabwehr', *ibid.*, Bd. XIV, 1928.

II. The Ego and Laughter

(1) *Laughter as a Social Act*

Let us consider first a concrete situation, by analysing which we shall try to proceed step by step to a more general understanding. Some people are in a room together and in one part of it laughing begins; it spreads and becomes a social act. We then look for an explanation of the phenomenon; we shall try to give it step by step, without avoiding detours, and yet without being able to complete it in one important point.[11]

Laughter breaks out, according to one of Freud's theories, which has been confirmed again and again, when a sum of psychic energy which has been employed for the cathexis of certain psychic trends suddenly becomes unusable.[12] What use can we make of this theory for our problem?

Let us start with a special case, that of some kind of occasion which provokes a common outburst of laughter among some people whom we are watching—the telling of a joke perhaps. This is a familiar example which we know from Freud's description: the communication of an experience or the mutual experience of the comic through the telling of a joke affects the listener like 'an invitation to common aggression and common regression'. One part of the psychic energy which is freed—if we consider an aggressive joke for instance—comes from the saving of an expenditure of energy for repression, the other part, the pleasure-gain, comes from a common regression and common utilization of infantile modes of thought. The pleasure-gain from regression shows us that the adult requires a certain cathexis, i.e. expenditure of energy, to curb in himself the way of working of the primary process, which breaks through in the infantile modes of thought contained in the comic of adults.[13] And so laughter indicates in a double sense mutual understanding and mutual guilt.

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[11] Cf. below, p. 324, footnote 23.

[12] In Freud (*Der Witz, Gesammelte Schriften*, Bd. IX, S. 164) the word 'suddenly' does not occur. It seems to me that the word is essential since it is precisely the 'shock-nature' and suddenness of the discharge which is the specific precondition of laughter. A more detailed confirmation of this interpretation, which approaches Reik's point of view, would lead us into the psychology of the comic proper, which cannot be discussed here.

[13] Strictly speaking we ought to speak here of an expenditure for suppression. In the first case an instinctual impulse is suppressed and in the second a method of behaviour.

To apply this to our example : the united action which takes place within the human group, the group-formation in laughing, is to be understood as a joint way of reacting. This seems to be in accordance with the fact that when someone joins a laughing group, as a stranger to it, he becomes acutely conscious of being an outsider.[14] He cannot join in the laughter when the others laugh ; for *them* anything is good enough to laugh at, everything adds to their mirth ; to *him*, the things that amuse them seem senseless and stupid ; he has not made the intellectual regression with them and it will be some time before he can adjust himself and then, in laughing, become part of the laughing group.

But how does it happen that an alliance is formed between those who laugh—that laughter becomes a group-situation ? Can we hope to find an answer that will satisfy us by means of this illustration of telling jokes? An argument against this is provided by simple observation : in a group-situation one may join in the laugh without quite knowing what the laughter is about, in fact without even knowing anything about it at all. At this point laughter is not necessarily a reaction to a common stimulus. The laughter of the group no longer requires a ' butt ' to laugh at, it can itself represent both content and sealing of the pact. The motive for laughing will sink into the background in this way, as the mass-tie becomes sufficiently strengthened, at the same time that the controlling and inhibiting function of the individual becomes restricted. Every weakening of the ego can hasten this condition, a slight intoxication being the most certain method.

At this point let us consider once more our illustration, the telling of a joke. Here too the aim is the creating of a group, the establishing of a community, schematically a ' group of two '. But the weaker the identification secured by the group-situation, so much the cleverer must the device be and so much the better the joke ; conversely, these standards are lowered if the collectivity is firmly established, until laughter, apparently without cause, or easily provoked, leaps from one

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[14] Cf. Bergson's fine description of this situation : *Le rire*, p. 6 f. It is not only valid for laughing : ' Un homme, à qui l'on demandait pourquoi il ne pleurait pas à un sermon où tout le monde versait des larmes, répondit " Je ne suis pas de la paroisse ".' This ' not being able to join in the laugh ' is met with as a symptom in obsessional neurotics ; cf. Ernest Jones, *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, Third Edition, 1923, p. 534.

person to another. But what is the source of the 'freed psychic energy' in this case, and how shall we understand laughter in this case to be discharge of pleasure?

For an explanation we must focus our attention on the fact that laughter is a *bodily* process, which may be distinguished by two characteristics: by the coming into prominence of a rhythmic movement, primarily depending on an interference with outward breathing brought about by the intercostal muscles,[15] and by an accompanying excitation of the whole body, which is clearest in an attack of laughing: one is convulsed with laughter.

Instead of any description I will introduce here a quotation from the best psychological tradition. Cicero (*de Oratore*, IV, 441) declares: 'Ore, vultu denique ipse toto corpore ridetur.' Laughter begins with the mouth, gradually spreads over the whole face, and finally indeed over the whole body—i.e. a pathognomic act is changed into or, more exactly, changed back into a motor one. Here also it is a matter of regression, the reduction or renouncing of functions which the ego otherwise carries out. These conditions also—no matter whether of reduction or renunciation—are to be understood as regression to an earlier level of behaviour, if we think along the lines of the ontogenesis of human motor activity.[16] The motor activity of infants has rhythmical muscular actions as its principal character and these become co-ordinated in the course of cortical development. The acquiring of bodily control culminates, from four to six years of age, in a phase of development distinguished by the grace with which individual movements are carried out and it has been described as the period of 'luxury of movement' in children. One can observe something analogous in the expressive behaviour of childhood. At first there are strong but undifferentiated reactions to pleasure and unpleasure;[17]

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[15] Cf. G. Dumas, *Nouveau traité de psychologie*, T. III, p. 244.

[16] Cf. Homburger, 'Über die Entwicklung der menschlichen Motorik und ihre Beziehung zu den Bewegungsstörungen der Schizophrenie', *Zeitschrift für die ges. Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, Bd. LXXVIII, 1922. Homburger's views, as Landauer has already pointed out ('Die kindliche Bewegungsunruhe', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XII, 1926), approach those of psycho-analysis in several important respects. For example, he distinguishes in the historical development of human motor activity a dichronous onset, which corresponds exactly to the dichronous onset of sexual development, in the Freudian sense.

[17] Cf. Drommard, *La mimique chez les aliénés*, 1909, p. 3.

differentiation takes place by a gradual acquisition of newer forms of communication and by a toning down of the older ones. Let us visualize the face of an infant at the moment when it begins to be contorted: we do not know whether he is going to laugh or cry. (Anticipating what comes later, I may add that it is possible for an adult also at the peak of an emotional experience to say that he does not know whether he feels impelled to laugh or to cry.) It is only the continuous development of the pathognomy of the child which leads gradually to an ability to supplement involuntary reactions to stimulus by signals to the environment which show differentiated mental processes. Considering the two lines of development together, we may say that a generalized periodic and undifferentiated process of expression is developed in the service of the reality principle in two directions not previously differentiated, towards *purposive* movements and *expressive* movements (Homburger). Their distinction only emphasizes the statement that all purposive movements are expressive as well; a person's walk, the way in which he performs a purposive movement can tell us something about his nature, what sort of a person he is. The converse does not hold: not all expression is purposive.

What has just been stated in the terminology used by contributors to neurology, particularly Homburger, may now be expressed in Freudian terms.[18] The musculature was originally used in the service of the pleasure principle for the relief of the mental apparatus from situations of stimulation, by discharging unco-ordinated stimuli in movement and by sending innervations to the interior of the body, which set going pathognomy and general movement. Only when the reality principle was introduced did the unco-ordinated movements become ' purposive actions ', or—and this is my insertion—appropriate signals, i.e. they were used for an effective mastering of the outer world and—by the same token—for making contact with the environment.

And now another statement of Freud's, to the effect that the necessary restraint of motor discharge is provided by means of the process of thought. We shall not proceed with a direct recapitulation of Freud's train of thought; everything seems to point to a familiar formula: the language of the body is replaced by the language of

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[18] Cf. especially ' Formulations regarding the two Principles in Mental Functioning ', *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 16.

words. Thereby a state of affairs arises which is of fundamental importance for the development of motor acts: the acquisition of speech was the event which determined the fate of one branch of general movement, namely, movements of expression; that branch is the more archaic means of expression, and its 'plasticity' is lessened through verbal language. Experimental research confirms this. In the case of children of normal intelligence the capacity to use expressive movements for purposes of making themselves understood gradually diminishes and for early latency it is true to say that the higher the level of intelligence, the less the capacity to use the body as an apparatus for expression. It is well established that this experimental finding depends on the acquisition of speech, since the capacity remains latent in normal cases and is regained by people who become deaf and dumb after organic illness.[19]

The phrase 'language of words instead of language of the body' requires nevertheless some modification. Bodily processes of expression are not completely replaced; certain forms of expression—'gestures' and the whole field of pathognomic expressions—remain. The amount of what remains varies according to social position and the level of culture, but for the normal person expression *toto corpore* is eliminated. This elimination, which among civilized peoples certainly does not take place only under the pressure of education, appears to correspond to an evolutionary curve in phylogenesis: it is evident that expressive movements shown by less civilized peoples are more lively and various than our own.[20] But even

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[19] Cf. T. Schäfer, 'Über gebärdliche Verhaltensweisen insbesondere bei Kindern', *Archiv für die ges. Psychologie*, Bd. XCI, 1934. This stimulating paper also deals with expressive behaviour in the latency period and the conclusion is reached that the average capacity for expression is low in this phase. I have not been able to convince myself that these findings are sufficiently well established.

[20] That is particularly true of the free uninhibited laughter *toto corpore*: 'The aborigines of Australia express their emotions freely, and they are described by my correspondents as jumping about and clapping their hands for joy, and as often roaring with laughter. . . . Mr. Bulmer, a missionary in a remote part of Victoria, remarks, "that they have a keen sense of the ridiculous; they are excellent mimics, and when one of them is able to imitate the peculiarities of some absent member of the tribe, it is very common to hear all in the camp convulsed with laughter".' (Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions*, p. 218.) An analogous observa-

primitive society recognizes limitations, as well as conditions under which special freedom is permitted to expressive movement: these considerations are part determinants of orgy and dance as ritual customs.

To complete our review let us turn our attention to the animal species. A quotation will help us here: 'Animals have not shared in the transformation of grasping into pointing movements' (Cassirer), which for the first time posit an object. An animal lacks the capacity to point things out; in short, an animal has no index-finger, its whole body being its apparatus for expression.[21] This anthropological approach marks out a field which includes the development from autoplastic to alloplastic behaviour and allows us to recognize pathognomy as the 'legitimate residue' of what was once a more universal method of behaviour. The more archaic methods of expression, however, have not lost their power of attraction; we recognize them in various phenomena of human behaviour and may ask under what conditions civilized man is inclined to turn again to the archaic type of expression, namely *toto corpore*.

A survey of these conditions is not difficult: if we disregard cases of pathological damage to the central nervous system, it is always a matter of alteration in the extent of the ego's power, of the limitation of one or more of its functions on the part of or in favour of the id. The clearest cases are those in which the ego is overwhelmed by instinctual claims or affects. The rôle of the instinct can be seen at once: in states of sensuous excitement everything presses forward

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tion was kindly put at my disposal by Róheim. A central Australian who listened to a gramophone record of Róheim's, which he could not possibly have understood, began to laugh unrestrainedly when laughter began to come from the record; he threw himself on the ground as he laughed. Many ethnologists referred to by Sully (*Essay on Laughter*, 1902) think that the free laughter of primitives can be distinguished from the restrained laughter of those who have been in contact with missionaries. Experienced field-workers dispute this statement.

[21] Cf. Otto Witte, 'Untersuchungen über die Gebärdensprache', *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*, Bd. CXVI, 1930, S. 205 ff. With regard to the disturbances shown by psychotics, the behaviour may be such that the whole body suddenly becomes the vehicle of expression; for a description and evaluation of this see Nunberg, 'Über den katatonischen Anfall', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. VI, 1920, S. 25 ff. and especially S. 38.

with a different rhythm. And, as Edward Glover [22] has pointed out, the motor apparatus functions in many ways that remind us of the movements of an infant. Something analogous is true of facial expressions: what would be regarded as normal in the 'speech of the countenance' is overstepped in states of physical excitement. One speaks of an expression of animal greed. What is still more evident—though it can only be noted aphoristically here—is that no fixed pattern of expression has been evolved for orgasm. The id has no expressive behaviour. A state of violent emotion has similar characteristics: in a furious temper the human countenance can become a grimace, at times of the keenest despair there is a breaking-through of rhythmical movement in attacks of uncontrollable sobbing and crying. Something similar happens in the act of laughing and it enables us to see how narrow the dividing line is which separates the expressions of opposite affects. But we are now concerned with the differences and not the likenesses. The rhythmic shaking of the body in laughter is marked by the positive and not the negative sign. It is pleasurable, it serves to discharge mental energy in the service of the pleasure principle. In laughter too the whole body becomes, to a varying degree, an 'apparatus for expression'; archaic pleasure in movement is reactivated and is socially permissible.

Let us return once more to our starting point. Group laughter, as shown in infectious laughter, is to be understood as regression in common. It requires no 'occasion'; what is tolerated in this case need not be some special way of thinking, or aggressive thoughts, but the behaviour itself, namely laughter. But according to this theory some part at least of the energy set free for laughing comes from a diminution of expenditure, which would otherwise be used to safeguard our 'adult behaviour', making it appear that we are 'in complete control' of our motor and expressive behaviour.[23]

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[22] 'The Significance of the Mouth in Psycho-Analysis', *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, Vol. IV, 1924, p. 139. Something similar has been observed in the case of laughter too; here stamping occurred, like that of a little child in a temper. (Cf. C. Vanlar, 'La psychologie du rire', *Bull. Acad. R. de Bruxelles, Classe de sciences*, 1903, p. 1295 ff.)

[23] The discussion of laughter as a social activity is not pursued here beyond what is useful for our special purpose. For instance, an important problem concerning the nature of *infection* in pathognomic-motor activity demands separate treatment, such as that given in the special contributions to this question by Schilder. (His latest contribution is to be found in

(2) *The Control of Laughter*

That laughter holds a unique position is made very plain by the fact that we can seek out laughter. We are inclined to give in to it and long for the relief it brings. 'I should like to laugh to-day!' we say, and we often succeed. Looked at from this point of view laughter belongs to the extensive group, 'enjoyments', the tame descendants of primitive orgies, which are characterized by the same relief and the same voluntary sinking below the wearisome high level of adult every-day behaviour. But that is not the only conceivable case and perhaps not even the most frequent.

We may also start laughing without meaning to; it can also happen *in opposition to* the ego and it can attack us quite suddenly. We become weak with laughing; he who laughs is defenceless. When laughter overcomes us and disarms us, we speak of an attack of laughing; it has been repeatedly compared to an epileptic attack. An attack of laughter is often very difficult to stop; it is much easier to prevent it starting, to control it before it develops. This is best done, as everyone knows, by diligently turning our attention to something else: the ego function of attention is called up to check a threatened process which would otherwise be uncontrollable.[24] This method of procedure is universally valid for the function of attention. It is characteristic of this function that it lays claim to the whole of us; any other activity interferes with it; we hold our breath when we pay attention. On the basis of this theory, which one may accept, that a close relation exists between many automatic actions of the body and ego functions, let us return once more to the suppression of laughter by a voluntary diversion: the ego acts here (as Ferenczi has said) like a railway pointsman.[25]

But how does this switching-over work in the case of laughter? Two extensive groups of substitute actions are observable in the

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The Image and Appearance of the Human Body, Psych. Monogr. No. 4, London, 1935.)

[24] Cf. Suter, 'Die Beziehung zwischen Aufmerksamkeit und Atem', *Archiv für die ges. Psychologie*, 1925; cf. also Fenichel, 'Über respiratorische Introjektion', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XVII, 1931, S. 254, and Ferenczi's highly condensed paper 'Thinking and Muscle Innervation' (1919), *Further Contributions*, p. 231.

[25] 'Die Psyche als Hemmungsorgan', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. VIII, 1922, S. 204.

pathognomic apparatus. It is possible to *make* a serious face instead of laughing; the laughter is suppressed, but a somewhat artificial expression persists. This artificiality can be described as a special kind of rigidity. The approach to motility is shut off and is anxiously kept shut; all play of the facial muscles is stopped in order to prevent them being seized by laughter. The other way out is more remarkable: if one can call the first a complete turning away of the ego, the second strikes one as a victorious fight, in which the desire to laugh is subjugated and becomes reduced to a smile. A movement producing sound and spreading to all parts of the body is reduced to a play of the muscles around the mouth; in the words of Cicero: *ore* instead of *vultu* and *toto corpore*. This is the way out which polite manners recommend. In the West it goes back to Plato and Seneca but it has been constantly in force outside the bounds of Mediterranean civilization; the most famous instance of this is well expressed in the 144th letter of the Earl of Chesterfield to his Son, in which he says: '. . . and I could heartily wish, that you may often be seen to smile but never heard to laugh while you live.' But what was taught as a model of behaviour for an English gentleman in the eighteenth century has a general currency, though with a varying intensity: for us too smiling is 'higher' than laughing, we regard it as the humanization of laughter. But however indisputable this theory seems to me, it still requires some comment, because if we test our theory that the smile is a restricted and more civilized form of laughing by applying it to the development of the individual, to the 'ontogenetic model', it does not fit. The smile of the child is older than his laugh and not the product of later development.[26]

The smile has just as many riddles as the laugh. Just as we do not intend to touch on all the questions relating to laughter, so we have just as little hope, or even less, of contributing anything new to the 'Riddle of the Smile'. By a few remarks only shall we attempt to establish its connection with our subject.

To paraphrase Aristotle, it may be said that mental life begins in a human being on the fortieth day,[27] because the smile of the satisfied

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[26] The existence of a genetic connection between laughing and smiling is a disputed point in the literature of the psychology of laughter; many authors (McDougall for instance) deny it.

[27] As a matter of fact, the smile can appear much earlier; the sixth week is evidently an average time.

infant, free from want and anxiety, is the expression of the first contact —outside the sphere of vital needs—the first mental contact between one human being and another. We can only surmise what it is in the behaviour of the infant that releases precisely a smile; a theory of Freud's deals with this question. He is of the opinion that the position of the lips which is characteristic of the smile represents, so to say, 'Enough' or even 'More than enough'.[28] The smile, however, becomes detached quite early from this situation, from which it may derive its shape, and becomes a reaction to what is familiar, the human face in particular. If we adopt Freud's line of argument, we may then say that the expression which first denoted repletion becomes the expression of friendly psychological contact in general.

The smile retains the privileged place of the first-born in pathognomic functioning. One can say that it appears everywhere as a substitute expression, to bring about a moderation of any pathognomic situation which was of a contorting kind: anger that has been repressed, fright that has been assimilated, crying that has been overcome can turn into a smile. If we also think of the smile in all these cases as an earlier form of laughing we may be inclined to attribute to it a function of discharge. We could put forward some such view as the following: that in all these cases the smile expresses a 'relief of tension', a discharge of very small amounts by the ego. It would be very difficult however to verify such a connection by observation. For the use of the smile as a substitute act of the pathognomic apparatus extends still further: the 'keep smiling' custom of the West, the unvarying smile of the Oriental which is imposed by social custom and ritual, the stiff compulsive smile of many people who are to a greater or lesser degree mentally disturbed and smile in order to hide an affect, chiefly anxiety—all these show the smile being used as a mask, in a series extending from the normal to the symptomatic.

If we place alongside this what we know of the slight smiles, or the occasionally distorted ones, in archaic works of art, in Greek art of the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., in the art of the middle ages from the late twelfth to the fourteenth centuries, then the field of our problem is amplified very considerably. It seems that in Greek art, as in the art of the Middle Ages, the smile serves the general purpose of representing pictorially psychic animation (Max Dvořak); in this sense it emerges again at a higher level in which 'animating' has acquired a

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[28] *Der Witz, Gesammelte Schriften*, Bd. IX, S. 164, footnote.

new meaning, pictures no longer depict the psychic activity of mankind in general but that of a particular human being: for example the smile of Leonardo da Vinci's women.

Now it is my opinion that the smile in these works of art is nothing else than a pathognomic expression of mental activity. And as the smile is the first pathognomic expression by means of which a human being makes contact with another, it remains the most universal, which sometimes expresses no more than: 'here is some psychic activity taking place'. So the smile would be the *first* pathognomic constellation which plastic art copies from life, if such copying may be assumed to be its aim, and so the smile would come to be, on the other hand, the representative of those pathognomic constellations which are prohibited as being major distortions of the countenance and have therefore to be suppressed. They are replaced by a signal which we are accustomed to interpret as indicating a friendly and contented state of mind and also as a good omen for emotional relationships. But besides this there is undoubtedly still another special relation between smiling and laughing: it expresses *moderate* joy, a controllable quantity; it stands as evidence of the triumph of the ego.

III. Some Typical Disturbances of Pathognomic Activity

So far we have represented in a very one-sided way the contribution which the ego makes to expressive behaviour, in that we have ascribed to it, first and foremost, the inhibition of primitive pleasure in movement. It is now time to proceed to a wider examination of the subject.

To begin with, there is a statement from Freud to the effect that the ego's control over motility is so firmly rooted that it regularly withstands the onslaught of neurosis and only breaks down in psychosis.[29] This statement can obviously be valid only within certain limits; even if the ego's control over motility breaks down only in a psychosis, limitations of this control certainly exist within the spheres of both normality and neurosis. I should now like to discuss a few examples illustrative of such limitations in the control of the pathognomic apparatus. They will be arranged in a scale extending from the normal to psychotic behaviour.

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[29] 'The Unconscious', *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, pp. 111–112. Restrictions similar to those which are about to be discussed have been considered by Fenichel, 'Über organlibidinöse Begleiterscheinungen der Triebabwehr', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XIV, 1928, S. 48. He distinguishes gross alterations from slight modifications.

We start with the fact that two fundamental functions of the ego are liable to disturbance. The first concerns the integration of the separate pathognomic impulses—it is bound up with those tendencies of the ego which strive towards synthesis ; the second is related to the temporal sequence of the pathognomic procedure.

Let us consider the first kind of disturbance. The examples used to exemplify it relate mostly to laughing or smiling.

(1) Often the integration of an individual pathognomic impulse cannot take place because the ego ' hinders ' it ; the inhibition may be intentional. The suppression of an expression, the stifling of physical pain, and in fact all those cases in which we mean to hide what goes on in us belong to this group. It is clear how near we are here to the border of the pathological ; it is obviously already crossed when ' not to reveal oneself ' becomes an instinctual aim. But in pathological cases also the process in relation to the pathognomic apparatus itself can be described in a simple way : we will make use for the purpose of an example chosen for its transparency.

One frequently observes that dancers and acrobats have a particularly artificial and empty smile ;[30] it is directed towards the audience and is supposed to heighten the effect of their performance by giving the impression that it is effortless. Here also the smile is a mask, i.e. a pathognomic substitutive act, which is recognizable as it forces aside another expression. This is an attractive example because we are able to say why this smile is not a convincing one. Examination of the pathognomic position shows that we get the impression of an ' artificial, empty smile ' because there is a ' false innervation ' either of a branch of the zygomatic muscle—which is manifested by the position of the lips—or, more frequently, of the orbicular muscle, which is contracted instead of relaxed. It is easy to understand how just this *grammatical mistake* arises—this refers to the introductory observations which I made in reference to a grammar of pathognomic speech. The contraction of the orbicular muscle is known to be a reaction to exertion, which one may surely ascribe to the dancer who has to perform a difficult step correctly, or to the athlete attempting some physical feat. The artificiality of the smile is thus caused by the fact that *only the mouth* smiles, that the smile is not echoed in other

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[30] Cf. M. Toulzac, *Rire et pleurer spasmodiques*, Thèse de doctorat, Paris, 1901, p. 14.

parts of the face.[31] In short, it is a case of failure of integration of differently directed pathognomic impulses. One can describe the disturbance from two points of view. Either an expression of something artificial arises because the appropriate pathognomic expression —it would be one of exertion—has to be withheld, or the expression of a smile has failed because all the different facial muscles do not vibrate together correctly, all the pathognomic impulses in the direction of smiling have not been integrated.

(2) The example I shall now use is one mentioned incidentally by Freud.[32] It concerns the laugh or smile of a condoling person and represents an actual derailment of the pathognomic act, a parapathognomy. We enter a room with a sympathetic face, we are filled with 'compassion' or 'fellow-feeling' and are about to press the hand of the afflicted person in order to show our sympathy, when a smile intrudes itself on our features which we are not able to deal with pathognomically and which gives our face an awkward and embarrassed expression, or else we feel that we want to laugh and fear we may do so; compulsive laughter does actually occur in pathological cases.

We all know what is generally accepted as the explanation of this phenomenon: a repressed, condemned—and usually aggressive—thought has presented itself, has disturbed the pathognomic activity and has turned it into parapathognomy. The topography and dynamics of the process are easily discernable: it is a matter of *pathognomic parapraxis*. There has been a failure to integrate contradictory impulses, the intended impulse and the one which breaks through. This is as far as we can go in the description of the process, since any attempt to pursue it further into its pathological rami-

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[31] Instructions to be found in text-books on art from ancient times onwards lend support to this point of view. 'If the mouth smiles while the rest of the features contradict its mirth, a distortion arises, a sneering smile. . . . A smiling expression must be put on from the very start; the cheerfulness must spread equally to all parts of the face. The mouth must smile; but also the eyes, and the forehead, the whole countenance.' (Sonnenfels, *Vom Verdienst des Portraitmalers*, 1768, S. 57.) 'Dans une tête qui rit, non seulement l'œil rit, mais encore le nez rit, les lèvres, le menton, les joues rient aussi.' (*Magasin Pittoresque*, Paris, 1872, p. 267.) There is an old French proverb: 'Ne crois pas au sourire de la bouche que n'accompagne pas le sourire des yeux.'

[32] 'Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis', *Collected Papers*, Vol. III, p. 331.

fications would lead us away from our subject. We may, however, state briefly that we have touched here upon one of the origins of the grimace, because the way in which anger produces facial distortion is not fundamentally different from that of a parapraxis. If in one case it is a matter of the sudden upheaval of a suppressed impulse, in the other it is a storm of affect, the control of which is unsuccessful: the result can be the same in both cases—distortion resulting in a grimace. Failure to integrate emotional expressions may be brought about not only by instinct and affect, not only by aggression, anger and doubt—by the passions, that is to say—but also by a disturbance in the ego itself, such as fatigue occurring in certain states of exhaustion; the victorious athlete occasionally makes a grimace of this kind.[33]

(3) We have so far considered examples of inhibition of function and unsuccessful purposive acts within the field of expressive phenomena, without crossing the borders of pathology; what now follows refers to an extremely large group of phenomena which can be roughly described as neurotic disturbances. For this purpose, phenomena are grouped together which range from simple hysterical conversion symptoms such as frequent blushing, increased perspiration of the face—to such things as *tic*. The theoretical aspect calls for no special discussion; much light has been thrown on the clinical aspect by the exhaustive researches of Ferenczi and Abraham which were amplified by Helene Deutsch, Melanie Klein and Kovács from different points of view.[34] A discussion of their findings and theories—they are concerned with the autoplastic and magical significance of *tic*, its relation to aggression or its genesis in specific infantile situations—would take us outside the general plan we have in mind in this paper.

An example may be introduced instead, the case of a young man suffering in a mild degree from psychogenic compulsive laughter. I will enumerate the determinants and the meanings of his laughter in

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[33] I come to no conclusion here as to how far the intelligibility of the expression is retained in the distortion; the empirical side deserves exhaustive examination by the psychology of expression. But the theoretical approach from which we started out is still too simplified for the investigation of a single case, because the passionate feeling is not simply or invariably foreign to the ego; and therefore we only represent things schematically here too.

[34] Cf. the comprehensive presentation of the problem and its literature in Fenichel, *Hysterien und Zwangsneurosen*, 1931, S. 169 ff.

the order in which they occurred in the psycho-analytic sessions. One of the very early meanings which lay very near consciousness was superiority; it always appeared in his ordinary life when he felt in phantasy that an opponent was defeated or could be defeated, and in the transference when he had seen through the analyst: 'You are not omnipotent, you are a man like me, I can defeat you.' Already in this setting one cannot fail to see a close relation between laughter and anxiety, the attitude of superiority striking one as a defence against anxiety as well as a mastery of it.[35] This function of laughter rests upon the formula: 'I need not be afraid; it is "laughable"' —and, in the language of denial: 'I laugh, so I am not afraid, for he who laughs is powerful, strong and superior.'

In a deeper layer laughter has a still closer and more direct relation to defence against anxiety: 'Look at me and see how I laugh; a fool like me who is always laughing is a very harmless person'—and by this means he thinks he is able to evade the responsibility which he so much dreads in connection with his aggressive wishes.

Just as in this sense laughter serves the purpose of autoplastic representation—debasement to the level of the laughable buffoon—so in the next layer to it there is an even clearer indication of an autoplastic and double meaning in the opened mouth in the act of laughing: the showing of the teeth in the laugh serves an aggressive purpose in that it is meant to be an aggressive grimace, still full of that secret significance which attaches to all the masks used by primitive peoples;[36]

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[35] It seems to me that the relation of laughter to anxiety forms a central theme in the psychology of the comic and I have endeavoured to treat it separately in a paper upon 'Ego Development and the Comic' (this JOURNAL, Vol. XIX, 1938). In the process of laughter itself we can scarcely overlook the phenomenon of increased activity of expiration, which reminds us of the reactions to experiences of anxiety; all the respiratory accessory muscles participate in the same way as in attacks of suffocation; cf. E. Hecker, *Die Physiologie und Psychologie des Lachens und des Komischen*, 1873. Bibring has many times referred in discussions to similar observations.

[36] Herland has given a consistent account of the derivation of laughter from a position in which it was an attack, making it possible to distinguish two kinds of laughter, a primitive one nearer to this position and a higher, more intellectual form, in which 'inhibitions against the tendency to attack are brought into play', *op. cit.*, p. 209 ff. The phylogenesis of the smile has a similar origin: it is derived from the apotropaic grimaces of

at the same time the mouth opened for laughing is in the service of homosexual and feminine instinctual tendencies, and is used to seduce the dreaded and ridiculed object in a feminine way.

This example was inserted here to make clear how extraordinarily rich in possible meanings the process of laughter is. All possible over-determinations of clinical material—in which, however, though we have not explicitly mentioned it, they are not all of equal importance —are represented independently in the field of normality; it is obvious that all these and many other meanings belong to laughter and can be expressed and conveyed by it. It is easier to prove this theory in relation to the rôle which laughter plays in cult and myth than by observation itself: it represents aggression and seduction simultaneously, is associated with birth or rebirth and procreation, is the sign of godlike strength and so of godlike privilege, but is also the sign of the rebellion of the human race,[37] and one feels continually forced to the conclusion that ultimately defence against anxiety, mastery of anxiety, and pleasure-gain are compressed together in the one act.

I must forgo any detailed discussion of this hypothesis, which leads to the heart of the psychology of the comic, and return once again to our example. The young man, from whose analysis we selected a part, finds it very difficult to control his laughter. An attempt to suppress it produces a fixity of expression or a slight distortion of the features. The integration of the pathognomic impulses continually miscarries, a piece of the pathognomic apparatus is sexualized. The laughter itself functions as an assault which is passively experienced; the attempt to get control of the laughter—by means of a plausible occasion, by voluntarily laughing it off—serves the purpose of a defence against the passive experience. The symptom has become libidinized and has the full value of a satisfaction. Here also the language of the body has replaced the language of words, autoplastic movement has ousted every other method of elaboration.

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masks; cf. also H. E. Pottier, 'Les origines de la caricature dans l'antiquité', *Annales du Musée Guimet* (Bibliothèque de Vulgarisation), 1916, who has more or less shown that a defensive threatening attitude persists in the smile of Bes.

[37] Cf. Reinach, 'Le rire rituel' (*Revue de l'Université de Bruxelles*, 1911, and *Cultes, Religions et Mythes*, T. IV, 1912); Luquet, *Journal de Psychologie*, 1930; E. Fehrle, 'Das Lachen im Glauben der Völker', *Zeitschrift für Volkskunde*, N. F. II, 1930–31.

(4) We choose as our final example disturbances of pathognomic behaviour which are met with typically in schizophrenics. It is not convenient to discuss this class of disturbance in any complete way, but we shall instead bring forward some descriptions from psychiatric literature which are trustworthy. For a starting point it is useful to compare the motor behaviour of a schizophrenic with that of a normal adolescent. Homburger, who has discussed this relationship exhaustively, refers to the fact that the phenomenon of the motor behaviour of adolescents oscillates between two extremes. One of these is characterized by the utmost control of the motor apparatus—it is kept in hand to such an extent that the effort expended in control exceeds what is necessary ; in the other type of behaviour the effort made is not as great as the demand and the motor apparatus is only partially under control. Affectations, with the accompanying false innervations and stiffness of behaviour seen in the movements of adolescents, belong to the first type of disturbance, while to the second belong their lazy and clumsy movements. The comparison which it occurred to neurologists to make between the motor movements of adolescents and those of schizophrenics gains fresh and additional support from the psycho-analytic standpoint. In both types of behaviour the disturbance lies in the relation of the ego to the outer world. ' The heightened libidinal cathexis of the id '—brought about in puberty by the biological processes of maturation and their psychic elaborations, in schizophrenics by the withdrawal of libido from the environment—' in each case adds to the instinctual danger, causing the ego to redouble its efforts to defend itself in every possible way.' [38] In the case of schizophrenics contact with the outer world is endangered by withdrawal of interest ; but it is precisely expressive movements which further that contact. That makes it seem understandable that disturbances of expressive behaviour stand out in bold relief while normally all purposive motor acts remain undisturbed.

One might suppose that one could understand many pathognomic disturbances of schizophrenics by the application of Freud's theory of attempts at restitution. The loosened contact with the outer world has to be reinstated, a certain apathy in the pathognomic processes has to be overcome. This attempt miscarries ; a natural behaviour is not achieved, but instead artificial ways and mannerisms appear, which produce a pathognomic effect. How this struggle can shift from one expressive pattern to another, I endeavoured to show some

[38] Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence*, p. 188.

years ago in relation to the self-portraits of a sculptor who was insane ;[39] and certain other analogous phenomena may be set beside them.[40]

But the disturbances of expression of many schizophrenics explained in this way as attempts at restitution—attempts to ' make a face ' in order to retain contact with the outer world—lead us to new problems. Psychiatrists report that the impression of something strange and affected in the behaviour of the patients is only gained after some observation ; the impression is gradually acquired. It might be supposed that this was so because a certain space of time is required for the observations accumulating in the preconscious to be capable of being worked over. But it seems that what is most important is not the time at the disposal of the observer, but the temporal sequence of the behaviour itself—in our case, in the pathognomic phenomenon—which he is observing.

Certain knowledge empirically gained lends support to this hypothesis : if snapshots of schizophrenics are cleverly selected they are often not recognizable as those of mental cases.[41] Now I am of the opinion that this impression is not due to any success in the expressive act itself but to the conditions of photographic portraiture : the point

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[39] ' Ein geisteskranker Bildhauer (Die Charakterköpfe des Franz Xaver Messerschmidt) ', *Imago*, Bd. XIX, 1933 ; cf. also *Jahrbuch der Kunsthistorischen Sammlungen in Wien*, N. F. VI, 1932, where reproductions of all these heads will be found.

[40] They are to be found in the older literature of ' physiognomy ' ; I may mention as the outstanding examples : Hermann Ludwig, ' *Ich will* ', with 44 illustrations of physiognomy, and *Die Himmelsleiter*, with 46 illustrations, Part One (Kommissionsverlag von Max Spohr, Leipzig). These are obviously the work of an insane person (published about 1910). The illustrations show highly dramatic situations ; but when one looks through them one gradually gets the impression of an emptiness and strangeness, which one does not get when looking at one alone. In this case the ' stereotypy '—in contrast to Messerschmidt's heads—does not lie in the repetition of a single pathognomic constellation, but in maintaining a constant state of exaggeration, in a permanent condition of exaltation which betrays itself.

[41] I was able to make a cursory examination of the material referred to here in the Heidelberg Clinic in 1931. H. W. Gruhle used it in a lecture in Vienna (1930) and drew the conclusion that a diagnosis based on expression should receive a sceptical judgment. I do not know whether Gruhle has published his views in regard to this.

discussed here first became clear to me owing to another experience. Most of the busts of the sculptor mentioned above (F. X. Messerschmidt), when seen singly, had sufficient effect to cause the observer to try to puzzle out the ' meaning ' of each one as an expression. He would put the question to himself: ' What is it that is represented here? What does this expression mean? ' But when looking at many of the busts, or perhaps the whole series of more than forty pieces, he would become impatient and recognize the pathological element in the *stereotypy* of the expression. The fact that is decisive for the observer is just his awareness of what is empty and artificial in the expression, his awareness that ' there is nothing behind it '. Now the analysis of individual pathognomic situations in most of the cases which we have in mind here leads us to discords recognizable as disturbances in integration. Bleuler, according to the accounts of his fellow-workers, sometimes attempted to confirm a diagnosis of schizophrenia by shutting off one half of the patient's face from his field of vision, so that he could see the upper and lower halves in turn, separated. But I am inclined to think that this method of approach is only applicable to certain cases. In others, and in a much clearer way, the disturbance in expression reveals itself not in lack of unification of individual impulses but in another attribute of expressive behaviour.

At the beginning of this section of the paper we mentioned a second function of the ego concerned in the regulation of expressive activity, which has not yet been given further attention. It is now time to bring it forward. All motor activity is composed of movements and in all movement sequence plays its part.[42] If one follows the example of Monakow and Uexküll one speaks of the melody of movements, or, according to others, the temporal form of motor processes. In the same way, we may regard the temporal form of an expressive act as an important factor and we may ascribe the regulation of this expressive act to the ego. In every disturbance of expression—so I am

[42] In relation to the problem cf. F. H. Levy in Brugsch-Levy, *Die Biologie der Person*, Bd. II, 1927, S. 851 ff. From the literature of specialists I may suggest as well the works of A. Flach, *Die Psychologie der Ausdrucksbewegung*, 1928 (*Archiv für die ges. Psychologie*, Bd. LXV), the same author's *Psychomotorische Gestaltbildung im normalen und pathologischen Seelenleben*, 1934 (*Archiv für die ges. Psychologie*, Bd. XCI), and O. Kauders, *Zur Kenntnis und Analyse psychomotorischer Störungen*, 1931 (*Abhandlungen aus der Neurologie, Psychiatrie, u.s.w.*, Heft 64).

inclined to think—something has been disturbed in the curve followed by the process. We find this supposition confirmed if we review the types of disturbances which we have distinguished. In the first type, which is represented by the *risus artificialis* of the athlete, as in every other analogous case, it is the fixity of the expression, the fact that there is no pathognomic melody and no change of expression, that is partly responsible for betraying the failure. In the second case, that of a parapraxis of expression, the repressed smile intrudes itself on features which are attuned to grief, it disturbs a process by interrupting it. In the third case, that of psychogenic compulsive laughter, the situation is clearest. The laugh which appears here like an attack can only gradually be brought under control, and turned from a grin into a smile and ' laughed off '. In those stilted poses which are the pathognomic characteristics of attempts at restitution each single solution is ' correct ' ; in a static picture, and therefore in a photograph, which shows one section of the curve of the process, the difference may be blurred ; over a longer period of observation the stiffness of the process, the disturbance in the pathognomic melody may attract our attention. What I have brought forward here as a theory can be tested by making a comparison of a film-strip with a photograph ; many new aspects to the problem would thereby be opened up, which must be omitted from this sketch.[43] But a macroscopic

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[43] We are able to make such comparisons because of the researches which were carried on at the Vienna Psychological Institute under the direction of Dr. Käthe Wolf. Buytendijk and Plessner emphasize the small degree of certainty pertaining to an interpretation of an expression in a static picture. The interpretations, according to them, are uncertain because the expressive pictures belong simultaneously to more than one situation. A bad taste in the mouth and loathing, listening and reflection, scorn and irritability, are mixed up and ' still stronger contrasts are to be found in the interpretations made ', and thus both Darwin and Klages are contradicted. They believed that one meaning at a time belongs to one expressive picture, though it is obvious that more than one meaning may fit it, and the decision of which meaning is correct can only be obtained from the situation as a whole. This is the basis of unpublished researches by Ruth Weiss (at the Psychological Institute of the University of Vienna). I am permitted to make use of one astonishing result of this enquiry, one which coincides with my own observations. If one covers up everything in the photograph of a group except the expression of one face, people's guesses as to the situation in the photograph vary enormously. The

impression supports the point of view put forward here. The disturbances of expression which have been described here are part of a series, at the end of which are placed those cases where, according to Freud, the ego's control over motility breaks down, and we have the picture of catatonia. Here the process has disappeared. A single motor situation has escaped from the curve of temporal sequence and become immobile.

The two disturbances of the pathognomic apparatus which in our description have been treated in succession, disturbance in synthesis and disturbance in the temporal sequence, are in reality very difficult to separate from each other. They interact, and indeed one may be continually in doubt to what extent they exist independently. It must often remain uncertain whether one distinguishes a grin from a smile on account of its inharmoniousness, whether one regards a smile as compulsive because of its fixity, or because only part of the face is involved. Moreover, the development of both functions extends far back into the individual's early childhood. For we may connect the capacity to organize and shape the pathognomic-motor process with the most archaic function of the ego, with its task as an apparatus for inhibition. We touch on previously developed lines of thought when we suggest that it is the function of this apparatus to subdue the primordial rhythmical movements and to mould them into the temporal forms of pathognomic activity: when we try to control an attack of laughter, and when a convulsive type of laughter is turned into free and voluntary laughter, the ego has reconquered a position which was threatened.

One further reflection. If we review the whole field of phenomena

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statements are astonishingly correct when they relate to behaviour which is strictly regulated and intentional; thus, one recognizes with a high degree of certainty a spectator at a sporting event, but only with difficulty a mourner at a funeral. Perhaps the further development of this line of research will confirm a conclusion suggested to me again and again by my casual observations. The more complete the ego-regulation of the expression, the clearer will be the understanding of it in a snapshot without any need of a context. It seems that the more the ego is engaged in working over affects and the more full of conflict the situation is which the pathognomic activity expresses, the less unequivocal does the expression seem to be. Only when there is an irruption of affect does the expression once again become unequivocal. According to Buytendijk and Plessner laughing and crying are clearly recognizable.

in which laughter occurs as an expression of mental activity, we find that one and the same physiological and muscular process—it has been appropriately described as 'a mechanism prepared in advance'[44]—can range from 'scorn to humour' (Reik), and from pleasure to sadness. How is this possible? How can such a thing come about?

I am of the opinion that it is the central function of the ego which controls our pathognomic apparatus and supervises the shaping of expression. We hear a laugh in the next room and listen to it at first with uneasy surprise, but soon we get our bearings and feel at ease about it: it was the gay laugh of a happy person, or the ironical laughter of someone who has been offended. In this case too the temporal course of the process is not the least important factor in our recognition.

The shaping which the physiological act of laughter undergoes through the agency of the human ego is a clear and impressive example of the fact that everything which we recognize to be a process of giving form and shape to psychical material is to be regarded as an ego-function.

Let us return once more, in view of this theory, to the analogy we used when seeking to present the problems to be dealt with in a scientific examination of expressive behaviour. The speech of the countenance is limitless and capable of great variety of expression; vocabulary, grammar, and syntax are astonishingly copious, and this richness is all the more impressive precisely because pathognomy is remarkably poor in what would correspond to verbal roots, to *etyma*, in speech. Let us not bind ourselves to a comparison with speech which threatens here only to hinder our understanding; let us try to account for the fact that all the various manifestations of the expressive function are closely related at the start. In the illustrations which are to be found in old text-books on facial expression, one notices how easily and through how slight an alteration in the illustration the whole of the expression changes. Here also it is only a step from laughing to crying. Or again, if photographs are covered so that only a part of the face, mouth and lips, or eyes and forehead, show, we can complete each one in our mind into very different expressive situa-

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[44] Cf. Johannes von Kries, 'Vom Komischen und vom Lachen', *Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenheilkunde*, Bd. LXXIV, 1925, S. 245, following Spencer.

tions.[45] Only when we see the complete face as a whole and with its temporal changes do we get the expression. This view of things seems banal and self-evident if one is relating it to one's own perception, since no one has ever doubted that the expression of the human countenance is a question of *Gestalt* in the sense used by Gestalt-psychology. But I do not plead for this point of view here as a contribution to the understanding of pathognomy but for its creation ; not as an attribute of our perception but as an achievement on the part of the body, by whose agency this entity is brought into being. In regard to disturbances of expression, in cases, for instance, in which what is usually automatic about the function becomes conscious, every one can experience in himself, can ' feel ' in his own motor actions, how ' integration ' and temporal regulation may fail. It is, however, only these functions that ensure the richness and fullness of the ' speech of the human countenance '.

And laughter too, which lies on the border between expressive and purposive motor behaviour, only acquires its meaning as an expressive action through undergoing this formative process in its nature and the course it takes. Only because of the wide scope of its significance does it become human and in the Aristotelean sense peculiar to man.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The problems dealt with in this paper have been taken from different fields of research and therefore the relevant literature cannot be presented in any comprehensive way. In the following I give at least a brief indication of the bibliographical resources employed. Lists of the more recent literature on the problems of expressive behaviour will be found in the

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[45] Cf. Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie*, Bd. I, S. 114. A good empirical investigator of expressive behaviour describes such similarities in different expressive movements somewhat as follows : ' Laughter is only a facial movement of extension and is effected principally by an extensor muscle. Hence in mirth the nostrils and forehead are placed in horizontal folds and the teeth are shown, as in anger. So it is possible for two different affects to correspond with each other in respect of their types of movement, whether in one sense or the other, i.e. because they move in the same direction. One only has to picture to oneself the teeth bared in wrath, in strong sexual desire, and in laughter, or the staring eyes of a snake inflamed with greed and those of a man in both fear and hope.' Aemilius Huschke, *Mimische und physiognomische Studien*, 1821. (New edition : *Der Körper als Ausdruck*, II, 1931, ed. W. Rink).

works by Bühler and Dumas quoted on pp. 315 and 320 ; with regard to the earlier literature, in which the post-classical tradition survives, reference may be made to Orbilio Anthroposco's *Geschichte der Physiognomik*, Leipzig, 1784, and to the bibliography in Hughes's *Die Mimik des Menschen*, Frankfurt, 1900. It is more difficult to review the literature which deals with the psychology and physiology of laughter. To help us here, however, we can fall back on an extremely good alternative : in the *Index-Catalogue of the Surgeon-General's Office, United States Army*. Under the word ' laughter ' will be found a very exhaustive catalogue of the literature (*op. cit.*, First Series, Vol. VII, Washington 1886, p. 878 ; Second Series, Vol. IX, Washington 1904, p. 314 ; Third Series, Vol. VIII, Washington 1928, p. 408).

ABSTRACTS

General

Norman J. Symonds. ' On the Conception of a Dread of the Strength of the Instincts.' *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1939, Vol. XVIII, Part 2, pp. 154–162.

This paper is concerned with the nature of instinctual anxiety and discusses it with especial reference to Anna Freud's treatment of it in her book, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence*. The writer's main enquiry is as to why the ego should be supposed, in the normal course of things, to dread the strength of its libidinal instincts. Certain external situations are obviously dangerous and as such rightly evoke anxiety in the ego. Similarly, certain attitudes of the super-ego are threatening and to be feared. But there seems no *primâ facie* reason why a powerful current of libidinal emotion should be felt as a threat to the ego. This could only be the case where complicating factors had set in early in life. One of these might be that a massive outflow of object-libido is felt by the ego as a corresponding impoverishment of narcissistic libido, thus causing a fear of being starved of love. Such a reaction would be referable to a traumatic oral frustration in infancy, at a time when any thwarting of love would be largely compensated by identificatory processes. Another factor might be that the sensuous and aggressive aspects of id-libido, which had become defused in the process of deflection from object- to ego-attachments, were threatening to break through the repression and overwhelm the ego, which would then react with anxiety.

Such effects as these of the vicissitudes of the libido upon the narcissistic development of the individual point, however, to a schizophrenic rather than a normal make-up; so that the existence of instinctual anxiety should by no means be accepted as a normal phenomenon.

A. S.

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Karl A. Menninger. ' Emotional Factors in Hypertension.' *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic*, 1938, Vol. II, No. 3, pp. 74–88.

The author deprecates the use of the term ' psychogenic ', holding that in every disease proper investigation would uncover psychological as well as physical and chemical features. While some physicians are impressed by the pathology of advanced cases, the psychological investigator notes that (1) transient hypertension may be induced by emotional stimulation, (2) some cases show gross emotional pathology, and (3) chronic hypertension may sometimes be reduced by psychological procedures.

The psychological studies made by numerous authors ' indicate that

patients with hypertension are characterized by an external poise, often gentleness and amiability, beneath which there exists a strong undercurrent of fear which arises from the existence of strongly repressed aggressions, usually dependent upon resentment over threats to the patient's dependent security.'

Menninger suggests that the ' co-ordinating determinant ' behind the physical, chemical and psychological phenomena may be found in the concept of primary constructive and destructive tendencies—Freud's ' life instinct ' and ' death instinct '.

Finally, he makes two practical suggestions: (1) that a passive conversational approach releases resentment and should be reflected in a decrease of vascular tension; and (2) that, in view of the benefits to be obtained from externalizing aggression, this should be encouraged if not mechanically too strenuous, and exercise and work recommended rather than forbidden.

W. Hewitt Gillespie.

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' Frustration as an Experimental Problem.' Symposium under the Chairmanship of Dr. Saul Rosenzweig. *Character and Personality*, 1938, Vol. VII, No. 2, pp. 126–160.

After a short introduction on the definition of and attitudes to frustration, four short papers are presented. The first deals with research implications of the concept of frustration in relation to social and educational problems, and stresses the positive as well as the negative results of frustration. A list of ten important questions in understanding the concept are postulated, and in the discussion of these, Freud is largely quoted. Subsequently twelve more questions on the practical applications of essential and unessential frustrations are put forward and a plea made for earnest investigation of them. The next three contributions give experiments in artificially imposed frustrations, on chimpanzees, sheep and children respectively, with conclusions drawn from them regarding the results of varying amounts, types and durations of frustrations, in terms of increased cognitive capacity, neurotic breakdown, regression, etc.

Dr. Rosenzweig adds a further paper to complete the symposium. He discusses types of frustrating situations, in terms of privation, deprivation and conflict. He introduces the concept ' Frustration Tolerance ', and gives examples of how this may be raised or lowered, instancing, among other methods of raising it, that of the psycho-analytic situation. He enumerates varieties of reaction to frustration in the following terms: adequate–inadequate, direct–indirect, defensive–preservative, specific–non-specific, and ends by expressing the hope that the formulation of

frustration may make for greater co-operation between psychological, especially psycho-analytical, principles and experimental methods, to the mutual enrichment of each.

R. A. Macdonald.

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W. R. D. Fairbairn. ' Is Aggression an Irreducible Factor ? ' *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1939, Vol. XVIII, Part 2, pp. 163–170.

In this opening paper of the symposium on ' The Concept of Aggression ', held at the St. Andrews' Meeting of the British Psychological Society in April, 1938, Dr. Fairbairn maintains the psycho-analytical view that the instincts are internally determined as against the view, represented, amongst others, by McDougall, that they are primarily a response to an external situation. He also rejects Jung's concept of the fundamental unity of all instincts, according to which aggression is merely a manifestation of the libido on a lower level, in favour of a dualistic view of the instincts. He regards aggression as a primary trend and as an irreducible factor from a qualitative point of view. As regards the possibility of modifying it quantitatively, he thinks that there are two practicable methods of doing this. One is to canalize it into the various recognized social activities, such as art, religion, science and good works ; and the other, which he considers a newer and more hopeful line, is to lessen the frustrations to which the individual is exposed in early life and which originally served to increase the degree of aggressive feelings in him.

A. S.

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Karin Stephen. ' Aggression in Early Childhood.' *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1939, Vol. XVIII, Part 2, pp. 178–190.

This is another contribution to the symposium on ' The Concept of Aggression ' held by the British Psychological Society in 1938. In it Dr. Stephen discusses infantile aggression as the result of anxiety arising from an accumulation of undischarged instinctual tension. Such aggressive feelings, she thinks, perform a useful function in so far as they enable the child, firstly, to discharge its emotions to some extent, secondly, to force the people about it to gratify its needs, and thirdly, to attack and destroy the source from which the unpleasure it is experiencing comes ; but they are harmful in so far as they make the child afraid of giving way to such a violent outburst of rage and hatred that it will destroy both those it loves and its own self. This fear leads to stronger measures of frustration, which in their turn increase instinctual tension and consequent aggression ; and thus a vicious circle is set up, until the possibility of the child's finding any emotional outlet whatever is in the end completely blocked. The best

way to counter this situation, in Dr. Stephen's opinion, is to strengthen the child's ego, so that it can grow to tolerate its instinctual tensions.

A. S.

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A. W. Wolters. 'Aggression.' *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1939, Vol. XVIII, Part 2, pp. 171–177.

This is mainly a summary and criticism of the papers read at the symposium on 'The Concept of Aggression' held by the British Psychological Society in 1938. The author is chiefly concerned to effect a clarification of the terms employed. He also makes the interesting point that since the important self-preservative reaction of aggression requires practice and expression in real life, it is essential for the individual to experience actual danger and fear; and he cites the case, observed by himself, of an over-protected child who used to amuse himself by playing at being afraid.

A. S.

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Michael Bálint. 'Ichstärke, Ichpädagogik und "Lernen".' ('Ego-Strength, the Education of the Ego and "Learning".') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1939, Bd. XXIV, Heft 4, S. 416-427.

The author thinks that the strength of the ego depends upon the extent of its field and upon its capacity to keep instinctual tension in suspension (which he compares to the capacity of a condenser to hold an electric charge). He equates the strengthening of the ego with the psycho-analytic task of working through, with educating for analysis (which latter task he considers indispensable for many children and psychotics) and with learning. In conformity, therefore, with his two-fold criterion of ego-strength he regards learning as a double process—as an enlargement of the ego's sum of knowledge and as an increase in its capacity for instinctual toleration.

He furthermore believes that there is a great scope for educative treatment in psycho-analysis, especially as regards hysterical cases. But he does not mean by that the usual sort of education, which is addressed to the super-ego and exerts a restrictive influence, such as inculcating cleanliness, pity and shame; he means education of the ego in its proper functions of ensuring sublimation, pleasurable instinctual discharge and auto- and allo-plastic modes of behaviour.

A. S.

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Walter Hollitscher. 'Über die Beziehungen zwischen der psychoanalytischen und behaviouristischen Begriffsbildung.' ('The Relation

between the Nature of Psycho-Analytical and Behaviouristic Concepts.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1939, Bd. XXIV, Heft 4, S. 398–416.

As far as it refers to the field of psycho-analysis, this paper points out that since psycho-analytic concepts are not only based upon private perceptions which cannot be directly experienced by anyone except the subject but assume the existence of mental states of which he himself is totally unaware, they are liable to be dismissed as fantastic or meaningless by other schools of thought, especially by the Behaviourists. Nevertheless, those concepts can be established objectively and even be made to satisfy the standards of truth of Behaviourism. This is possible because most private perceptions are correlated with other perceptions and are accompanied by certain constant outward signs which can be observed by other people ; so that the presence or absence of such associated perceptions and signs will indicate whether any given private perception is real or imaginary and thus whether any concepts based upon it are likely to be true. Their truth can, moreover, be further tested by seeing whether the consequences which would be expected to follow from them do in fact occur or not.

A. S.

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Clinical

Jules H. Masserman and Hugh T. Carmichael. ' Diagnosis and Prognosis in Psychiatry.' *Journal of Mental Science*, 1938, Vol. LXXXIV, pp. 893–946.

Long in the ' mystical state ' (Comte) of the evolution of a science, psychiatry rapidly entered into its taxonomic phase once its rightful claims became recognized. Almost simultaneously, premature efforts to expedite its evolution led to a burial of the facts in rigid classificatory systems. Recent years have witnessed a salutary tendency among psychiatrists to review their data and re-examine the pragmatic and heuristic value of accepted formulations. In this connection the researches of the psychoanalytical school in ætiology and psychopathology deserve special mention. The present paper is offered as a contribution towards the fundamental reorganization of psychiatry. One hundred patients were intensively studied and treated in the Psychiatric Division of the University of Chicago Clinics and were re-examined a year or more after discharge for the evaluation of (*a*) the validity of the diagnoses made during their hospitalization, (*b*) the results of the various forms of treatment employed. Among the results of a detailed and statistical analysis of the data were the following. The patients had a mean age of 29 and were mostly unmarried ; three-quarters were female. The percentage of Jewish patients was excessive, especially in the schizophrenic group. [The period of hospitalization

averaged 24 days. A history of abnormal behaviour in childhood was commonest in patients diagnosed ' psychopathic personality ', and rarest in the control group of organic cases. It was also commoner in schizophrenics than psychoneurotics. In less than 50 per cent. of cases could the personalities of the schizophrenics and manic-depressives be described respectively as ' schizoid ' and ' cyclothymic '. All groups included individuals of a personality designated ' puerile '. Although passive and dependent, such individuals were not ' infantile ' ; nor were they either ' psychopathic ' or ' neurotic ' characters (in Alexander's sense), since their reactions were both alloplastic and autoplastic. Psycho-sexually the women were demanding, insecure and frigid, the men impotent, jealous and promiscuous. The mixed character of most neurotic and psychotic reactions was shown by the irregular distribution of symptoms in the various diagnostic categories. Predominant emotional tones were only found in manic and depressive cases. Depression was the commonest affect—its frequency being notable in patients with early schizophrenic syndromes (the group with the highest incidence of suicidal tendencies). The affect next in frequency was anxiety. Distortions of thought and feeling appeared in all groups and formed an almost continuous series from hypochondriacal preoccupations and obsessions to phobias, feelings of unreality and delusions. Obsessions and compulsions appeared in all diagnostic groups (and notably the schizophrenic). Maladjustments were but rarely confined to any single sphere. Sexual maladjustments were commonest among schizophrenics and conversion hysterics. In cases of ' psychopathic personality ' external sexual adjustments were better, social and occupational adjustments proportionately worse. The psychoneurotic reactions of most married patients were judged to have been aggravated by connubial incompatibilities. Under a régime which included all indicated forms of medical treatment and superficial psychotherapy, definite improvement occurred during hospitalization in 65 per cent. of ' psychoneurotics ', 55 per cent. of ' manic-depressives ' and 30 per cent. of ' schizophrenics ' ; but the obsessions and compulsions, like the hallucinations and delusions, remained uninfluenced. Out-patient treatment followed discharge in half the cases ; and environmental readjustments were generally recommended. Psycho-analytical treatment was recommended in 4 cases ; but the results are not yet available. A year after discharge the general level of recovery was found to have been fairly well maintained, even in the absence of such a reorganization of the personality as psycho-analysis might have effected. The figures conformed closely to the revised figures of the Chicago Psycho-Analytic Institute. It was found that in individual cases the prognosis could not be closely related to the diagnosis assigned. Since, in 41 cases, careful observation during the year following discharge revealed developments necessitating a major

revision of the original nosological classification, it must be inferred that, unless the original diagnoses were unreliable, the nosological concepts used were of little prognostic, therapeutic or heuristic value.

W. R. D. Fairbairn.

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Jules H. Masserman and Eva R. Balken. 'The Psychoanalytic and Psychiatric Significance of Phantasy.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1939, Vol. XXVI, Nos. 3 and 4, pp. 343–379 and 535–549.

This paper is a report of the study of the phantasies produced by 50 patients in a psychiatric clinic. Many types of mental disease were among them. Pictures used by Morgan and Murray for phantasy production were shown to the patients for their associations. It was found that the stories told by the patients denoted in disguised symbolic form the desires, repressions and conflicts of the patient, and offered valuable leads to the psychodynamisms of the subject's neurosis. The histories of three patients are given and samples of their phantasy material with interpretations.

Apart from the psycho-analytic interpretation of the content of the phantasies in terms of unconscious mental dynamisms, phantasy studies may be of value in determining the state of the transference. This may be shown in attitudes to people in authority, in the phantasy and in the amount of production: i.e. profuse or sterile and brief. The test may further be an aid in getting the history; and it may bring into sharp relief salient psychological features of the case, such as the sources of indecisiveness, guilt or anxiety in a given case. The phantasies may also be used as an aid in psychiatric diagnosis; thus conversion hysterics, anxiety neurotics, depressives, etc., tend to have characteristically different types of phantasies. And, finally, the test may be used to indicate advisable directions in which to attempt psychiatric therapy and the nature of the prognosis.

Clara Thompson.

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Dexter M. Bullard. 'The Application of Psychoanalytic Psychiatry to the Psychoses.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1939, Vol. XXVI, No. 4, pp. 526–534.

The paper contrasts the approaches of psycho-analytic psychiatry and descriptive psychiatry to the psychotic patient. In the former, psychoanalytic concepts are used in understanding the patient and there is a difference in attitude towards the patient because of the awareness of the rôle which the psychiatrist plays for the patient. Sensitiveness to the reaction of the patient is very important and only those topics which the

patient can bring himself to talk about are introduced. The physician is especially aware that questions may have an accusatory meaning to the patient.

Clara Thompson.

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George Devereux. 'A Sociological Theory of Schizophrenia.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1939, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, pp. 315–342.

While admitting that sociological factors may not be the only important cause of schizophrenia, the author presents a sociological theory as a possible explanation of the disease.

Although insanity exists in primitive cultures, the proportion of schizophrenia to other mental diseases is markedly greater in civilized cultures. Besides the fact that primitive cultures have a slower rate of change and have fewer traits to which to adapt, two other factors make orientation to the culture easier for the growing child. One is that the family is not an isolated, closely fused unit. The child may treat many as mothers and fathers in the tribe. Secondly, the child is considered as a potential adult and trained in life from the beginning, so that becoming adult has relatively few unknowns.

In contrast, civilized cultures, as well as having a more rapid rate of change and more factors, have a strongly knit family life with a tendency to protect the child from outside influences, and the emphasis in education is in the direction of profession rather than knowledge of life. He therefore has few things on which he can depend for adult orientations. In the presence of this disorientation schizophrenic thinking appears. Rituals and modes of thinking similar to schizophrenia appear in primitive people in a similar situation: i.e. when confronted with phenomena towards which orientations fail. Schizoid mechanisms can, therefore, be understood 'as an individual or collective primitive attempt to become adapted to a milieu in which one is disoriented, and as an attempt to neutralize the dysphoria resulting from disorientation.'

Clara Thompson.

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Harlan Crank. 'The Use of Psychoanalytic Principles in Out-patient Psychotherapy.' *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic*, 1940, Vol. IV, No. 2, pp. 35–40.

The application of psycho-analytic principles in short out-patient consultations can often effect considerable improvement. The case is quoted of a patient suffering from headaches, exhaustion, and periods of confusion and severe anxiety, whose blood-pressure was found to be 175/110. Weekly interviews resulted in marked symptomatic improve-

ment and in a fall in blood-pressure to an average of 113/71. The treatment lasted five months.

W. Hewitt Gillespie.

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Theodor Reik. 'Der Traum ein mögliches Leben.' ('Dreams as a Possible Reality.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1939, Bd. XXIV, Heft 4, S. 373–383.

The patient, a happily married woman who was pregnant, dreamed that she did not know whether the father of her child was X. or Y. (the implication being that she was unmarried). She was in despair, and after she had awoken the dream still seemed real to her and her mood of depression continued all day. In actual fact there seemed to be no cause for the dream, as the patient was in love with her husband and was glad to be going to have a baby. It turned out, however, that before her marriage she had led a very free life and had had sexual intercourse with several men, among them X. and Y. She had had no sense of guilt about this at the time, although she moved in a strict society, and had taken so little thought about the possibility of becoming pregnant that she had used no contraceptives.

The motives of the dream seem to have been a deferred attempt to master anxiety (i.e. an old fear, unconscious at the time, of becoming pregnant and being found out), a self-punishment in order to appease her unconscious sense of guilt, a fulfilment of masochistic desires and, last but not least, a secret pleasure in contrasting the unpleasant 'might-have-been' with the actual happiness which was her lot.

A. S.

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Edmund Bergler. 'Beiträge zur Psychologie der Eifersucht.' ('Contributions to the Psychology of Jealousy.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1939, Bd. XXIV, Heft 4, S. 384–397.

After referring to the standard psycho-analytical writings on the subject, the author goes on to criticize the view that jealousy is specifically based on oral sadism. He lays stress on its predominantly narcissistic character—on the blow dealt to self-feeling and the ego-ideal, and on the large part played by the various identifications with super-ego and object, both good and bad. He also detects in it elements of voyeurism (as exemplified by the subject's constant picturing of love-scenes between his object and his rival), of exhibitionism (as seen in his tendency to publish his woes abroad) and of masochism and eroticized punishment from the super-ego; for he not only identifies himself with the imaginary victim of the assault as well as with her assailant, but undoubtedly obtains pleasure

from the pangs of jealousy which he suffers. The author thinks that if jealous people belong to the type that wants to *receive* love (broadly speaking, the feminine type) they will turn their vengeance against their love-object; but if they belong to the type that wants to *give* love (the masculine type) they will turn it against their rival.

A. S.

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Georg Gerö. 'Zum Problem der Oralen Fixierung.' ('The Problem of Oral Fixation.') *Internationale Zeitschrift fur Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1939, Bd. XXIV, Heft 3, S. 239–257.

A passive type of defence against infantile oral aggression is described in a female patient. The patient's oral-libidinal trends become over-emphasized in order to keep down her oral-sadistic ones, so that her relationship to her object is one of extreme possessiveness and, as it were, of 'clinging on' by sucking.

A. S.

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Arthur Harris. 'The Prognosis of Anxiety States.' *British Medical Journal*, September 24th, 1938, No. 4055, pp. 649–654.

Some of the literature on anxiety states is reviewed, particularly from the point of view of measurement of amount, and prognosis. A review is presented of a number of cases which were followed up, tables are given, and results summarized. The following conclusions are drawn. Anxiety states may persist unchanged for ten years and over, and only a small percentage pass on into hypochrondriasis. The prognosis is good if the duration is under two years, and poor, but not hopeless, if of longer standing. The chance of returning to work proved to be 80 per cent. of all cases. If the anxiety does not alter the mode of life, the prognosis is better, but the psychopathic personalities do not do well. No evidence of increased susceptibility to organic disease was found in the cases under consideration.

R. A. Macdonald.

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Walter Schmideberg. 'The Treatment of Panic in Casualty Area and Clearing Station.' *Life and Letters of To-day*, November, 1939, Vol. XXIII, No. 27.

For the prevention of panic, especially in air raids, it is essential (1) that an authority should be available to control the masses, (2) an outlet must be found for their accumulated and repressed aggression, and (3) paranoid fears must be allayed. After making various practical suggestions for prevention, the author discusses psychological first-aid treatment in the casualty stations, and expresses the view that while

analytical knowledge will prove an advantage, treatment of large numbers of people, aiming at immediate results, must necessarily involve the reverse of the customary analytical technique.

Author's Abstract.

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CHILDREN

Martin Grotjahn. 'Some Features Common to Psychotherapy of Psychotic Patients and Children.' *Psychiatry*, 1938, Vol. I, No. 3, pp. 317–322.

In both psychotics and children, it is contended, normal analytic contact is impossible. The transference situations must therefore be established by a modified and active technique in order to start communication. Various modifications of technique for getting into communication with psychotic patients are described, special emphasis being laid on the need to enter the patient's own level of a primitive and magic-symbolic communication.

It is maintained that owing to the child's ego being almost non-existent it is necessary to analyse a child in an environment away from its parents. This environment has to continue what the analysis can only start. For this reason, and also because the child's normal expression is activity, it is necessary for the child analyst to live in this milieu with the child, a milieu in which psycho-analytic knowledge is used to produce an ideal parental situation. Deep interpretations are then possible.

John Bowlby.

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Ludwig Eidelberg. 'Die Wirkungen der Erziehungsgebote.' ('The Effects of Educational Injunctions.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1939, Bd. XXIV, Heft 3, S. 281–291.

Besides being subjected to prohibitions, the child is told to carry out certain actions which on the one hand gratify an instinct and on the other wound his narcissism. He may respond to a positive command of this kind either by obedience or by refusal or by wavering between the two. Certain adult neurotics remain fixed in these modes of reaction, and, faced with a similar situation, either accept the injunction or reject it or hesitate in an obsessional way between doing either. They do not seem able satisfactorily to separate the two elements of instinctual gratification and narcissistic injury so as to enjoy the one and avoid the other, although in fact they are often in a position to do so. The theme is illustrated by material from several cases.

A. S.

Olaf Brüel. 'A Moving Picture as a Psycho-pathogenic Factor: A Paper on Primary Psycho-traumatic Neurosis.' *Character and Personality*, 1938, Vol. VII, No. 1, pp. 68–76.

Without necessarily excluding the early traumatic experiences of childhood, as described by psycho-analysis, an attempt is made to turn attention to certain shocks of later years, which might cause anxiety and obsession. Moving pictures are instanced, and an example of a localized phobia in a girl of 15 is related to an experience at the cinema at the age of 7–8 years. It is also shown that the patient was cured by the investigation of the phantasies stimulated by it.

R. A. Macdonald.

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Dorothy T. Burlingham. 'Phantasie und Wirklichkeit in einer Kinderanalyse.' ('Phantasy and Reality in a Child Analysis.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1939, Bd. XXIV, Heft 3, S. 292–303.

A detailed account and interpretation is given of a series of day-dreams produced in analysis by a six-year-old girl, showing how they were made up of her own ambivalent feelings, her mother's unconscious hostile wishes and real experiences, and how, in the course of treatment, they gradually became less phantastic and less aggressive and sadistic.

A. S.

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Hans Christoffel. 'Einige fötale und frühstkindliche Verhaltensweisen.' ('Some Fœtal and Infantile Modes of Behaviour.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1939, Bd. XXIV, Heft 4, S. 457–460.

The first part of the paper discusses the relative importance of retrospective phantasies as against an actual persistence or re-animation of uterine and post-uterine experiences in the production of regressive phenomena. The second part is devoted to the 'hospitalization' of children—i.e. to a discussion of their loss of the will to live when deprived of their mother's care—and gives long extracts from Pfaundler's writings on the subject.

A. S.

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John Bowlby. 'Jealous and Spiteful Children.' *Home and School*, July, 1939, pp. 83–85.

This is a popular article on jealousy and aggression in childhood. Stress is laid on the inevitability of jealousy and on the exaggerated fears

which children have owing to their phantasies and projections. Suggestions are given regarding ways of dealing with such children, recommending the course of sympathy with the child's feelings together with a kindly control of its actions.

Author's Abstract.

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APPLIED

The American Journal of Sociology, November, 1939, Vol. XLV, No. 3. (Cambridge University Press. Price 6*s*.)

The whole of this issue is devoted to a number of articles which seek to evaluate the influence of psycho-analysis upon the social sciences. We can only briefly mention a few of them.

The first is an essay by Havelock Ellis, which must have been among his very last writings, on 'Freud's Influence on the Changed Attitude toward Sex.' It is chiefly of interest as exhibiting more clearly than ever Ellis's excessive ambivalence towards psycho-analysis, an attitude which he himself sums up as 'the recognition of Freud as one of the greatest masters in thought together with a radical criticism of most of the results he has reached.' Dr. Brill contributes some personal recollections on 'The Introduction and Development of Freud's Work in the United States.' The influence of psycho-analysis upon psychiatry is discussed by Dr. Jelliffe and its influence upon sociology by Dr. Zilboorg. Dr. William Healy writes upon psycho-analysis and 'behaviour problems'; Dr. Horney speculates upon the nature of neurosis; and Dr. Wittels criticizes the 'Neo-Adlerians'. Finally, Dr. Kroeber has an essay upon 'Totem and Taboo in Retrospect' in which ambivalence, though of a less extreme kind, is once more in evidence: 'we, on our part,' he concludes, 'if I may speak for ethnologists, though remaining unconverted, have met Freud, recognize the encounter as memorable, and herewith re-salute him.'

J. S.

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J. H. Nicholson. 'Is our National Intelligence Declining? (3) Non-Genetic Aspects.' (Report on the Fifth Biennial Mental Health Conference.) *Mental Hygiene*, 1939, Vol V, No. 1, pp. 18–22.

Unlike preceding contributors to this symposium, Principal Nicholson approaches the question of declining national intelligence neither as a geneticist nor as an experimental psychologist, but as an educationist convinced that, whether our national intelligence is declining or not, too much of it is being deflected from its proper tasks by emotional factors. The practical achievements of modern science have converted everyone to the scientific outlook; but the recent outcrop of irrationality in Europe

shows how easily men shed the habit of rational thought which they acquire so laboriously. To seek a remedy in strengthening our rational defences against emotion and instinct presupposes an unjustified antithesis between reason and emotion. Actually scientific reason is a specialized instrument of thought adequate for its proper purpose, but inadequate for the wider purposes of living. If reason is to be our sole guide in life, it must be a more Platonic reason from which considerations of values are not excluded. The tests whereby national intelligence is assessed are essentially tests of scientific reason ; but intelligence may be deflected by emotional conflicts from the world of reality to the realm of phantasy. The analytical process whereby such conflicts can be reduced is essentially a rational process promoting a new adaptation to reality. Without imposing his own valuations the physician helps the patient to understand his experiences in the light of the values which he himself consciously holds. These values may change spontaneously during the process, however. Hence the sense of value has its roots in emotional responses to experience. Value-judgements are necessarily personal in origin ; but in the emotionally mature adult they vary from the intensely personal and subjective to the highly impersonal and objective. Although subjective valuations are irrational in that they correspond to individual needs, they have a legitimate place. Where valuations approach objectivity, however, they should be regarded as truly rational even when they cannot be substantiated by scientific reason. We must examine our experience of reality in the light of scientific reason to free ourselves from magic and superstition through understanding ; but this is not enough if we neglect emotional needs. Unless we resign ourselves to a compromise with insurgent emotion and its irrational values, we must introduce a radical change into educational methods. Since the trouble lies in a breakdown in our social valuations, we must fit the child to contribute to the remaking of the moral tradition by fostering the growth of sentiments based on first-hand valuations. Only so can we immunize the individual to both exploitation and infantile revolt. We can save freedom of thought and release intelligence for its social tasks only by recognizing the claims of emotion—and emotion demands not only the expression of instinctive urges, but a share in determining personal and social objectives.

W. R. D. Fairbairn.

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P. Hopkins. ' Analytic Observations on the *Scala Perfectionis* of the Mystics.' *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1939, Vol. XVIII, Part 2, pp. 198–218.

The successive stages of mystic attainment, as expounded in the Christian, Hindu, Mohammedan and Buddhist religions, are compared

with the psychological development which the neurotic goes through in the course of psycho-analytic treatment. Of the three main groups into which those stages fall, the first, or purgative one, in which confession plays a great part, is likened to the patient's outpourings to his analyst; the second, or illuminative, is likened to the release of energy effected in him by analytic interpretation; and the third, or unitive, to the establishment of a harmonious libidinal relationship between him and his analyst, and consequently between him and his internal and external objects.

A. S.

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Richard Sterba. 'Die Problematik des musikalischen Geschehens.' ('The Problem of Musical Experience.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1939, Bd. XXIV, Heft 4, S. 428–433.

The author gives two examples from observations made on himself to show that visual hallucinations based on heard music mainly reproduce the *movement* of the musical phrase, and he therefore concludes that the core of musical experience is kinæsthetic pleasure. He considers that the importance of this early narcissistic pleasure as an integrating factor in the growth of the body has not been sufficiently stressed.

He believes that the spatial quality of musical movement is based upon the infant's relation to the external world at a time when its concepts of self and not-self have not yet been completely formed, so that its control of the movements of its own body are still of a magical nature and involve an imaginary control over the movements of the outside world.

A. S.

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Max Kohen. 'Zur Deutung eines Sumerischen Siegelzylinders.' ('An Interpretation of a Sumerian Cylinder Seal.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1939, Bd. XXIV, Heft 4, S. 434–445.

The photograph of an ancient cylinder seal found at Lagash is reproduced and explained as a representation of the king being killed by his son while copulating with his royal wife, the son's mother, who, moreover, is probably helping in the parricidal act and will be seduced by her son as soon as it is accomplished. Reproductions of rock-drawings found as far apart as in North Europe and South Africa are then given to show the widespread extension of this Sumerian-Babylonian ritual and myth, according to which the son kills his royal father, with the assistance of his mother, becomes king in his place and makes the queen-mother his 'first wife'

A. S.

BOOK REVIEWS

Psycho-Analysis. By Edward Glover. (John Bale Medical Publications, Ltd., London, 1939. Pp. 139. Price, 12*s.* 6*d.*)

This book provides a short but comprehensive and carefully planned account of psycho-analysis for the use of medical practitioners. It may be read with advantage by analysts and candidates in training, but it should be remembered that it is addressed in the first place to readers with no special knowledge of the subject. In the author's own words: 'It is hoped that the present outline will give the practitioner some idea of the existing scope and future possibilities of this science.' Hence, 'no attempt is made to argue the validity of psycho-analytic views or to give the evidence on which they are based. The terms used or definitions given are those which have stood the test of time.' The primary aim is to give simple non-controversial information calculated to assist doctors in assessing and prescribing for mental disorders in their patients.

The practical intention of the book is evident throughout, a survey of general theory being undertaken as a necessary preliminary to specifically clinical considerations. Thus the book is divided into an Introductory Chapter and three Sections. Section I consists of seven chapters on basic theory, leading up to dreams and symptom formation, Section II of seven chapters on clinical syndromes, including psycho-sexual disorders, social difficulties and the psycho-analysis of children. Section III contains a vital chapter on practical applications, with a list of key books for further reading and a short but adequate index.

The Introductory Chapter gives in a nutshell the cardinal points of the Freudian conception of mind as an apparatus for the regulation of instinctual excitations and of the three-fold approaches, topographic, dynamic and economic that 'are essential to the full understanding of every mental event'. It contains an excellently simple differentiation between normal and abnormal results of economic processes. 'Some of these economic manœuvres have satisfactory results; others have not. When the result is regarded as satisfactory by both individual and the community the individual is by common consent regarded as normal. Neuroses and other mental abnormalities are simply forms of unsatisfactory discharge which take place when the psychic organ has failed to deal adequately with the instinct tensions to which it is subjected' (p. 3). Stress is laid on the fact that symptoms have meaning and that disorders are policies directed towards adaptation and that the 'patterns of these adaptations are laid down in infancy' (p. 5).

Section I therefore begins with the 'Embryology of Mind'. This topic is such a vexed question that this chapter is sure to be criticized in some

quarters as taking too little for granted and in others for going beyond what is generally accepted. Whatever criticism it may incur it has two definite merits: it gives a preliminary account in non-technical language of introjection and super-ego formation that should convey some intelligible notion of these processes to an uninstructed reader and it emphasizes to the same reader the immense psychic tasks of the first five years of life, ending with the very necessary recommendation that ' mental disabilities deserve to be regarded with sympathetic understanding; they represent the price paid in later life for over-rapid or ill-consolidated victories over baby instincts ' (p. 16). This leads on naturally to a chapter on ' The Dynamic Aspects of Mind ', i.e. the Instincts, including ambivalence and affective states, and thence to chapters on the structure and economics of mind. The ground covered is recapitulated in ' Phases of Mental Development ', classified in time sequence, in terms of the psychic situations that may be expected to obtain during 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th to 6th years. The Section ends with chapters on Dreams and Symptom Formation that pave the way for Section II.

Section II begins with an introduction giving timely warning that although psycho-neurotics are in the main suited to analytic treatment, suitability involves other factors than accurate clinical diagnosis of the disorder presented. The following chapters give useful summaries of the main conditions with which the practitioner is likely to be faced. The choice and presentation of material aim at giving him the kind of information that will enable him to arrive at an approximate initial diagnosis and help him to decide whether specialist treatment is needed and if so which type of specialist to recommend.

Section III, Practical Applications, gives excellent advice as to the general conduct of psychological examination, together with an objective discussion of diagnosis and prognosis, not omitting the special difficulties in regard to duration and cost of analytic treatment and the influence of ' family situation '.

As has been said earlier, the planning of the book is excellent. The idea of providing a basis of general theory as a platform for more detailed clinical instruction is undeniably sound and every effort has been made to present this basic material simply and in a natural logical sequence. Nevertheless it must be admitted that Section I may prove difficult for people without previous knowledge to digest, chiefly because it does offer such a very full meal in concentrated form. The difficulty is not only one of quantity but of quality. The human mind and its processes are not simple in themselves and therefore the most determined effort to describe them plainly must leave the reader with an impression of variety and complexity, unless it is to convey really false impressions both of the nature of mind and of the state of our present knowledge of it. For the same reasons,

Section I cannot perhaps be recommended to candidates as the best possible introduction to their reading of theory. But it can be heartily recommended to anyone who already has some systematic knowledge. For informed candidates, and for junior and senior analysts alike, it provides just that type of bird's-eye view of the whole wood of theory that is so easily lost sight of in preoccupation with individual trees. Some readers may feel that certain features in the landscape are over- or under-emphasized and that not everything written is ' generally accepted '. But it is clear that every effort has been made to reduce the factor of individual preference to a minimum and that the book is written throughout with genuinely scientific intent. Even if the novice or the practitioner stumble a little in Section I he should carry away from it the essential orientation towards mental disorder that is characteristic of analysis. The practical utility of Sections II and III can scarcely be questioned and the level-headed, temperate manner in which problems of the scope and value of analytic treatment are discussed is very highly to be commended. The book is definitely one that if widely read should go far to bridge the gulf between analysis and general medicine. For this reason it is to be regretted that its price is quite so high. At the present time this fact may tend to hinder it from achieving the full publicity it deserves.

Marjorie Brierley.

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Superstition and Society. By R. Money-Kyrle. (The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, London, 1939. Pp. 163. Price, 4*s.* 6*d.*)

This is a superlatively good book. It has only one fault: its title, which gives no idea of the wealth of riches the book contains. Indeed the author uses the word ' superstition ' throughout in an over-popularly broad sense as covering all the irrationality of man instead of in its folkloristic sense of one variety of magico-phobic activity.

After making this formal protest one has nothing but praise for the book, which belongs to the select class indispensable to every serious psycho-analyst's library. Readers of the JOURNAL should read the book itself, for no review could dispense with that pleasurable duty. Actually its very richness defies reviewing; it would require an inordinate space merely to indicate the extraordinary amount of ground Mr. Money-Kyrle has covered in it. There is no other work on the relation of psycho-analysis to anthropology and mythology to compare with it for clearness, neatness of presentation, wealth of allusion, conciseness and fertility.

Mr. Money-Kyrle's originality is displayed both in the freshness with which he co-ordinates his material and in a number of new ideas. Thus, to mention a few only, we note the suggestions that to control the environ-

ment magically by speech (as the infant does with a scream) may be important in the formation of language; that the incestuous king or god who dies is a scapegoat; that magic may be defined as an irrational method of dealing with irrational anxiety. He deals successfully with those who are dissatisfied with the anthropological data on which Freud based his theory of totemism and shows that the theory is broader than these facts: not only can it be built on other foundations than the cyclopean family but it holds as well for a multilinear as for an unilinear view of the development of religion. In enquiring into the essential differences between man and other animals Mr. Money-Kyrle writes: 'In animals we must suppose that the oral phase is nearly over before the sexual phase begins. In man, however, the period of oral dependence and the capacity to satisfy sexual desire are both retarded, while the onset of the sexual desire itself has not been retarded at all. Hence the child finds himself not only stirred by sexual desire long before he can satisfy it, but also at a period when he is still orally dependent upon his mother. He is not only overwhelmed by another and still more important desire, but the desire inevitably expresses itself in oral as well as genital terms and chooses the mother as its object.'

Mr. Money-Kyrle is to be congratulated on this book, which may be warmly recommended.

E. J.

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New Ways of Psychoanalysis. By Karen Horney. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., London, 1939. Pp. 313. Price, 12*s.* 6*d.*)

In her very readable though somewhat ambitious book, the author reviews the whole of Freud's theory of psycho-analysis. While recognizing the fundamental significance of his discovery of the unconscious, transference, psychical determinism, the motivating force of emotional impulses and the technique of free association and interpretation, she dismisses most of his other almost equally far-reaching concepts, such as the Œdipus complex, the super-ego, the libido theory, the death instinct, repetition-compulsion, introjection and unconscious guilt; and she finds a great deal to correct in his ideas about anxiety, identification, masochism, narcissism and many subjects of similar importance. In the place of all this she puts forward some views of her own concerning the principles on which the human mind works and the way in which it should be treated in analysis.

Dr. Horney differs from Freud on three main points. She believes in the first place that neurotic behaviour is ultimately caused, not by instinctual tensions in the individual, but by the pressure of external factors upon him (or by some conflict of will or feeling) which endangers his position; in the second place that such behaviour is a safety-device designed to secure him against danger and not to gratify an impulse; and

in the third place that it arises from his present-day self—his ' total character-structure '—and not from a more or less separate impulse that has persisted in him from infancy. She takes, as she puts it, a ' horizontal ' rather than a ' vertical ' view of the mind.

These points of difference proceed from a still more general rejection of the Freudian doctrine that all mental life is ultimately governed by the instincts, which themselves obey biological laws. Dr. Horney is furthermore especially concerned to minimize the part played by the sexual impulses in the life of the individual, particularly in his early years. She is thus led to deny that the neuroses of adults have their main source in the libidinal fixations of childhood and derive their pathological character and strength from the various erotogenic zones that are dominant at different times.

Dr. Horney is inclined to overlook the fact that Freud constantly points out that neurotic behaviour and symptoms are in the nature of a compromise-formation, and that they not only express the subject's original impulse but the defensive forces which are acting against it. Moreover, being too much inclined to equate the instinctual with the libidinal, she does not give due weight to the tremendous influence which the aggressive impulses are known to have upon the neurotic development of the individual. Thus, in attributing so much pathological importance to the pressure which his real and present-day environment exerts upon him, she fails to allow for the far-reaching effect which the projection of his own hostile and infantile impulses will have had in making that environment seem much more dangerous to him than it really is. Again, if in ' environment ' she includes the unconscious as well as the conscious behaviour of the people around him, she has underestimated the value which psychoanalysts attribute to it as a pathogenic factor.

Concerning the problem of anxiety, Dr. Horney agrees with Freud that it is a reaction to a situation of danger. But, in accordance with her belief in the non-instinctual nature of mental trends, she considers that such situations have nothing to do with instinctual tensions or a threatened irruption of id-impulses. She thinks that anxiety arises whenever a person feels that there is a threat to one of the particular neurotic trends (such as a need to be loved, or to be independent or always to be in the right) which he has set up in order to ensure his psychological safety.

In regard to female psychology, Dr. Horney questions the unique importance which Freud attaches to the envy of the penis felt by the small girl as a factor which determines the whole course of her later life. Here again, however, the author bases her counter-arguments on social factors, such as the relatively high or low position occupied by the woman in her milieu, rather than on instinctual ones, such as the amount of guilt-free gratification which the little girl is able to get from her own true genital

zone, the vagina, or her innate tendency to be attracted by and to love someone of the opposite sex.

On the subject of masochism, the author remains true to her standpoint and denies the instinctual origin of that feeling ; instead, she regards it as an expression of feelings of helplessness and dependence designed to ensure the safety of the individual.

The last part of the book is occupied with the therapeutic aspect of psycho-analysis. Dr. Horney points out, truly enough, that the treatment of patients is not always successful. She therefore suggests certain modifications of method in line with her general theory of the neuroses. She would like to see the patient approached, not from the angle of his various symptoms with their historical background, but of his adult personality as an indivisible whole ; and similarly, she would give second place to the work of linking up his present-day difficulties with his past ones and recovering repressed memories of his infantile life, in favour of dealing with his current conflicts and problems, including more especially, of course, those which arise in the analytic situation. She also advocates the adoption of a less neutral attitude on the part of the analyst who, she thinks, should not be afraid on occasion to give his patients a little moral guidance and to let them have a glimpse of his own feelings. This all sounds rather more heterodox than in fact it is, for in the main Dr. Horney seems to rely upon the stock tools of the regular analyst—transference, free association and interpretation—and not to stray very far from a reasonably analytic attitude to the patient.

As far as the critical side of this book is concerned, the two main objections to it seem to be that it does not always give a fair picture of the views it is attacking, and that, when the attack is over, the target does not seem greatly damaged. As an instance of the first objection, Dr. Horney, in considering Freud's concept of the unconscious sense of guilt, says that he postulated this enormously important factor without attempting to produce any evidence of its existence or to find out the cause of its appearance. As an instance of the second, we may take her general attack upon the Freudian concept that the trends of the mind are based upon the instincts. She shows, quite correctly, that most of the feelings of grown-up people are not crudely instinctual any longer but have become greatly complicated and refined in countless ways ; yet, when all is said and done, she has not succeeded in shaking the view that those feelings are ultimately founded upon the instincts and derive their motive force from those sources.

On its constructive side, although many of the psychological observations that are contained in the book are undeniably true and shrewdly seen, one cannot help feeling that they stay on a comparatively superficial level and do not take us very deep into the recesses of the human mind.

As to her main postulate, the motivating principle of safety (or self-preservation), which she sets up against the motivating principle of gratification, it does not appear to be a very original idea, nor is there any reason why the two should not exist together. The only real difference of view lies perhaps in the question whether the principle of safety is instinctual in origin in the same sense as the principle of gratification is.

It seems that, on the whole, Dr. Horney does not lead us so far astray from the fields of orthodox analysis as she wishes to make out. As far as her positive contributions go, there should not be much difficulty in introducing a number of them into the regular body of psycho-analytic knowledge—if they have not already found a place there—without disturbing its existing structure to any great extent. For psycho-analysis sets out to be more than a two-dimensional science. It aims at obtaining a ' horizontal ' *and* a ' vertical ' view of the human mind.

A. S.

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Conscious Orientation. By J. H. van der Hoop. Translated by Laura Hutton. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., London, 1939. Pp. 352. Price, 15*s*.)

There are two main classes of books on psychology—the descriptive or static and the interpretative or dynamic. It would seem hardly likely that any author consciously sets out to produce a work belonging exclusively to one or other of these categories, and yet a large number seem to slip insensibly into the first, and a smaller number into the second, leaving the reader either with the intellectual interest of a detailed bill of fare and an empty stomach, or with a feeling of distension, without any certainty as to what he has eaten.

One sits down hopefully, therefore, before a table on which is displayed by Dr. van der Hoop the definite intention to provide both, but soon there are hints that the meal may not live up to the menu, and, as one proceeds, this is found, to some extent at any rate, to be true. The resulting dis—appointment is due as much, perhaps, to the size, accuracy and detail of the menu, as to the shortcomings of the meal.

The reader is prepared, however, for this situation at the very beginning, where the author asks if the unconscious has not come to occupy too large a place in psycho-analytical conceptions. That it has for him, he points out by assigning his interest in phenomenological distinctions to his being an introvert of thinking-type, with intuition as a subsidiary function, and relegating his interest in feeling in its relation to the instincts (and from this his appreciation of psycho-analysis) to the effects of polarity.

It will be gathered from these last references that a further rapprochement is also attempted : that is, between the psychologies of Freud and

Jung. For his daring in making this attempt he expects criticism from members of both schools, but does not envisage what seems to be the most important criticism of all, namely, that he has, at least partially, failed in the rapprochement itself. In other words, Freud's sphere of influence is largely restricted to psychological abnormalities, while Jung's type psychology is applied to the so-called normal.

The first part of the book deals with the classification of types—extravert, introvert, intuitive, instinctive, thinking and feeling—and is a piece of brilliant and penetrating description. It has been, perhaps, easier to make it so, because these attitudes of mind are considered by the author to be hereditary, and therefore descriptive perfection need not be clouded by attempts to account for their existence. To explain conscious orientation by ascribing it to heredity means of necessity to neglect the more recent work of psycho-analysts, and particularly those of the English school, on the development of the ego, and the influence of unconscious drives and defence mechanisms on the building up of character.

In the second part of the book, which deals with psychiatry and the types of conscious orientation, and which is described as dynamic, in contrast to the more static aspect of the first part, we get the first mention of the division of the mind into id, ego and super-ego, and of defence mechanisms such as repression, introjection and projection. As long as he is dealing with psycho-pathology, the author shows much understanding of dynamic mechanisms, but, at the opening of the third part of the book, which is called a philosophical commentary, this once again partially deserts him, and is replaced by his very able descriptive technique.

The reviewer would like to correct, at this point, any impression that his rather critical remarks may have given that this book has little value for psycho-analysts. The term ' Conscious Orientation ' embraces a very wide field including, by the use of such concepts as secondary function and polarity, manifestations of ego activity which analysts might prefer to call dissociation, reaction-formation, etc. In so far as even the most pathological manifestations of these, and other defence mechanisms, can only show themselves by means of ego activity, which, at the moment of showing must be conscious, it would appear that parts of the ego which attend to these manifestations, and are normally unconscious, can sometimes fuse with the conscious ego, distort it, or replace it. Such results of these mechanisms as come within the limits of normal behaviour, would, by Dr. van der Hoop, be included in variations of the conscious orientation, so that the failures of unification mentioned earlier are, to a slight extent, due to differences in terminology.

It might be felt, therefore, that nothing new has been added ; but the accurate observations and discussions of human behaviour which are disclosed suggest lines along which further elaboration of the structure and

development of the ego by psycho-analysis might be possible. Freud himself has pointed the way to research, namely by accurate observation of manifest clinical phenomena, and the subsequent development and modification of theory to explain these. There seems, occasionally, a danger of reversing this process, and making observed fact fit into already existing theory. Dr. van der Hoop has presented us with a mass of clinical phenomena, which, just because few of us will agree with his statement as to their origins, should help to stimulate further additions to our theory or modifications of it, so that we may be in a still better position to implement our disagreement.

A word of praise must go to the translator for her great help in making the English edition of a work that demands considerable intellectual effort on the part of the reader so clear and unambiguous.

R. A. Macdonald.

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General Psychology. By Lawrence Edwin Cole. (McGraw-Hill Publishing Co. Ltd., London, 1939. Pp. xii + 688. Price, 21*s*.)

Here is what its author regards as a text-book of ' scientific psychology '. The student of its seven hundred pages will be inclined to grant that it is a *scientific* text-book, since it contains lengthy accounts of the anatomy and physiology of the central nervous system, of the functioning of the special sense organs, of the endocrine glands, of the behaviour responses in fœtal guinea-pigs, of the retinal and postural factors in localizing movements, and of countless other pre-eminently scientific subjects. But whether it is a text-book of *psychology* may be considered a more open question, and it might even be argued that its author proceeds to extreme lengths in order to avoid contact with the painful subject of the human mind.

Of his seven hundred pages Professor Cole devotes twenty to what he hopes in his preface is a ' reasonably sympathetic ' account of psycho-analysis, in the course of which he remarks that ' the truth is that the psycho-analytic gospel is more of a cult than a scientific view ' and that psycho-analysts ' as dream interpreters can claim little superiority to the ancient soothsayers '. Actually these twenty pages are occupied with very brief sketches of Freud's views on the theory of instincts, of dreams and of mental topography, against all of which the author produces a number of arguments largely of the logical type. What is striking indeed both about the author's account of Freud's work and about his criticism of it is precisely their theoretical character. Not only is he innocent of any real approach to the clinical findings upon which Freud's generalizations are based, but he hardly even seems aware that a clinical side to the subject exists. It seems as though, like many academic psychologists, he finds it

easy enough to be ' scientific ' about the chemical receptors of the mouth cavity and about the mouse-catching behaviour of kittens, but is obliged to take refuge in abstract and *a priori* reflections the very reverse of scientific as soon as he is confronted by the disturbing manifestations of the mind itself. A true text-book of scientific psychology would have a very different character and content.

J. S.

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American Psychology before William James. By Jay Wharton Fay. (University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 1939. Pp. ix + 233.)

American psychology before William James has generally been regarded as either non-existent (Cattell) or of little significance (Baldwin, Brett, Murphy). The present volume by Jay Wharton Fay is an attempt to show that neither estimate is justified. Much depends, however, on one's definition of psychology. Mr. Fay's point of view is that there was a science of mind long before Wundt and that, though this science may have been strongly linked to metaphysics and ethics, it made permanent contributions to our understanding of mental processes as well as psychological theory. Admitting this, one must agree with Mr. Fay that American psychology before William James is more a neglected than a negligible field.

American interest in psychology began in colonial days (1735) and, while this interest was influenced at all times by European philosophers, particularly those of the Scottish school, it manifested a vitality of its own. From the start American writers seem to have been interested in practical applications. In the colonial period, these applications were closely bound up with theology, in the eighteenth century with ethics, and in the nineteenth century with problems of education. In the last period much of the writing was in the form of text-books. Many of these turned out to be excellent manuals and some, like *The Human Intellect* by Noah Porter (1811–1892), gained wide recognition and were used abroad. Moreover, a number of important modern psychological concepts and points of view were first developed if not announced by early American psychologists. Thus, ante-dating Watson by more than fifty years, James Rush not only gave expression to the basic ideas of behaviourism but published a lengthy study in defence of what is now desribed as the sub-vocal theory of thought. After the Civil War American writers became very much interested in the educational field and it was one of them (Louisa Parsons Hopkins) who first introduced the term educational psychology. In 1863 Dr. Isaac Ray, of the Butler Hospital, pleaded for a mental hygiene in the contemporary sense of the words. He not only defined the term but

showed the importance of the preventive aspects of psychiatry which are so much emphasized to-day.

The student interested in the history of psychology should find Mr. Fay's book both useful and illuminating. It is excellently annotated and contains a list of the principal American contributions to psychology from Brattle (1735) to James (1890).

David Wechsler.

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Experimental Psychology. By R. S. Woodworth. (New York, 1938. Pp. 889. Price, $3.80.)

The latest book by Professor Woodworth is destined to a welcome reception, for it is again testimony to its author's incomparable ability to make dry subjects appear interesting. In this volume most experimentalists will find little to complain of, either as regards the content of the volume or the emphasis placed on the various subjects. The book is furthermore refreshingly free from physiological descriptions and interpretations.

A considerable portion of the work (200 pages) is devoted to memory, learning and associated topics. Another 100 pages is taken up by discussion of feeling and emotion, particularly their bodily expressions. The psychogalvanic reflex is given a generous chapter. Each of the senses is taken up in the conventional manner, but perception of form and perception of visual space are treated separately. There is a chapter on experimental æsthetics and two on psycho-physical methods. The book concludes with chapters on ' problem solving ' devoted largely to animal learning and thinking, which include the author's views on imageless thought.

In addition to giving us a thorough exposition of these topics, Professor Woodworth has tried to demonstrate the value of experimental psychology in understanding human behaviour. But in the opinion of the reviewer experimental psychology is far from having demonstrated its ability to fulfil this objective. It has concerned itself little with human beings as such. Its investigations have been restricted for the most part to limited portions of human behaviour under very special conditions—such as the most effective ways of learning nonsense syllables, of estimating distances, discriminating differences in pitch, etc. Most attempts to apply its methods to the broader fields of child development, abnormal and social psychology, have been generally regarded askance by the experimentalist. Professor Woodworth has omitted practically all reference to work done in them because he wished to confine himself ' to the usual content of a course in experimental psychology '. The omission, we think, is rather regrettable, because it leaves experimental psychology where it always has been—in the laboratory.

Within these limits Professor Woodworth's volume will undoubtedly long remain one of the outstanding text-books in the field.

David Wechsler.

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Mental Disease in Urban Areas. By R. E. L. Faris and H. W. Dunham. (University of Chicago Press, 1939. Pp. xx + 270. Price, $2.50.)

It has been repeatedly shown that mental disease shows a higher incidence of hospitalization in urban areas than in rural. Evidence from Sweden would indicate that this hospitalization is a function of urban environment since mental disease is distributed with fair uniformity throughout the general population. In any event it is of decided practical importance to know more precisely those forces in urban life which do bring about greater hospitalization.

On the basis of area studies in the city of Chicago the frequency of hospitalized mental disease in each area as it is related to the estimated population of that area has been charted by Professors Faris and Dunham. They report that schizophrenia, alcoholic psychoses and general paresis are most prevalent in the transient, disintegrated, or slum areas of the city. Manic-depressive insanity is fairly uniformly distributed over the city. The mental diseases of old age show a different pattern, being more prevalent in poor or marginal areas.

There are two major objections to this monograph. First, it is impossible to state with any degree of accuracy the real population of any urban area unless a recent and accurate count by census has been made. This is particularly true of transient and disintegrating areas. Second, even after careful study it is frequently impossible to decide which tables and figures are to be related to the particular conclusions. This is distressing, since the evidence of the figures is not always in obvious agreement with the stated conclusions.

A very cautious interpretation of the findings has been advanced by the authors (Professor Burgess in his Foreword is much less cautious). They point out the similarity between the introverted disintegrating personality and the self-centred disintegrated portions of the city from which he comes. They make some use of psycho-analytic ideas without showing any very deep appreciation of the meaning of them.

The authors should be congratulated on their pioneer study in this neglected field. Their findings are of sufficient importance to justify the continuation of their work. The questions which this monograph has raised go directly towards some of the central problems of American civilization.

L. E. Hinsie

The Organism: A Holistic Approach to Biology, Derived from Pathological Data in Man. By Kurt Goldstein. (American Book Company, New York, 1939. Pp. xvii + 533. Price, $4.00.)

In this book Goldstein's aim is to systematize points of view derived from a long series of observations on patients with brain injury. His contributions to methodology are perhaps more interesting and important than the considerable sections of the book devoted to more metaphysical topics. His holistic approach does not merely involve the conception of psycho-somatic unity, but also rejects attempts such as those of reflexology to understand the organism in terms of isolated parts and systems. His thought, accordingly, is closely allied to that of the Gestalt school.

Space does not permit any adequate review of the book as a whole, but one chapter devoted largely to a discussion of psycho-analysis calls for more detailed attention. Goldstein's attitude to psycho-analysis is ambivalent, with the customary tributes to Freud's genius. One cannot but feel, however, that his criticisms are founded to a considerable extent on misapprehensions and inadequate knowledge of the subject; so that many of his 'improvements' appear to be nothing but analytical findings and formulations dressed in a new terminology. To take one example, Goldstein evidently uses the word 'anxiety' to denote an extreme degree of panic, such that the individual is incapable of apprehending his environment and of reviving memories. This is synonymous with what he calls 'the catastrophic reaction' and it occurs in situations where it is impossible adequately to cope with the environment. Fear is then explained as due to 'the experience of the possibility of the onset of anxiety'. Topsy-turvy as this sounds, it will be seen that a few alterations in terminology would bring it near to Freud's theory of the 'anxiety-signal'.

According to Goldstein, there are no instincts or drives in the healthy organism, but only the 'tendency to self-actualization of its nature'; and this tendency (which would seem to be equivalent to Freud's life instinct) comes into conflict with the opposing forces of the environment. The healthy organism overcomes this disturbance not out of anxiety but out of 'the joy of conquest'. Goldstein denies any important rôle to repression in healthy development. Former attitudes are rendered ineffective by the continual formation of new patterns through 'maturation'. He is led astray at this point by his implicit misconception that repression must be a conscious process because it is carried out by the ego. If the child is prematurely subjected to demands and prohibitions for which the stage of his maturation is still inadequate, then catastrophic situations set in and lead to attempts to escape anxiety through non-conscious procedure. This may hinder further development and cause the persistence of certain attitudes adopted in early stages. Goldstein states these views as if they were his own discoveries.

Ambivalence is produced when there is failure to solve by ' centering ' the conflict between the tendency to self-actualization and the contrary demands of the outer world. The Œdipus situation is a product of this ambivalence, not vice versa, and it is not essentially sexual. Goldstein shows a marked reluctance to recognize even overt manifestations of childhood sexuality, which he prefers to regard as ' harmless play ' (p. 325).

The findings of psycho-analysis are due to the methodological mistake of failing to take all symptoms as equivalent, and instead taking *one* phenomenon as primary. Confirmation through new observations obtained in the same way is fallacious, just as in the case of the reflex theory, where criticism is impossible on the basis of reflexology. In reply, it may be remarked that the method Freud advocates in listening to a patient (' *gleichschwebende Aufmerksamkeit* ') corresponds closely to Goldstein's ideal.

On the whole this must be reckoned a disappointing book, in that it fails to fulfil the considerable promise with which it sets out.

W. Hewitt Gillespie.

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The Startle Pattern. By C. Landis and W. A. Hunt. (Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., New York, 1939. Pp. 168. Price, $2.50.)

The topic of this book is the pattern of relatively unadaptive movement that takes place on sudden intense stimulus, such as a loud noise (a gunshot), a sudden and unexpected painful stimulus, etc. Habituation leads to a diminution of the reaction. The normal pattern is a general flexion. The relation to certain primitive reflexes is discussed. Brain disease has little effect on the pattern. Catatonics showed exaggerated response, other psychoses no change. In epileptics the response was found to be absent. The reaction is markedly diminished under hypnosis. It is possible to abolish it by certain verbal instructions under hypnosis. The author prefers neuropathological explanations to psychological ones in trying to explain the deviations of the startle pattern. He regards it as belonging to the type of response which Goldstein has called ' catastrophic behaviour '. The book is of great interest to anybody who studies the startle reactions from the biological aspect.

E. Stengel.

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Sleep and Wakefulness. By Nathaniel Kleitman. (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, and Cambridge University Press, 1939. Pp. 638. Price, 30*s.*)

This is another massive production financed by the Rockefeller Founda-

tion. It has its value as a reference book to the writings on the subject, from the variations in the alpha rhythm to those of the cholesterin content during sleep. This value would have been greater had the author used more discrimination in his selection and above all had he displayed the capacity for summarizing and passing judgement on the data instead of merely leaving them in a catalogued form.

There is a chapter on dreams, largely abstracted from a book by Manacéine published in 1897. It tells us that ' while astrology has long ago given way to astronomy, with respect to dream knowledge and understanding we are not much further advanced than the ancients. In fact, astrology, fortune-telling, crystal-gazing, and dream interpretation are often practised to-day by the same individual.' The author has heard of the term ' psycho-analysis ', and says that the Unconscious ' is often thought to determine and influence the dream pattern.'

There is a bibliography of 1,434 numbers. The only one of them by Freud is an apocryphal book, entitled *Dream Psychology—Psychoanalysis for Beginners*, 1920, a pirated version of various abstracts from Freud's writings.

E. J.

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Alfred Adler : The Man and his Work. By Hertha Orgler. (The C. W. Daniel Company Ltd., London, 1939. Pp. 241. Price, 8*s.* 6*d.*)

The publishers of this book say that Adler was ' one of the greatest psychologists of his own or any previous age ', and this sentence gives the key-note to the tone of the whole book. Mrs. Orgler is perhaps Adler's most devoted pupil and she writes throughout in superlative language of the greatness of his qualities and achievements. The book is evidently intended as a pious memorial to her master and it would be out of place to review it in any critical spirit. She has performed her work admirably and has omitted nothing that could be said in favour or praise of Adler. We welcome the fact that very little reference is made to either Freud or psycho-analysis and can confirm her statement that Adler's relationship with psycho-analysis in his early days was always of an extremely superficial order. It would have been much better both for Adler's work and for psycho-analysis if this temporary association, which has led to so much confusion and unfairness, had never existed.

E. J.

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The Open Way : A Study in Acceptance. By E. Graham Howe and L. le Mesurier. (Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1939. Pp. 201. Price, 8*s.* 6*d.*)

This book sets out to present a message and is written in the language

of religion and metaphysics. It makes no pretence at being a scientific work and so to consider it from a purely scientific angle is perhaps inadequate. The message, which is presented clearly and sincerely, derives partly from modern psychotherapy. The value of patience, toleration and acceptance of the bad and unpleasant things, both within ourselves and outside, is stressed, and the futility either of shutting our eyes or of merely hating them taught. Love and acceptance, both for ourselves and others, are presented as the great healers. Few psycho-analysts would cavil at this message. What they would miss, however, is any attempt to further the understanding of the unconscious sources of guilt, fear and hatred which, between them, make patience, tolerance and love so difficult. Without this detailed understanding, the value of the message is limited.

John Bowlby.

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The American Imago, Vol. I, Nos. 1 and 2. (Published by Dr. Hanns Sachs, 168, Marlborough Street, Boston, Mass., 1939–40.)

Here is a most welcome addition to the small and diminishing ranks of the purely psycho-analytical periodicals. It is no secret that Freud himself took a particular interest in it, though he did not live to see its actual appearance, for it is devoted to the aspect of psycho-analysis which was his own favourite one—its application to the arts and sciences. He was keenly disappointed when circumstances made it necessary to merge the original *Imago* with the *Internationale Zeitschrift ;* so that its re-emergence as an independent entity in America could not fail to give him much satisfaction, particularly since its editor, Dr. Hanns Sachs, was one of the joint editors of the first *Imago* when it began to appear in Vienna in 1912.

The new publication shows every promise of carrying on the old tradition. We can only make a brief mention of a few of the contents of the first two issues. Dr. Fenichel discusses ' The Psycho-Analysis of Antisemitism ' in a paper written before the publication of Freud's *Moses*, with which it is interesting to compare it. Dr. Theodor Reik gives a reconstruction of a lecture upon a particular instance of a phenomenon in the psychopathology of everyday life delivered by Freud in 1913 but never written down or published by him. There is a first instalment of a comprehensive study by Dr. Róheim upon ' The Dragon and the Hero ', which is of particular interest from the light it throws from ethnological sources upon Mrs. Klein's hypotheses in regard to incorporated objects. And finally there is a long essay by Dr. Sachs himself upon *Measure for Measure*, that most Shakespearean of Shakespeare's plays.

If we have a criticism of the journal to make it can only be upon formal and stylistic grounds. It is not merely that there are far too many misprints

and that the punctuation is erratic : we have a right to expect a higher level of English, especially in essays of a semi-literary nature. ' The gruesome-scrurrilous [*sic*] scene with Barnadin [*sic*] shows that Shakespeare's feeling was not too soft, but anyhow, in this way he made it possible to make use of this theme for the purpose of a comedy—even a non-hilarious one—which would have been impossible without this inovation [*sic.*]' No one who is acquainted with Dr. Sachs's German writings would recognize the authorship of such a sentence ; and equal injustice is done to Dr. Reik. It is the very excellence that can be divined in the originals that makes us urge the editor to provide us with more adequate translations.

J. S.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

[*Appearance in this list does not preclude subsequent notice.*]

A. BOOKS

Beyond the Clinical Frontiers : a Psychiatrist views Crowd Behavior. By Edward A. Strecker. (London : Chapman & Hall Ltd., 1940. Pp. 210. Price, 9*s.* 6*d.*)

Cast Out Your Devils. By Alfred M. Uhler. (London : The World's Work (1913) Ltd., 1939. Pp. v + 277. Price, 7*s.* 6*d.*)

Diseases of the Nervous System. By W. Russell Brain. (Second Edition.) (Oxford : University Press. 1940. Pp. xx + 950. Price, 30*s.*)

Ethnologische Studien an Indonesischen Schöpfungsmythen. By W. Münsterberger. (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff. 1939. Pp. xii + 244.)

L'éducation de demain. By J.-E. Marcault et Thérèse Brosse. (Paris : Félix Alcan. 1939. Pp. xi + 308. Price, 40 frs.)

Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction. By Karl Mannheim. (London : Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd. 1940. Pp. xxii + 469. Price, 16*s.* 6*d.*)

Mythology of the Soul : A Research into the Unconscious from Schizophrenic Dreams and Drawings. By H. G. Baynes. (London : Baillière, Tindall & Cox. 1940. Pp. xii + 939. Price, 32*s.* 6*d.*)

New Facts on Mental Disorders : Study of 89,190 *Cases.* By Neil A. Dayton. (London : Baillière, Tindall & Cox. 1940. Pp. xxxiv + 486. Price, 25*s.*)

Reassurance and Relaxation. By T. S. Rippon and Peter Fletcher. (London : George Routledge & Sons, Ltd. 1940. Pp. 221. Price, 6*s.*)

The Child and His Family. By Charlotte Bühler. (London : Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd. 1940. Pp. viii + 187. Price, 10*s.* 6*d.*)

The Clinical Treatment of the Problem Child. By Carl R. Rogers. (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1939. Pp. xiii + 393. Price, 15*s.*)

The Integration of the Personality. By Carl G. Jung. (London : Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd. 1940. Pp. 313. Price, 15*s.*)

The Inter-Relationship of Mind and Body. (Proceedings of the Association for Research in Nervous and Mental Disease.) (London : Baillière, Tindall & Cox. 1939. Pp. xv + 381. Price, 36*s.*)

The Life and Death Instincts. By Arthur N. Foxe. (New York : The Monograph Editions. 1939. Pp. 64. Price, $2.00.)

The Nature of Dreams. By A. J. J. Ratcliff. (London : Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd. 1939 Pp. viii + 178. Price, 2*s.* 6*d.*)

The Psychological Aspect of Delinquency : a Series of Lectures. Edited by G. de M. Rudolf. (London : Baillière, Tindall & Cox. 1939. Pp. 64. Price, 2*s.* 6*d.*)

The Rape of the Masses : the Psychology of Totalitarian Political Propaganda. (London : George Routledge & Sons, Ltd. 1940. Pp. xviii + 299. Price, 7*s.* 6*d.*)

The Sexual Perversions and Abnormalities. (Oxford : University Press. 1940. Pp. xii + 193. Price, 7*s.* 6*d.*)

B. PERIODICALS

Archives de Psychologie (Geneva).
Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry (Chicago).
Archivio di Psicologia, Neurologia, Psichiatria e Psicoterapia (Milan).
British Medical Journal (London.)
Indian Journal of Psychology (Calcutta).
Journal of Criminal Psychopathology (New York).
L'Année Psychologique (Paris).
Man (*London*).
Medical Record (New York).
Mental Hygiene (New York).
Psychological Abstracts (Providence).
Psychosomatic Medicine (New York).
Revista de Neurologia e Psychiatria de S. Paulo (Brazil).
Revista de Neuro-Psiquiatria (Lima).
Rivista di Psicologia (Bologna).
Scientia (Bologna).
The American Imago (Boston).
The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy (Sydney).
The Journal of the American Medical Association (Chicago).
The Psychoanalytic Quarterly (New York).
The Psychoanalytic Review (New York).
Tokio Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse (Tokyo).

BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

EDITED BY
EDWARD GLOVER, GENERAL SECRETARY

XVIth INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL CONGRESS

The Council of the International Psycho-Analytical Association regrets that owing to the international situation arrangements for the XVIth International Psycho-Analytical Congress have had to be postponed until further notice.

EDWARD GLOVER,
Secretary.

CLINIC REPORTS

1938–1939

Owing to delays arising out of the international situation it has not been possible to collect all the Clinic Reports for the year 1938–1939. Accordingly it has been decided to hold up the reports already received and publish a complete account in the next issue of the Bulletin.